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This thesis examines the legal and governance issues presented by internet blocking 
(“filtering”) systems through the use of the United Kingdom’s Cleanfeed system as a 
national case study. The Cleanfeed system – which aims to block access to child abuse 
images – has been influential both domestically and internationally but has been the 
subject of relatively little sustained scrutiny in the literature. Using a mixed doctrinal 
and empirical methodology this work discusses the evolution of Cleanfeed and considers 
the way in which government pressure has led to a private body without any express 
legislative basis (the Internet Watch Foundation) being given the power to control what 
UK internet users can view. 
 
The thesis argues that the Cleanfeed system sits at the intersection of three distinct 
trends – the use of architectural regulation, regulation through intermediaries and self-
regulation – which individually and collectively present significant risks for freedom of 
expression and good governance online. It goes on to identify and examine the 
fundamental rights norms and governance standards which should apply to internet 
blocking and tests the system against them, arguing in particular that Cleanfeed fails to 
meet the requirements developed by the European Court of Human Rights under 
Articles 6 and 10 ECHR. It considers the extent to which Cleanfeed might be made 
amenable to these principles through the use of judicial review or actions under the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and concludes that the diffuse structure of the system and the 
limited availability of horizontal effect against private bodies will leave significant 
aspects beyond the effective reach of the courts. 
 
This work also assesses claims that the Cleanfeed system is a proof of concept which 
should be extended so as to block other material considered objectionable (such as 
websites which “glorify terrorism”). It argues that the peculiar features of the system 
mean that it represents a best case scenario and does not support blocking of other types 
of content which are significantly more problematic. The thesis concludes by 
considering proposals for reform of the Cleanfeed system and the extent to which greater 
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New means of communication have long presented challenges for those who would 
control the exchange of information. Whether we look at the production of sedition or 
blasphemy on printing presses in the 1580s
2
 or the distribution of pornography via 
floppy disk in the early 1990s
3
 a similar pattern emerges: technology lowers the barriers 
limiting dissemination of material considered objectionable and enables it to reach a 
wider audience. The growth of the internet has led to a culmination of this trend, giving 
the individual worldwide reach. 
 
                                                 
1
 Accessed 16 May 2011. 
2
 See e.g. Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 
chap. 6. 
3




Regulatory responses to the challenge of controlling online content have varied. In some 
cases – racist publications for example – the focus has been on the producers or 
distributors, so that material may be legal to possess but not to distribute.
4
 In other cases 
– notably child abuse images (CAI)
5
 – the recipient has also been targeted, so that mere 
possession is criminalised.
6
 These efforts have, however, often proved unsuccessful, due 
to the international, decentralised and often anonymous nature of the internet.
7
 
Consequently, there has been a move towards enforcement by intermediaries
8
 – such as 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and search engines – by encouraging or requiring them 
to block access to particular material.
9
 This is most associated with states such as China 
where blocking is used to suppress political speech; however, in the last decade blocking 
has also become more common in democracies, usually as part of attempts to limit the 
availability of CAI.
10
 Numerous governments have therefore settled on blocking as their 




The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of this trend. Since 2004 an industry-
funded body – the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) – has worked with ISPs to identify 
and block access to web pages hosted abroad which contain CAI. This was first 
implemented by British Telecom (BT) on a voluntary basis but following Home Office 
threats of legislation almost all UK ISPs have followed BT’s lead and now filter user 
                                                 
4
 Yaman Akdeniz, ‘Governing Racist Content on the Internet: National and International Responses’, 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal 56 (2007): 103. 
5
 The use of terms such as “child abuse images” in preference to “child pornography” is discussed in the 
Appendix. 
6
 Yaman Akdeniz, Internet Child Pornography and the Law: National and International Responses 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pt. 1. 
7
 Peter P. Swire, ‘Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law and the Internet’, The 
International Lawyer 32 (1998): 991. 
8
 Jonathan Zittrain, ‘Internet Points of Control’, Boston College Law Review 44 (2003): 653; Jonathan 
Zittrain, ‘A History of Online Gatekeeping’, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 19, no. 2 (2006): 
253. 
9
 Ronald Deibert et al., eds., Access Denied (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008). 
10
 Yana Breindl, Internet Content Regulation in Liberal Democracies: A Literature Review, DH 




 Nart Villeneuve, ‘Barriers to Cooperation: An Analysis of the Origins of International Efforts to Protect 
Children Online’, in Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights and Rule in Cyberspace 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). 
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connections against an IWF supplied blacklist. This scheme is generally known as 
“Cleanfeed” – a title which was originally used internally by BT
12
 but is now more 




The Cleanfeed system has, however, proved extremely controversial. The manner in 
which it was introduced – following government pressure, in close conjunction with the 
Home Office, Metropolitan Police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) but without 
any legislative basis – coupled with the way in which it delegates determinations of 
legality to a private body has led to claims that it threatens freedom of expression.
14
 
Similarly, the system has been challenged on grounds of transparency and fair 
procedures. The IWF does not generally notify site owners either before or after material 
is blocked, and most ISPs have implemented blocking in such a way that users are 
presented with a deceptive error message rather than being informed that material has 
been blacklisted.
15
 There have also been fears of function creep, not least as copyright 
litigants have succeeded in persuading the courts that they should be entitled to 




2. Aims and original contribution 
 
While these individual issues with Cleanfeed are interesting in their own right, from the 
wider perspective of this thesis the system is significant in the way in which it brings 
together a series of wider trends in internet governance and offers us the chance to 
evaluate those trends in a national context. At the most abstract level, it illustrates the 
debate between cyber-libertarians and cyber-paternalists as to whether the internet is 
                                                 
12
 Philip Hunter, ‘BT’s Bold Pioneering Child Porn Block Wins Plaudits amid Internet Censorship 
Concerns’, Computer Fraud & Security 2004, no. 9 (2004): 4. 
13
 The use of the term “Cleanfeed” is discussed in more detail in Appendix 1. 
14
 Lilian Edwards, ‘From Child Porn to China, in One Cleanfeed’, SCRIPT-Ed 3, no. 3 (September 2006). 
15
 Tim Richardson, ‘ISPA Seeks Analysis of BT’s “Cleanfeed” Stats’, The Register, 21 July 2004, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/21/ispa_bt_cleanfeed/. 
16
 See e.g. Darren Meale, ‘NewzBin2: The First Section 97A Injunction against an ISP’, Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 6, no. 12 (2011): 854. 
4 
 
inherently resistant to censorship
17
 or can be subjected to regulation by appropriate 
technological responses.
18
 By automating the enforcement of the criminal law it 
embodies Lessig’s concept of “code as law” and enables us to assess his concerns about 
the opacity of code as a means of regulation.
19
 Likewise, by focusing on intermediaries 
rather than producers or recipients it reflects the practical advantages Zittrain has 
described in the use of “internet points of control”
20
 and also the threats to freedom of 
expression Kreimer has identified in respect of “censorship by proxy”.
21
 Insofar as it 
relies on industry self-regulation
22
 – lacking legislative underpinning – it may offer a 
flexibility and responsiveness absent from traditional forms of regulation
23
 while at the 
same time raising the legitimacy and accountability concerns associated with “self”-
regulation which impacts on the rights of others.
24
 Finally, by offering a means of 
enforcing national law online it illustrates Reidenberg’s argument that there is a 
democratic imperative for states to meet their responsibilities online as well as offline; 





The Cleanfeed system is therefore a particularly useful case study to consider these 
discussions about internet governance and the extent to which they have been reflected 
in the UK experience. To date, however, there has been relatively little research into 
                                                 
17
 David R. Johnson and David G. Post, ‘Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’, Stanford 
Law Review 48 (1996): 1367. 
18
 James Boyle, ‘Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and Hardwired Censors’, University 
of Cincinnati Law Review 177 (1997): 186. 
19
 Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York, N.Y: Basic Books, 1999). 
20
 Zittrain, ‘Internet Points of Control’. 
21
 Seth Kreimer, ‘Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of 
the Weakest Link’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 155 (2006): 11. 
22
 Jeanne Pia Mifsud Bonnici, Self-Regulation in Cyberspace, Information Technology & Law Series 16 
(The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2008); Damian Tambini, Danilo Leonardi, and Christopher Marsden, 
Codifying Cyberspace: Communications Self-Regulation in the Age of Internet Convergence (London: 
Routledge, 2008). 
23
 Monroe Edwin Price and Stefaan Verhulst, Self-Regulation and the Internet (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2005), 1. 
24
 See e.g. Anthony Ogus, ‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15, no. 1 (1995): 
97–108; Michael D. Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren, ‘The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence of the 
State in the Digital Environment’, Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 8 (2003): 6. 
25
 Joel R. Reidenberg, ‘States and Internet Enforcement’, University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 
1 (2004): 213. 
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either its development or operation.
26
 The legal and regulatory issues it raises have been 
considered by a number of authors but usually only in an abbreviated form and in the 
context of a wider examination of internet governance.
27
 In particular, there has been 
little work done on the way in which public law norms and fundamental rights might be 
implicated by Cleanfeed.
28
 To date it appears that only Laidlaw and the current author 




This thesis addresses this gap in the literature and provides an original contribution by 
describing how the Cleanfeed system has developed, using it to test the claims which 
have been made regarding filtering as a means of internet governance and assessing the 
implications which this type of state-directed “self-regulation” may have for 
constitutional values and fundamental rights in a UK context. In doing so it provides the 
first detailed examination of the domestic legal rules which govern self-regulatory 
filtering and considers whether – as is often claimed – such a system may undermine 
                                                 
26
 Leaving aside the technical implementation of the system, as to which see Richard Clayton, ‘Anonymity 
and Traceability in Cyberspace’ (PhD, University of Cambridge, 2005), chap. 7, 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/thesis.pdf. 
27
 See in particular Christopher Marsden, Steve Simmons, and Jonathan Cave, Options for and 
Effectiveness of Internet Self- and Co-Regulation Inception Report (RAND Europe, 30 April 2007), 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/information_society/evaluation/data/pdf/studies/s2006_05/inception_final.pdf; 
Christopher Marsden et al., Options for and Effectiveness of Internet Self- and Co-Regulation Phase 1 
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freedom of expression by enabling indirect state regulation which avoids traditional 




3. Why choose Cleanfeed as a case study? 
 
(i) Why the national level? 
 
Given the international nature of the internet, the choice of a purely national case study 
might seem unusual and merits a few words. There is a common assumption that internet 
regulation should take place at an international level, and equally one might say that any 
study should presumptively take an international perspective. Against that, however, 
there is a growing view that discussions of internet governance have neglected the 
national dimension.
31
 Collins, for example, describes as a myth the view that “national 
governance is unimportant” and argues that the UK has evolved a distinctive (albeit 
improvised) and well functioning system of internet governance as compared with other 




Collins’ argument has particular weight when we consider the IWF, which is a 
peculiarly British self-regulatory body. It is unique in a European context as a private 
entity which determines what material is illegal and should be blocked – in all 
comparable European systems this role has been reserved to the police.
33
 It raises 
distinct questions as to whether and how the actions of a private “censor” should be 
attributed to the state – questions which require a close examination of national law. The 
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singular nature of the IWF also highlights a wider point – generalised discussions of 
internet regulation may fail to consider local conditions in detail and may therefore be 
out of touch with national legal systems. Consequently, while we cannot neglect the 
international dimension inherent in any discussion of internet governance, this thesis 
will focus primarily on the UK. 
 
(ii) Why child abuse images? 
 
The choice of CAI for this case study should also be explained. Why consider this 
subject matter instead of other types of content where blocking has been tried? The 
answer is that this area has both led the vanguard in relation to blocking and represents 
the best argument for it. 
 
Child abuse is a particularly abhorrent crime and there is a substantial degree of 
international consensus as to the illegality of CAI. Unlike many other types of content 
which governments seek to control – such as adult pornography or file-sharing sites – 
the blocking of CAI has until recently generally provoked little public controversy
34
 and 
is less likely to cause the active resistance which has met blocking of filesharing sites. 
Child abuse images are illegal to possess, not merely to distribute, which provides an 
additional paternalist rationale that blocking serves the protection of users.
35
 Most 
importantly, there is a strong dignitarian imperative for blocking – that it serves to 
prevent victims of child abuse from being further victimised and distressed by further 




There is also an important practical aspect which has favoured this type of blocking. As 
compared with other types of content, there are fewer websites to deal with. The IWF 
                                                 
34
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URL list, for example, typically contains about 500-800 URLs at any one time
37
 and in 
2011 the IWF dealt with a total of 9,550 web pages hosting CAI on a total of 1,561 
different domains.
38
 In addition, judgments about CAI are significantly easier to make 
than judgments about other types of content. Whether something “glorifies terrorism” 
contrary to the UK Terrorism Act 2006 requires a difficult assessment of the context, 
including how it is likely to be understood by members of the public.
39
 By contrast, the 
evaluation of CAI does not generally present the same difficulty. As a result, the systems 
required to monitor, blacklist and ultimately block CAI present fewer administrative and 
technological difficulties. 
 
For these reasons, CAI can be viewed as the best case scenario for filtering and the area 
therefore merits special attention. If blocking is problematic in this context then it will 




Chapter 2 begins by outlining the legal framework which applies to ISP blocking of 
CAI. It examines the way in which UK law criminalises CAI and considers how this 
interacts with the obligations and immunities of ISPs and how these have shaped the 
deployment of blocking systems. It assesses the legal risks which “voluntary” blocking 
systems pose for ISPs and how they have mitigated these risks, and concludes by 
considering the way in which European Union law has influenced the growth of 
blocking. 
 
Chapter 3 sets out the history of the Cleanfeed system and outlines its operation. It 
begins by tracing the origins of the IWF and the way in which government pressure 
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forced industry to adopt both the IWF itself and later Cleanfeed. It then describes the 
evolution of IWF policy towards blocking before focusing on the 2008 blocking of 
Wikipedia and the lessons to be drawn from that incident. Finally it evaluates proposals 
to expand the remit of the IWF and Cleanfeed and considers what impact these might 
have. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 contextualise the Cleanfeed system within a wider literature on internet 
regulation. These chapters first set out the cyber-libertarian/cyber-paternalist debate on 
the feasibility and legitimacy of internet regulation and then focus on three regulatory 
approaches associated with cyber-paternalist thinking – the use of architectural 
regulation (“code as law”), regulation through intermediaries and self-regulation. The 
chapters consider the advantages and risks which have been predicted for each approach 
before going on to assess to what extent the Cleanfeed system bears out or challenges 
these predictions. The Cleanfeed system is argued to be particularly problematic insofar 
as it sits at the intersection of these three approaches, compounding the concerns 
regarding transparency and accountability which each approach would individually 
present. 
 
Chapter 6 examines in more detail the issues which arise from the self-regulatory nature 
of Cleanfeed by asking whether it evades judicial oversight or whether aspects of it 
might be subject to public law norms and compliance with fundamental rights. Two 
particular approaches are considered. First, we examine whether the IWF might have 
public status for the purposes of judicial review, an action under the Human Rights Act 
1998 or as an “emanation of the state” under European Union law. Second, we evaluate 
to what extent the state might face a positive obligation under the ECHR to protect 
freedom of expression against actions of private entities such as ISPs. The chapter 
concludes that public law norms and fundamental rights will be enforceable against the 
Cleanfeed system under both approaches – however, due to the diffuse nature of the 




Chapter 7 moves on to consider the type of norms which might be enforced against 
Cleanfeed. First, it surveys the literature to identify fundamental rights approaches and 
governance standards which should apply to internet filtering generally. It then examines 
the way in which English law already regulates internet filtering in other contexts – for 
example, in court orders blocking websites accused of facilitating filesharing. Finally, it 
applies the ECHR to the Cleanfeed system to assess to what extent the ECHR already 
embodies standards capable of regulating internet filtering and to determine whether 
Cleanfeed would comply with those standards. The chapter argues that the manner in 
which the Cleanfeed system implements blocking would not meet the emerging 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR in relation to internet filtering, but that ultimately the 
structural problems with the Cleanfeed system can only be partially addressed by any 
approach which focuses on individual rights or the use of litigation. 
 
In conclusion, chapter 8 considers proposals for the reform of the Cleanfeed system and 
in particular whether there is a risk that putting the system on a legislative basis might 
undermine the alternative accountability mechanisms and constraints imposed by self-
regulation. It then identifies the way in which the perceived success of Cleanfeed has led 
to a fascination on the part of successive governments with the use of blocking as a 
regulatory tool and argues that – correctly understood – the Cleanfeed system is deeply 
problematic in its own right while its unique context does not support the argument that 
blocking should be extended to other types of content. 
11 
 




A challenging aspect of research into the Cleanfeed system is the range of legal issues 
which it presents. In addition to the headline public law and fundamental rights points 
(which will be considered in chapters 6 and 7) there are a number of less visible but 
equally important areas of law which have shaped the actions of the IWF, ISPs and the 
state but have not received the same attention. 
 
The underlying status of the images to be blocked is one such area. While it might seem 
obvious that an examination of filtering should begin with an analysis of the legality of 
the blocked material, much of the literature has proceeded on the crude basis that 
filtering systems can be analysed as blocking the generic category of “child 
pornography” without any real examination of the types of content involved.
1
 When this 
is done it becomes apparent that there are a number of distinct offences subsumed under 
that general heading which are treated quite differently by the IWF and Cleanfeed. 
 
Similarly, to understand how the system has developed we must consider the legal 
constraints on the behaviour of the state and ISPs in implementing filtering. Here there is 
an extensive literature as to whether ISPs can be compelled to block but very little 
addressing the legal risks faced by ISPs who adopt filtering systems without a legal 
obligation.
2
 It is therefore necessary to consider the issues faced by ISPs and the IWF in 
operating a voluntary blocking system – for example, their potential exposure to 
                                                 
1
 See e.g. Hunter, ‘BT’s Bold Pioneering Child Porn Block Wins Plaudits amid Internet Censorship 
Concerns’; Ronald J. Mann and Seth R. Belzley, ‘The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability’, William 
and Mary Law Review 47 (2005): 239; Sylvia Kierkegaard, ‘To Block or Not to Block – European Child 
Porno Law in Question’, Computer Law & Security Review 27, no. 6 (2011): 573. 
2
 See e.g. Etienne Montero and Quentin Van Enis, ‘Enabling Freedom of Expression in Light of Filtering 
Measures Imposed on Internet Intermediaries: Squaring the Circle?’, Computer Law & Security Review 
27, no. 1 (February 2011): 21; Katalin Parti and Luisa Marin, ‘Ensuring Freedoms and Protecting Rights 
in the Governance of the Internet: A Comparative Analysis on Blocking Measures and Internet Providers’ 




defamation actions in the case of wrongful blocking of an innocent site – in order to 
understand how these have shaped the development of the Cleanfeed system. 
 
There is also a significant European Union dimension to this area, both at the level of 
soft law and binding legal rules. Three particular strands must be mentioned – the 
successive Safer Internet initiatives and child protection measures which since 1996 
have helped to promote blocking, the Electronic Commerce Directive of 2000 which 
limited the obligations which could be placed on ISPs, and the telecommunications 




This chapter will bring together these issues and assess how they interact with each other 





We will consider the law of England and Wales (“English law”). This reflects the fact 
that the key players – the IWF, Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), CPS, 
Metropolitan Police and the overwhelming majority of ISPs – are headquartered in that 
jurisdiction, and the IWF itself follows procedures which are based on that law.
4
 While 
the IWF remit is UK-wide and decisions of the IWF will have effects in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, a focus on English law is appropriate. 
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3. Criminalisation of child abuse images 
 
Although “child pornography” is commonly used to describe certain types of crime 
English law does not have any general offence of possession or distribution of “child 
pornography”.
5
 Instead, as Gillespie points out, offences involving images or other 
depictions of children may be prosecuted using a variety of crimes which fall under 
three broad headings: (i) communication offences, (ii) obscenity and (iii) indecent 
photographs, pseudo-photographs and related offences.
6
 To this we can now add a fourth 
classification: (iv) non-photographic images, added recently by the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009. Adopting and adapting Gillespie’s classification to reflect the 2009 Act, each 
of these categories will be considered in turn. 
 
(i) Communications offences 
 
Transmission of CAI will in some circumstances constitute an offence under section 127 
of the Communications Act 2003, which prohibits the sending of messages which are 
“grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character” via a public 
electronic communications network. Although this section appears intended to deal with 
harassment, the House of Lords in DPP v. Collins
7
 has confirmed that it applies whether 
or not the intended recipient would be offended by the message, and so must be 
differentiated from the comparable offence under section 1 of the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988. Instead the purpose of the offence is not merely to protect 
recipients but more generally to “prohibit the use of a service provided and funded by 
the public for the benefit of the public for the transmission of communications which 
contravene the basic standards of our society”.
8
 Indeed, the offence will apply even 
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where the recipient welcomes the message, and reciprocates with similar messages.
9
 A 
number of cases involving social media have also accepted that it applies to the internet, 




The implications for the transmission of CAI will be apparent. Where “grossly 
offensive” or “indecent or obscene” pictures are sent over the internet then an offence 
under section 127 is likely to have been committed – notwithstanding that the material 
may have been sent from one collector to another. It should also be noted that DPP v. 
Collins
11
 makes it clear that the effect of the section is that the offence is complete once 
the message is sent – irrespective of whether it is received.
12
 Consequently, provided the 
sender is located within the UK then the location of the recipient is irrelevant. 
 
It is likely that this will be used only as a last resort in relation to child pornography, as 
it is a summary offence only and carries a maximum term of imprisonment of six 
months. Nevertheless the vague nature of the offence may create difficulties. While 
there is no authority on the point, it is possible that ISPs could be prosecuted if they 
know that material hosted by them falls within the scope of the section as section 127(1) 
criminalises both a person who “sends” a grossly offensive, etc. message as well as one 
who “causes any such message to be sent” and there is no requirement that the defendant 
have any particular intention or purpose in doing so. Consequently ISPs may be called 
on to assess user content against the uncertain standard of “grossly offensive” or face 
liability for failure to remove it. 
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(a) Continued relevance 
 
Obscenity offences were the most important tools available to prosecute CAI prior to the 
Protection of Children Act 1978 but after that Act the use of obscenity offences fell 
off.
14
 This reflects the advantages for prosecutors of the more specific offences under the 
1978 Act which reduced difficulties of proof and provided for greater maximum 
sentences. Indeed, the current CPS legal guidance on obscene publications sets out a 





Despite this, obscenity offences remain significant. The 1978 Act applies only to images 
– specifically photographs and pseudo-photographs. Child pornography is however a 
substantially wider concept which may include audio-recordings of abuse, drawings and 
even computer generated images or plain text documents. Insofar as these fall outside 
the 1978 Act, the CPS guidance on indecent photographs of children recommends that 
prosecutors consider obscenity prosecutions in such situations.
16
 Consequently, 
obscenity offences must be considered in some detail. 
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The most important offences are those contained in section 2(1) of the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959 (as amended by the Obscene Publications Act 1964) which 
provides: 
 
any person who, whether for gain or not, publishes an obscene article or who has an obscene 
article for publication for gain (whether gain to himself or gain to another) shall [commit an 
offence].  
 
These require either publication or the intention to publish – they do not apply to simple 
possession or even creation of CAI. This limitation was, as we shall see, a key 
motivation behind the adoption of specific crimes relating to indecent images of 




(c) Application to electronic files and the internet 
 
The 1959 Act was adopted significantly before the development of the internet. To what 




The offence created by the 1959 Act relates to obscene “articles”. Consequently an issue 
arises as to whether electronic files fall within this definition. Under section 1 of the 
1959 Act “article” is defined widely to mean: 
 
any description of article containing or embodying matter to be read or looked at or both, any 
sound record, and any film or other record of a picture or pictures.  
 
This definition was extended further by section 2 of the Obscene Publications Act 1964 
to cover any items (such as photographic negatives, stencils and moulds) which can be 
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used “either alone or as one of a set, for the reproduction or manufacture therefrom of 
articles containing or embodying matter to be read, looked at or listened to.” 
 
Caselaw has taken an expansive view of the term, and in Attorney General’s Reference 
(No. 5 of 1980)
18
 the Court of Appeal held that the showing of screen images derived 
from a video tape amounted to the publication of an obscene article contrary to section 2 
of the 1959 Act. Although the court accepted the general principle that it “should be 
slow to apply the words to a piece of electronic equipment which probably had not been 
within the contemplation of Parliament” it went on to hold that the words chosen in the 
legislation were wide enough to embrace any developments in the electronic field. 
Similarly, in R. v. Fellows; R. v. Arnold
19
 the Court of Appeal held that a hard disk 
containing scanned images of children was capable of being an “article” for the purposes 




Simple possession of obscene articles is not an offence. To achieve a conviction under 
section 2(1) of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 it is necessary to show that a person 
either “publishes an obscene article” or has one “for publication for gain”. In 1994 the 
law in this area was specifically adapted to address electronic publications, and section 





This will cover all forms of internet distribution. Indeed, in R. v. Fellows; R. v. Arnold
21
 
the Court of Appeal held that even prior to 1994 section 1(3) was wide enough to apply 
to a situation where a person made files available via the internet. This has since been 
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confirmed in R. v. Waddon
22
 where the Court of Appeal accepted that “there is 
publication... both when images are uploaded and when they are downloaded”. Crucially 
for ISPs, R. v. Fellows; R. v. Arnold
23
 also held that the making available of files for 
downloads initiated by others is sufficient – it is not necessary to show that a defendant 
himself actively initiated a particular transmission of a file. 
 
One to one communications 
 
The scope of “publication” has also been considered in R. v. GS
24
 which accepted that it 
could apply even to private text communications online. In that case the defendant was 
prosecuted on the basis of Internet Relay Chat logs found on his computer. These 
recorded conversations with another person describing his fantasies about the physical 
and sexual abuse of children. The prosecution case was that his comments constituted 
“obscene articles” for the purposes of section 2(1). The trial judge accepted the defence 
submission that one to one chat online could not amount to publication in the absence of 
any evidence that the material was shared to some other party – treating this as the 
equivalent of a private conversation in a physical room. On appeal by the prosecution, 
however, the Court of Appeal held that “to publish an article to an individual is plainly 




The significance of this decision lies in the way in which it takes the “public” out of 
publication – by confirming that the 1959 Act applies even to private conversations it 
opens the door to the investigation and prosecution of anyone using the internet to 
discuss sexual fantasies with another if those fantasies meet the malleable standard of 
obscenity. The decision also resurrects obscenity prosecutions for the purely written 
word – something which most observers had considered dead following the Inside Linda 
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Lovelace acquittal in 1976 – thus creating a fresh legal risk for ISPs who had previously 




(d) Defining “obscenity” 
 
What do we mean by obscenity? Section 1(1) of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 puts 
the common law test on a statutory footing by providing that: 
 
an article shall be deemed to be obscene if its effect... is taken as a whole, such as to tend to 
deprave or corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, 




 definition is inapt when applied to CAI insofar as it focuses on harm to 
the viewer rather the victim depicted in the image. That said, it does parallel a more 
modern theme – that blocking prevents accidental or casual viewers from awakening a 





The test of obscenity depends on the likely audience for the material. It will be easier, 
for example, to demonstrate that material is obscene if it is freely available online and 
likely to be viewed by children than if it is only available to subscribers to a particular 
website or mailing list. Consequently determinations of obscenity are a matter of fact to 
be determined by the jury on a case by case basis and it is not possible to categorically 
say what types of CAI would fit this definition – whether, for example, simple nude 
images would be found to be obscene. Nevertheless, it is probably safe to say that the 
                                                 
26
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types of images which were involved in R. v. Fellows; R. v. Arnold
29
 (described by the 
court as “children engaged in various sexual acts or poses”) are likely to be found 
obscene. 
 
Also, material may be obscene notwithstanding that it is published to a willing audience 
which may be to some extent already “depraved and corrupt”. In the leading case on this 
point, DPP v. Whyte
30
, the House of Lords held that the 1959 Act “equally protects the 
less innocent from further corruption, the addict from feeding or increasing his 
addiction”.
31
 Consequently, the fact that CAI is only made available to those with a pre-




Finally, brief mention should be made of the so-called “aversion argument” – that is, 
that material is not obscene if its effect is to repulse the viewer. This argument (which 
was most famously advanced by John Mortimer at the “Oz trial”
33
) would not, however, 
be likely to be successful in the context of online CAI. As Gillespie notes “[c]hild 
pornography on the internet is frequently placed there to allow ‘like minded individuals’ 







A public interest defence in respect of obscenity is provided by section 4(1) of the 
Obscene Publications Act 1959 where publication is “justified as being for the public 
good on the ground that it is in the interests of science, literature, art or learning, or of 
other objects of general concern”. Although at first glance this might appear to have 
little relevance to CAI, it highlights a real risk for ISPs. There have been several 
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instances where images of children displayed in prominent galleries have been seized by 
police for investigation, suggesting that the boundary between art and obscenity or 
indecency remains uncertain in this context.
35
 This boundary is further blurred by the 
context-sensitive nature of obscenity, so that an image which might not be obscene in 
the context of a gallery exhibition may present further issues when made available to a 
wider audience via a website.
36
 Consequently an ISP faces the possibility that even 
mainstream art hosted by it may be the subject of an obscenity investigation – and this 
risk is all the greater when we go on to consider the legal status of “indecent 
photographs”, in respect of which there is no public interest defence. As we shall see in 









Prior to 1978 CAI were generally prosecuted as a form of obscenity. The Protection of 
Children Act 1978 changed this by providing for new offences relating to “indecent 
photographs” of children.
38
 As originally adopted, the 1978 Act criminalised the making 
and distribution of photographs, but subsequent amendments have also criminalised 
mere possession
39





 of photographs. 
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These crimes have considerable advantages for prosecutors as compared with either 
communications offences or obscenity offences. In particular, they carry substantially 
greater maximum sentences, do away with the difficulties of obscenity varying 
according to the likely audience and the related public interest defence, and criminalise 
mere possession without the need to show transmission, publication or an intention to 
publish. Consequently, they now constitute the primary response of English law to CAI 




The offences created under the 1978 Act all require an indecent photograph or pseudo-
photograph. What do we mean by “indecent” in this context? The legislation does not 
itself provide a definition. Instead, caselaw has established that indecency is a question 
of fact to be decided by the jury according to “recognised standards of propriety” and on 
an objective basis under which the motive of the person making the image (or the person 




The vague nature of this test presents difficulties. Jury verdicts can be unpredictable 
regarding images at the “lower end of the child pornography scale” such as simple nude 
images.
43
 However, this jury unpredictability is forgivable when judgments of the Court 
of Appeal also differ on the question of whether non-sexual images of children involving 
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Consequently, as we have already seen in relation to the public interest defence in 
obscenity, there will be borderline cases where it will be difficult to judge whether a 
particular photograph might be deemed indecent. It is not surprising that the most 
controversial application of the Cleanfeed system to date – the blocking of the 
Wikipedia page on the album “Virgin Killers”
45
 – involved such a photograph.
46
 The 
result is to put ISPs in a difficult situation in relation to material hosted by them. 
 
Ironically, the “objective” nature of the test for indecency will compound this difficulty 
in assessing borderline images. When examining the public interest we noted that the 
contextual nature of obscenity – depending as it does on the likely audience for material 
– complicates assessments of obscenity. The objective test for indecency, however, 
presents problems of its own. By preventing consideration of the circumstances 
surrounding an image, it can result in crude outcomes. In the Wikipedia case, for 
example, the IWF was compelled to ignore the fact that the image in question was first 
published on an album cover 32 years ago and had been made available worldwide 
without any attempt to prosecute.
47
 Had these circumstances been taken into account 




(c) Photographs, pseudo-photographs and tracings 
 
The scope of the indecency offences is set out in section 7 of the Protection of Children 
Act 1978. This has been heavily amended over the years to widen the types of visual 
depictions criminalised, including several amendments aimed specifically at computer 
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 Though note that the IWF and police remain of the opinion that the image was properly classified as 






 Gillespie makes a strong argument that the test for indecency should be reformed to take account of 




images. As originally adopted, section 7(2) simply provided that: “[r]eferences to an 
indecent photograph include an indecent film, a copy of an indecent photograph or film, 
and an indecent photograph comprised in a film”. No special provision was made for 
electronically stored images. This section remained unchanged until 1994, when 
growing public concern about computerised child pornography prompted two significant 
changes in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
 
Computer images included 
 
The first of these was to specify that references to a photograph include “data stored on a 
computer disc or by other electronic means which is capable of conversion into a 
photograph”.
49







The second change was more fundamental and widened the scope of the 1978 Act 
significantly by extending it to “pseudo-photographs” also. This was prompted by police 
reports of encountering images which were not straightforward photographs but were 
manipulated or composites in some way – for example, where a child’s head was 
superimposed onto the body of an adult. Such cases were not, according to CPS 




Although such images might not in themselves be directly abusive of a child, they 
nevertheless gave rise to a number of concerns – for example, that they might fuel the 
demand for other child pornography material, might be used to “groom” children for 
abuse, or might jeopardise prosecutions if technological advances meant that it became 
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difficult or impossible to distinguish realistic pseudo-photographs from genuine 
photographs.
52
 Section 7 was amended to bring such images within its scope and now 
provides that ‘pseudo-photograph’ means an image, whether made by computer-
graphics or otherwise howsoever, which appears to be a photograph”. This amendment 
is, however, relatively limited in its scope in that it only applies where an item “appears 







For the sake of completeness, we should also mention the further expansion of section 7 
by section 69 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 which criminalised any 
“tracing or other image” which is “derived from… a photograph or pseudo-photograph”. 
This relatively new provision was described by the CPS as a response to a practice 
amongst some offenders of tracing images of children (whether by tracing paper or on 
computer) and subsequently destroying the original photograph, so that the resulting 






The possession offence in relation to photographs, pseudo-photographs and tracings is 
provided for in section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which provides that “it is an 
offence for a person to have an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child in 
his possession”.
55
 This offence carries a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. 
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Defences to possession 
 
Section 160(2) provides the following defences to a charge of possession: 
 
Where a person is charged with an offence under subsection (1) above, it shall be a defence for 
him to prove— 
 
(a) that he had a legitimate reason for having the photograph or pseudo-photograph in his 
possession; or 
(b) that he had not himself seen the photograph or pseudo-photograph and did not know, nor 
had any cause to suspect, it to be indecent; or 
(c) that the photograph or pseudo-photograph was sent to him without any prior request 
made by him or on his behalf and that he did not keep it for an unreasonable time. 
 
The first of these defences is of particular relevance to ISPs, in that it will permit the 
temporary retention (but not copying) of indecent images for the purpose of criminal 
investigation. 
 
(e) Making indecent photographs, etc. of children 
 
One of the most serious offences is that of making an indecent image of a child, contrary 
to section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Children Act 1978 which provides that it is an 
offence “to take, or permit to be taken or to make, any indecent photograph or pseudo-
photograph of a child”.
56
 This offence carries a maximum penalty of ten years 
imprisonment and reflects a legislative judgment that the making of an image is 
substantially more culpable than mere possession of an image. However, this distinction 
is blurred in the online context where possession and making blend together. 
 
Making, downloading and transient copies 
 
As originally enacted, section 1(1)(a) covered the “taking” of photographs only. As part 
of the 1994 amendments the section was amended to include the “making” of such 
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photographs also. This presents an important issue in relation to electronic images. Does 
a person “make” an image simply by downloading that image to their computer? This 
point arose in R. v. Bowden
57
 where the Court of Appeal held that the act of 
downloading necessarily involved the “making” of a new image – the local copy – 
rejecting defence arguments that “making” should be understood to mean the creation of 
an entirely new image. Indeed, the making offence has been held to apply even to 
situations where a purely transient copy is made. In R. v. Smith; R. v. Jayson
58
 the Court 
of Appeal found that deliberately calling up an image to the screen would suffice, stating 
that “the act of voluntarily downloading an indecent image from a web page on to a 
computer screen is an act of making a photograph or pseudo-photograph”, on the basis 
that “[b]y downloading the image, the operator is creating or causing the image to exist 
on the computer screen”. 
 
This reasoning, logical as it is, presents two sets of problems. The first is that it makes 
the possession offence largely redundant in relation to computer images, as almost any 
act in relation to such images (even copying an image from a hard drive to a CD-ROM) 
will constitute making rather than mere possession – undermining the legislative intent 
that the two offences should be distinct. Indeed the courts have recognised this point in 
the context of sentencing, regarding downloading as being less serious than taking an 




Second, the expansive interpretation of the making offence meant that actions carried 
out by ISPs, the IWF and police in the context of investigating CAI offences were 
themselves crimes, as the statutory defences under the 1978 Act did not apply to the 
making offence. Consider, for example, the position of a police officer taking a forensic 
image of a suspect’s hard drive or an IWF analyst viewing a web site on foot of a 
complaint from a member of the public. 
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This inadvertent criminalisation was partly addressed by the fact that prosecutions under 
the 1978 Act required the consent of the DPP, which consent was unlikely to be given in 
cases where the making was by the IWF or took place in the context of a genuine 
investigation.
60
 This was, however, still unsatisfactory – particularly from the 
perspective of ISPs. As Clayton put it: “ISPs, who may from time to time offend 
Government or police by their stance on unrelated matters such as data retention or 




Public interest defence to a making charge 
 
The legislative response came in the form of a new affirmative defence in section 46 of 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where making an image is necessary “for the purposes of 
the prevention, detection or investigation of crime, or for the purposes of criminal 
proceedings”. The CPS and ACPO have provided guidance on this section in a 
Memorandum of Understanding setting out a number of factors to be taken in account 
when assessing this defence.
62
 These include: 
 
1. The way in which the indecent image was discovered or made; 
2. The speed with which the image was reported, and to whom it was reported; 
3. Whether the handling and storage of the image was appropriate and secure; 
4. Whether any copying of the image was the minimum to achieve the objective and 
was appropriate; and 
5. Whether, in all the circumstances, an individual acted reasonably. 
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That memorandum gives specific recognition to the role of the IWF and accepts that 
“reports made to the IWF in accordance with its procedures will be accepted as reports 
to a relevant authority” for the purposes of the defence.
63
 This is, we will argue later, 




(f) Other offences 
 




The first is that of distribution, and under section 1(1)(b) it is an offence for a person to 
“distribute or show such indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs”. In R. v. Fellows; 
R. v. Arnold
65
 it was accepted that this offence extended to the making available of 
images via the internet.  
 
Possession with a view to distribution 
 
The second offence is possession with a view to distribution, contrary to section 1(1)(c) 
which provides that it is an offence for a person to “have in his possession such indecent 
photographs or pseudo-photographs, with a view to their being distributed or shown by 
himself or others”. Again in R. v. Fellows; R. v. Arnold
66
 this offence was found to apply 
where images are held with a view to making them available online. 
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Advertisements and newsgroup titles 
 
The third offence is that of publishing an advertisement for indecent images, and section 
1(1)(d) provides that it is an offence for a person to: 
 
publish or cause to be published any advertisement likely to be understood to be conveying that 
the advertiser distributes or shows such indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs, or intends 
to do so. 
 
This offence has presented particular difficulties when applied to newsgroups. Consider, 
for example, the newsgroup “alt.binaries.pictures.child.erotica.female”.
67
 Clearly the 
postings within that newsgroup may themselves be illegal indecent images – but might 
the title of the newsgroup itself be an illegal advertisement “conveying that the 




This issue came to the fore during 2001/2002 when the IWF sought to draw up a policy 
dealing with newsgroups which regularly contained illegal images. As part of this 
process, legal advice was given by the CPS and the IWF’s own advisers that newsgroup 
names could themselves constitute illegal advertisements so that an ISP which 
knowingly carried such a group name could be committing an offence. Consequently, 
the IWF now prepares and updates a list of newsgroup names which it considers may be 





This offence is particularly wide, and the CPS guidance on this point makes worrying 
reading for ISPs: 
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Internet newsgroup names constitute an advertisement and therefore Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) risk prosecution for advertising news groups with names, which imply or declare that child 
pornography is likely to be found within... 
 
Publication can be “passive” and an ISP that facilitates the transmission of an indecent 
photograph of a child by storing it may be liable under section 3 PCA 1978 as the publisher of 
the material. A publisher of an advertisement may be guilty of aiding and abetting the offence or 





Distribution, possession with a view to distribution and the publication of 
advertisements all carry a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment. 
 




A controversial extension of the law took place through the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 which criminalised non-photographic pornographic images of children – bringing 
cartoons, drawings and entirely computer generated images within the scope of the law 
(though one might question whether purely virtual images should be termed CAI as they 
do not involve the actual abuse of a child). As we have previously seen, publication of 
such images may already have been an offence under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 
but for the first time simple possession was also criminalised. 
 
The rationale behind this extension was explained by the Ministry of Justice as follows: 
 
There were concerns that the images could be used as a “grooming” tool to prepare children for 
real abuse. In addition, it was recognised that modern computer software made it easy to create 
drawings and other fantasy style images of explicit child sexual abuse from photographic images. 
If the link to a real image that would not be covered by prior legislation could not be proved it 
could create a situation where an abuser could create a fantasy-style visual record of actual abuse. 
There was also a concern that the possession and circulation of these images could reinforce 
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Against this, however, the Act was criticised on the basis that non photographic images 
involve no direct harm to children and arguably therefore prohibiting simple possession 




While the merits or otherwise of this extension are beyond the scope of this chapter the 
new offence presented an important issue for ISPs and the IWF – should it be included 
within the blocking remit? While there is a substantial international consensus in relation 
to actual indecent images of children, there is no such consensus in relation to simulated 
imagery. Many jurisdictions do not criminalise such imagery and the United States 
recognises a constitutional prohibition on criminalising images where there is no actual 
abuse of a child.
73
 The result is that sexualised virtual images of children are very 
common online – much more so than actual images of abuse. Following the 2009 Act 
the IWF therefore decided against extending its blocking remit to such images for fear 
that the numbers involved would make the blocking system unworkable and also that 
such blocking might result in adverse publicity.
74
 This is significant in demonstrating 
that the Cleanfeed system does not merely apply the law on “child pornography” in a 
passive manner – instead, the IWF as the gatekeeper to the system decides which “child 
pornography” offences should be taken into account. 
 
(b) Elements of the offence 
 
Section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 creates the offence of being in 
possession of a “prohibited image” of a child, carrying a maximum sentence of three 
years imprisonment. 
 
“Prohibited image” is defined as being an image which is: 
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1. Pornographic (that is, “of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to 
have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal”); 
2. Grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character; and 
3.  Focuses solely or principally on a child's genitals or anal region or portrays any 
of six specified sexual acts. 
 
Section 64 sets out general defences in respect of this offence, which are the same as 
those for the possession of indecent images of children under section 160 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988. There is a defence where a person has “a legitimate reason 
for having the photograph or pseudo-photograph in his possession” which will apply to 
ISPs in the context of investigations carried out by them. 
 
4. ISP exemptions from liability 
 
From the above discussion it will be apparent that many ISP activities present a risk of 
criminal liability. These risks are compounded when dealing with vague concepts such 
as obscenity where an ISP may not be sure whether material hosted by it passes the 
boundaries of legality. This section will detail the extent to which those risks have been 
mitigated. 
 
(i) 1996-2002: Threats of prosecution followed by de facto immunity 
 
In August 1996 the Metropolitan Police wrote to UK ISPs asking ISPs to stop carrying 
certain newsgroups which they identified as containing illegal pornographic material.
75
 
This warning formed part of wider political pressure – led by the Minister for Science 
and Technology – aimed at prompting the industry to implement self-regulatory controls 
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 The clear message was that prosecutions would follow otherwise. 
As The Observer put it at the time: 
 
Scotland Yard has warned British service providers that unless they withdraw access to illegal 
material they will be prosecuted under the Protection of Children and Obscene Publications Acts. 
However, police sources said enforcement… would not begin until the industry had been given a 




This pressure – and way in which the industry “put its house in order” by establishing 
the IWF – is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
78
 For present purposes, however, we 
should note how the establishment of the IWF in 1996 operated to avert these threats of 
prosecution.
79
 The IWF from the outset worked closely with the Home Office 
(represented on its steering group) and the Metropolitan Police (who provided training 
for its staff).
80
 Consequently, membership of the IWF responded to official demands in a 
way which was understood to provide a de facto defence for ISPs – with the significant 
caveat that failure to follow IWF take down notices might result in prosecution on 
charges of knowingly permitting their services to be used for the distribution of illegal 
material.
81
 In effect, membership of the IWF signified the goodwill and cooperation of 




(ii) 2002 onwards: The effect of the E-Commerce Directive 
 
The next significant development was the adoption of the Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002
83
 which implemented the hosting, caching and mere conduit 
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immunities required by the Electronic Commerce Directive.
84
 From 2002 onwards the 
de facto forbearance associated with the IWF system was, for the first time, 
accompanied by formal legislative protection for ISPs.
85
 The most important aspects in 
the context of CAI are the hosting and mere conduit immunities, which will be 
considered in turn. 
 
(a) Hosting immunity 
 
The hosting immunity is established by regulation 19, which provides: 
 
Where an information society service is provided which consists of the storage of information 
provided by a recipient of the service, the service provider (if he otherwise would) shall not be 
liable for damages or for any other pecuniary remedy or for any criminal sanction as a result of 
that storage where –  
 
(a) the service provider –  
 
(i) does not have actual knowledge of unlawful activity or information 
and, where a claim for damages is made, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which it would be apparent to the service 
provider that the activity or information was unlawful; or 
 
(ii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove or to disable access to the information; and 
 
(b) the recipient of the service was not acting under the authority or the control of 
the service provider. 
 
The hosting immunity creates an exemption from criminal liability provided that the ISP 
does not have actual knowledge of unlawful information and acts expeditiously to 
remove or disable access to such information on obtaining such knowledge. In practical 
terms, this largely mirrored the notice and takedown system which had already been 
established under the auspices of the IWF. This immunity has often been said to create 
perverse incentives for ISPs, by actively discouraging them from taking steps to police 
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content hosted with them for fear that by doing so they will acquire “knowledge or 
awareness” which might later be used to impose liability on them.
86
 In this way, 
however, it dovetails neatly with the IWF’s hotline system – as complaints about UK 
hosted material are largely diverted to the IWF, UK ISPs can avoid carrying out their 
own investigations which might put them on notice of illegality while any knowledge 




(b) Mere conduit 
 
The mere conduit immunity is established by regulation 17: 
 
Where an information society service is provided which consists of the transmission in a 
communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service or the provision of 
access to a communication network, the service provider (if he otherwise would) shall not be 
liable for damages or for any other pecuniary remedy or for any criminal sanction as a result of 
that transmission where the service provider –  
 
(a)  did not initiate the transmission; 
(b) did not select the receiver of the transmission; and 
(c) did not select or modify the information contained in the transmission. 
 
This secures the position of ISPs as a mere intermediary in respect of their role as access 
provider, and rules out any argument that by failing to prevent access they may be 
facilitating the commission of a crime. Unlike the hosting immunity, it is not based on 
knowledge or awareness, with the result that an ISP will benefit even if it is aware that 
(for example) a user is visiting a particular website which is known to host CAI. 
 
The nature of this immunity presents an issue for ISPs who engage in blocking. As with 
the hosting immunity, an ISP which voluntarily takes steps to stop illegal content takes a 
risk. It may lose the mere conduit immunity if it is found to have voluntarily 
relinquished its otherwise passive role. This was an issue of concern for BT during the 
adoption of the Cleanfeed system. BT stated at the time its view that “in diverting traffic 
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to a filter that may block access depending on the results of a URL match it does not 
‘select the recipient of the transmission’ within the meaning of the E-Commerce 
Regulations” but also acknowledged that if it was wrong on this point it “potentially 
face[d] liability for all the traffic on its network (not just traffic that it blocked)” and 




To date there has been no ruling from a UK court as to whether this type of filtering will 
result in loss of the mere conduit immunity and the question remains open. There is 
some tension on this point within the Directive itself. On the one hand recital 40 
envisages voluntary blocking by service providers by providing that: 
 
[T]his Directive should constitute the appropriate basis for the development of rapid and reliable 
procedures for removing and disabling access to illegal information; such mechanisms could be 
developed on the basis of voluntary agreements between all parties concerned and should be 
encouraged by Member States; it is in the interest of all parties involved in the provision of 
information society services to adopt and implement such procedures; the provisions of this 
Directive relating to liability should not preclude the development and effective operation, by the 
different interested parties, of technical systems of protection and identification and of technical 
surveillance instruments made possible by digital technology within the limits laid down by 
Directives 95/46/EC and 97/66/EC [emphasis added]. 
 
This would suggest that the mere conduit immunity should be given a purposive 
meaning which would facilitate voluntary blocking. Against that, recital 42 states that 
the exemptions from liability apply only where the activity of the service provider is “a 
mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the information society 
service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is 
transmitted or stored”. The ECJ has confirmed that this qualifies all the immunities 
under the Directive, holding in Google France v. LVM: 
 
it follows from recital 42 in the preamble to Directive 2000/31 that the exemptions from liability 
established in that directive cover only cases in which the activity of the information society 
service provider is ‘of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature’, which implies that that 
service provider ‘has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted 
or stored’. Accordingly, in order to establish whether the liability of a referencing service 
provider may be limited under Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, it is necessary to examine 
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whether the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely 





The later ECJ decision in L’Oréal v. eBay has elaborated on this concept of neutrality, 
holding that in the case of an online marketplace: 
 
Where… the operator has provided assistance which entails, in particular, optimising the 
presentation of the offers for sale in question or promoting those offers, it must be considered not 
to have taken a neutral position between the customer-seller concerned and potential buyers but 
to have played an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data 
relating to those offers for sale. It cannot then rely, in the case of those data, on the exemption 




Although both Google France and L’Oréal deal with the hosting immunity rather than 
the mere conduit immunity, the focus in each case on the “passive” and “neutral” 
position of the intermediary suggests that the blocking of particular sites would not fall 
within these criteria. This gains support from recital 43 which specifically addresses the 
mere conduit immunity and provides that: 
 
A service provider can benefit from the exemptions for “mere conduit” and for “caching” when 
he is in no way involved with the information transmitted; this requires among other things that 
he does not modify the information that he transmits; this requirement does not cover 
manipulations of a technical nature which take place in the course of the transmission as they do 
not alter the integrity of the information contained in the transmission [emphasis added]. 
 
Recitals 42 and 43, taken together with the limited guidance from the ECJ, therefore 
suggest that blocking would constitute a modification of information transmitted so as to 
end the immunity. While there is almost no authority on the issue, this was the view 
taken by the Irish High Court in EMI v. UPC, which held that Deep Packet Inspection 
for the purpose of traffic prioritisation was acceptable but that going further to insert 
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This does not, of course, mean that an ISP would face liability for all content it 
transmitted. If the mere conduit immunity did not apply then liability would become an 
issue for national law which in many cases would provide an alternative defence.
92
 It 
might also be argued that the loss of the immunity only applied to the particular data 
which was subject to non-passive or non-neutral treatment – leaving it intact in respect 
of other traffic which was handled in a neutral manner.
93
 That said, the use of blocking 
creates a very real risk. It highlights the strength of the political pressure placed upon 
them that despite this risk ISPs have proceeded to implement the Cleanfeed system 
regardless. 
 
(c) No general duty to monitor 
 
Both the hosting and mere conduit defences must be read in conjunction with Article 15 
of the E-Commerce Directive, which prevents Member States from imposing a general 
obligation on ISPs to monitor the information which they transmit or store, or a general 
obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. Following 
the decision of the ECJ in Scarlet (Extended) v. SABAM
94
 it is clear that the courts in 
assessing a blocking obligation must consider whether it would require an ISP to 
“actively monitor all the data relating to each of its customers” in order to “prevent a 
future infringement”
95
 – if so, it will be in breach of Article 15. In addition, that decision 
has made it clear that any blocking obligation must also take into account all 
fundamental rights involved – including the freedom of the ISP to conduct a business 
and the data protection and freedom of expression rights of users whose communications 
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Scarlet involved a remarkably invasive order in the context of filesharing and it is 
possible that the ECJ in balancing fundamental rights might be more receptive to a 
narrowly tailored approach to blocking CAI. Nevertheless, on its face the decision will 
significantly limit the ability of Member States to impose mandatory blocking 
obligations. While systems which merely block particular URLs are likely to pass 
muster (on the basis that they do not require active monitoring of all users’ 
communications and can be implemented in a relatively inexpensive fashion) any 
systems based on more detailed content matching and particularly deep packet 
inspection of the type involved in Scarlet would appear to be ruled out. This would in 
particular prevent Member States from imposing blocking systems based on the 
developing area of hash value matching.
97
 It therefore creates an incentive for Member 
States to continue to rely on “voluntary” self-regulatory systems which would be beyond 
the scope of Article 15 and could go further in their monitoring. 
 
5. Legal issues surrounding the implementation of filtering 
 
There has been a great deal written on the general question as to whether states should 
require or encourage ISPs to block certain types of internet content and the regulatory 
and governance issues this may present.
98
 There has been rather less, however, written 
on the legal implications of a filtering system introduced without legislative backup. The 
following section will consider these issues. 
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(i) Loss of mere conduit status 
 
The risk that ISPs may lose their mere conduit status has already been discussed. It is 
worth noting, however, that whether or not filtering of CAI will result in the loss of mere 
conduit status it has certainly helped to shift the overall debate towards the imposition of 
greater duties on ISPs including the imposition of blocking duties in other contexts. In 
the context of the Digital Economy bill, for example, the existence of the Cleanfeed 
system was decisive for many legislators as providing a proof of concept which could be 




(ii) Liability for wrongful blocking 
 
Suppose that an IWF analyst mistypes a URL which is subsequently propagated to 
participating ISPs via the Child Abuse Image Content (CAIC) list. Suppose further that 
the site in question loses a substantial amount of traffic, suffers economic loss of some 
description, or finds that visitors are presented with a block page stating that the page is 
blocked on the basis that it “may contain indecent images of children”. In those 
circumstances, what liability might either the IWF or the ISP face? 
 
(a) Comparison with US immunities 
 
In the United States, the ISP immunities introduced by section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act were accompanied by a specific provision allowing 
“Good Samaritan” blocking of content which applied to “any action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable”. Significantly, this provision did not merely provide that the 
                                                 
99
 See e.g. the comments of Lord Clement-Jones, quoted in ‘Lib Dem Peer on Why Site Blocking Is 




section 230(1) immunity would not be lost in such circumstances, but went further to 
create an additional affirmative defence. 
 
This has been the subject of a number of cases in the US, for the most part involving 
claims of wrongful inclusion in email spam filters.
100
 While the precise scope of this 
defence remains uncharted, it seems likely that if it applied in the UK it would cover the 
activities of both the ISPs as “voluntarily taking action in good faith to restrict access” 





There is, however, no comparable provision in either the Electronic Commerce Directive 
or domestic UK law. While it would be possible for domestic law to introduce wider 
immunities, it has instead been restricted to a narrow and literal transposition of the 
Directive. Given that fact, what liability might either the IWF or an ISP face in cases of 
wrongful blocking? There is no specific authority on this point and the issue does not 






Given the absence of any contractual claim between the victim of wrongful blocking and 
either the IWF or the ISP, the strongest claim which might be made would appear to be 
in defamation. The basis of the claim would be that either the distribution of the CAIC 
list by the IWF, or the publication of a stop page by the ISP, constituted a defamatory 
statement about the victim – i.e. that they were responsible for making available 
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indecent images of children. Whether or not such a claim may be successful is difficult 




It might be said, for example, that there is no defamation of an individual if the URL 
blocked does not permit identification – on the other hand, however, if tjmcintyre.com 
were to be blocked then identification would not be a problem as the contents of the site 
could readily be attributed to this author. 
 
Nature of blocking 
 
The manner in which the blocking was implemented would be of great importance. If an 
ISP were to return a fake “404 File Not Found” page then this, though deceptive, would 
not itself be defamatory. On the other hand, if an ISP were to block not just an individual 
URL but an entire domain (by using DNS filtering rather than URL filtering) then it is 
much more likely that there will be collateral blocking of innocent sites, so that the 
owners of those sites might be defamed even though one particular URL did host 
indecent images of children. 
 
Use of block pages 
 
The IWF is conscious of these risks, and has issued guidance
103
 to members as to the use 
of block pages (also known as “stop pages” or “splash pages”): 
 
For transparency purposes, the IWF recommends a splash page (landing page) is displayed in 
response to a blocked internet request for a URL on the IWF URL list, however it is important 
that the content and application of such splash pages is accurate. Therefore, any such page which 
differs from the recommended text below and which makes any reference to the IWF or is 
considered by the IWF to imply an association with the IWF, such as by referring to a ‘blocking 
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initiative’ or a ‘list of child sexual abuse websites/URLs’, must be explicitly approved in advance 
and in writing by IWF… 
 
Any such splash page must never be displayed in response to an internet request for any specific 
URL which is not exactly replicated in the IWF’s current list and must not be displayed for any 
blocked internet request at the domain level when that entire domain is not on the IWF’s current 
list. 
 
This final sentence in particular appears to be intended to avoid liability in possible 
situations where an ISP overblocks. For example: where the IWF lists a URL such as 
http://example.com/users/~johndoe/abuseimage.jpg in the CAIC, while an individual 





In that guidance, the IWF also recommends the use of a particular form of wording on 
block pages, which again appears to be motivated in part by a desire to minimise the risk 
of liability in defamation: 
 
403: Access Denied 
 
Access has been denied by your internet access provider because this page may contain indecent 
images of children as identified by the Internet Watch Foundation. If you think this page has been 
blocked in error please contact <your service provider>. 
 
Despite the careful wording of this notice, however, it may well be that wrongful 
blocking will give rise to liability in defamation. There is therefore another perverse 
incentive for ISPs – the more open they are about their blocking practices (by using 
block pages) the more exposed to liability they may be. 
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(iii) Data protection 
 
We have seen that defamation issues arise if a blocked URL can be associated with an 
individual. In much the same way data protection issues may arise to the extent that 
blocking systems involve the processing of information about individuals – both those 
responsible for particular URLs which are blocked and those who attempt to visit them. 
These issues are of particular importance insofar as the information may suggest that an 
individual has committed a criminal offence – something which might make the 
information sensitive personal data within the definition in sections 2(g) and (h) of the 
Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
This point has recently been made by the European Data Protection Supervisor, Peter 
Hustinx, in the context of proposals for a child protection directive.
105
 His opinion 
identifies several distinct issues which may arise: 
 
The EDPS has in previous opinions expressed his concerns regarding the monitoring of 
individuals by private sector actors (e.g. ISPs or copyright holders), in areas that are in principle 
under the competence of law enforcement authorities. 
 
The EDPS underlines that monitoring the network and blocking sites would constitute a purpose 
unrelated to the commercial purpose of ISPs: this would raise issues with regard to lawful 
processing and compatible use of personal data under Article 6.1.b and Article 7 of the Data 
Protection Directive. 
 
The EDPS questions the criteria for blocking and stresses that a code of conduct or voluntary 
guidelines would not bring enough legal certainty in this respect. 
 
The EDPS also underlines the risks linked with possible blacklisting of individuals and their 
possibilities of redress before an independent authority… 
 
This is particularly important considering the consequences of reporting: in addition to the 
information related to children, personal data of any individual connected in some way with the 
information circulating on the network could be at stake, including for instance information on a 
person suspected of misbehaviour, be it an internet user or a content provider, but also 
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information on a person reporting a suspicious content or the victim of the abuse. The rights of all 
these individuals should not be overlooked when developing reporting procedures: they should be 
taken into account in compliance with the existing data protection framework. 
 
(a) Logging of information about visitors to URLs 
 
These concerns have been shared by ISPs in the context of Cleanfeed. From the outset, 
BT was conscious of a risk of generating data suggesting that individuals are attempting 
to view illegal material and has therefore stated that it “does not log the IP addresses of 
users whose traffic is an attempt to reach a listed URL”.
106
 This has also presented an 
issue for ISPs in deploying block pages – there have been technical challenges in 




On the other hand, there was one initiative in 2007 where two IWF members were 
permitted to use the CAIC list as an “intelligence tool” for the purpose of “monitoring of 
school networks to identify devices where an attempt was made to access a URL on a 
CAIC list”. This was done in response to “pressure on IWF to allow the data to be used 
for the experiment”. Significantly, however, the IWF board on learning of this took the 
view that “as the purpose of the project could lead to the identification of potential 
offenders, this was a matter outside [its] current remit”. Consequently the IWF withdrew 
from the project, and “confirm[ed] with the two members that they may extend the use 




This incident and the concern of BT to avoid logging customer details reflect an 
interesting dynamic. It is clear that there is a desire on the part of some in policing to use 
systems such as Cleanfeed as an intelligence gathering tool and possibly even a tool to 
facilitate prosecutions.
109
 This would be consistent with other UK police activity – 
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notably Operation Pin from 2003 onwards which involved a website which served as a 
“honeytrap” for visitors seeking CAM.
110
 However the IWF has largely curtailed this 
tendency, seeing it as being outside its remit. This supports the wider argument 
developed in chapters 4 and 5 that the structure of the IWF – as an industry funded, non-
statutory and independent body – has helped to prevent function creep. 
 
(b) Blacklisting URLs 
 
The comments of the EDPS also suggest that there may also be a data protection issue 
associated with the blacklisting process. Consider, for example, the Finnish website 
lapsiporno.info. This site (which translates as childpornography.info) is well known as 
being owned by Matti Nikki, a civil liberties advocate who uses the site to criticise the 
Finnish police-led blocking system. His site is itself, however, blocked by that system, 
on the basis that he has published details of some sites on the blacklist in order to 
demonstrate that many sites have been blocked inaccurately.
111
 In this situation a data 
protection issue arises. The site in question is known to be under the sole control of an 
individual so that a determination that the URL is to be blocked may be, in the words of 
the EDPS, a blacklisting of an individual without the “possibility of redress before an 
independent authority”. 
 
A comparison might be made with the area of credit cards. There is a legal basis
112
 for 
English police to share details of convictions with credit card companies to enable them 
to cancel cards which are used for the purchase or sale of CAI.
113
 In the case of the IWF, 
however, there is no comparable legislative basis. Consequently, if the view is taken that 
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the blacklisting of a URL involves the processing of sensitive personal data on an 
identifiable individual then it is likely that the lack of a legal basis contravenes the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 
(iv) Net neutrality 
 
To what extent might the emerging legal framework regarding network neutrality impact 
on the Cleanfeed system? There is no one definition of net neutrality, which is “a 
deceptively simple phrase hiding a multitude of meanings”
114
 but we can broadly 
identify it as a principle limiting the extent to which ISPs are permitted to discriminate 
between traffic carried on their networks. From its inception, net neutrality has for the 
most part been narrowly framed as an issue of economics, innovation policy and 
consumer choice.
115
 More recent work has challenged this and has sought to develop it 
to promote freedom of expression and privacy in communications.
116
 For example, the 
2011 net neutrality law adopted in the Netherlands reflects freedom of expression 
concerns by preventing blocking of sites except where required “to give effect to a 
legislative provision or court order”
117
 or at the request of the user.
118
 Despite these 
developments, however, the UK and European understandings of net neutrality remain 
cramped and are therefore unlikely to have any impact on the Cleanfeed system. 
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Our starting point is an absence, for the time being, of any general net neutrality 
obligations in either European or UK law.
119
 Ofcom has taken a largely hands-off 
approach in this area and does not impose any direct controls on either the sites or 
services which ISPs may block. Its 2011 policy document on net neutrality restated its 
belief that market constraints on network operators have been effective at delivering 
consumer benefits so that there is no need to directly regulate traffic management. 
Ofcom has therefore rejected the notion of intervention to prevent blocking, relying 





Significantly, that policy document did not once mention either the ECHR or freedom of 
expression – its focus is entirely on the user as consumer, not the user as citizen, and it 
does not conceive of net neutrality or site blocking as having implications for 
fundamental rights. Instead Ofcom sees its role as being to promote effective 
competition between ISPs so that “sufficient information is available to enable 
consumers to make the right purchasing decisions; and consumers are able to act on this 




Ofcom therefore adopts a policy which focuses on transparency. It has two main 
elements. The first of these relates to the way in which services are marketed: 
 
[I]f ISPs offer a service to consumers which they describe as “internet access”, we believe this 
creates an expectation that this service will be unrestricted, enabling the consumer to access any 
service lawfully available on the internet. As a result, if a service does not provide full access to 
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 Ibid., 14–15. 
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Even this weak constraint does not, however, affect the actions of ISPs in implementing 
the Cleanfeed system. By referring to “any service lawfully available on the internet” it 
presupposes that ISPs may block access to “unlawful” services, but does not enter into 
any analysis as to how these might be determined or the safeguards which should apply. 
It therefore leaves open to ISPs the option of blocking access to any material they deem 
illegal. 
 
The second way in which Ofcom has dealt with the issue of consumer information is in 
its support for a “Key Facts Indicator” system.
123
 This has been developed since 2011 on 
a self-regulatory basis by UK ISPs who have agreed to use a standardised format to 
describe their traffic management policies.
124
 A copy is reproduced on the following 
page: 
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Again, however, this will not restrict ISPs as it excludes from its scope: “any service, 
content, application or protocol that an ISP is required to block by UK law and child 
abuse images as informed by the list provided by the Internet Watch Foundation”.
125
 
Consequently the Key Facts Indicator system does not provide any transparency on this 
point and does not even require ISPs to tell customers whether or not they filter 
connections against the IWF URL list. 
 
In this, Ofcom reflects the dominant international approaches to net neutrality which 
tend to permit extra-judicial blocking. In the United States, for example, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) Open Internet Order of 2010 expressly permits 
blocking of “unlawful content” and leaves it to the ISP to decide what is unlawful.
126
 
This approach is now being followed at European level also. On 11 September 2013 the 
Commission adopted a proposal
127
 for a Regulation which would impose harmonised net 
neutrality obligations throughout Europe.
128
 However, that proposal would still leave it 
open to ISPs to engage in “reasonable traffic management” which Recital 47 explains as 
the “prevention or impediment of serious crimes, including voluntary actions of 
providers to prevent access to and distribution of child pornography”. Consequently, the 
proposal as it stands would not restrict ISP participation in Cleanfeed or similar systems. 
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(a) Blocking permitted but not required 
 
European attempts to stop online child pornography date to 1996 when the Commission 
adopted the Communication on Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet
129
 and the 
Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audio-Visual and 
Information Services.
130
 These argued that the international nature of the internet would 
require a coordinated response from Member States but recommended a relatively 
limited European role. Three factors were central to this conclusion. The first was that 
Member States took very different approaches towards the acceptability of content: even 
in relation to child pornography national laws differed substantially. This practical 
difficulty was matched by a second related concern – to ensure that the doctrine of 
subsidiarity was respected, so that decisions about content would be made at a national 
level. Third, the Commission stressed the fact that legislative competence in this area 
was limited. 
 
The response was to differentiate between illegal and harmful content, and to deal with 
each separately. As regards content considered harmful to children (which required 
subjective assessment) the Commission recommended the use of parental or school 
filtering software, encouraging content providers to adopt codes of conduct, and 
supporting national awareness actions for parents and teachers. 
 
In respect of illegal content – particularly child pornography – the Commission 
identified a number of areas where national laws were broadly similar, and urged 
Member States to harmonise laws in those areas, to co-operate in the enforcement of 
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existing laws, to establish minimum European standards on criminal content, to clarify 
the liability of internet service providers, and to encourage self-regulation. 
 
This approach left control of illegal content to Member States and to self-regulation by 
industry, with responsibility to be allocated at a national level and the European role 
being facilitative rather than prescriptive. As such, it did not take a stance either for or 
against blocking or other technical measures but rather left these to the individual 
Member States. 
 
This approach was subsequently refined from 1999 onwards with the adoption of a 
series of Safer Internet Programmes funding internet safety initiatives. The first 
programme ran from 1999 to 2005 and in relation to child pornography its most 
significant contribution was to fund a series of national hotlines, providing a contact 
point for users to report illegal content online and for internet service providers (ISP) to 
be notified of illegal content hosted on their servers.
131
 This indirectly facilitated some 
national blocking schemes – in the UK, for example, the IWF was able to piggyback on 
the hotline mechanism and funding to generate its URL list – but without directly 
promoting them. 
 
These developments were paralleled in 2000 by the Electronic Commerce Directive 
which was drafted to leave filtering available as a policy option for Member States. This 
can be seen in particular in Article 12(3) which establishes the mere conduit immunity 
for ISPs but leaves open “the possibility for a court or administrative authority [to 
require] the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement”. 
 
Similarly, the Authorisation Directive in 2002
132
 also envisaged mandatory filtering 
obligations for ISPs. That directive established a light touch regime for the regulation of 
public communication networks and restricted the conditions which Member States 
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could impose on the operators of such networks – but explicitly permitted the imposition 
of “restrictions in relation to the transmission of illegal content” provided that those 




After the Electronic Commerce Directive and Authorisation Directive, therefore, the net 
effect of the European legal framework was that Member States could still legislate to 
require blocking while ISPs could choose to voluntarily block, subject only to the risk 
that by doing so they might lose the benefit of their mere conduit immunity. 
 
(ii) Move towards blocking and requiring states to block 
 
(a) Policy changes towards blocking; support of voluntary blocking schemes 
 
The overall European position during this period left blocking as a policy option to 
Member States but did not promote it directly. This began to change from 2006 onwards 
when a number of developments took place which collectively marked a shift in policy 
towards promoting blocking of child pornography. 
 
The most significant was the publication in 2006 of the Final Evaluation of the 2003-
2004 Safer Internet Programme. The evaluation, following a survey of stakeholders, 
argued that blocking had become an essential tool to prevent access to child 
pornography, and recommended that action should be taken at the European level and a 
Europe-wide black list of known illegal sites put in place. This recommendation was 
accepted by the Commission, which decided that the next Safer Internet Programme 
would include support for blocking generally and specifically ‘activities by hotlines 
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Why was this result reached? Although the evaluation document itself does not contain 
much detail, a number of factors appear to have influenced this outcome. During the 
period up to 2006 the number of websites offering child pornography increased 
significantly. According to the IWF the total number of domains hosting child 
pornography increased from 1,894 in 2004 to 3,077 in 2006.
135
 This growth fuelled 
demands for blocking and also, it has been argued, a moral panic which precluded any 




Also, by 2006 national blocking systems had become established in a number of 
Member States. The experience of those countries fed into European policy making by 
providing a proof of concept which previously had been lacking. The Cleanfeed system 
also appeared to demonstrate that more targeted forms of blocking were technologically 
possible, addressing complaints about overblocking. Prior concerns about limited 
legislative competence and differing national laws were also of less importance as the 
2004 Framework Decision had substantially aligned national laws, reducing the risk that 
European action would be inappropriate. In any event, issues of legislative competence 
were, arguably, less significant when national systems had demonstrated that blocking 
could be implemented on a self-regulatory and non-legislative basis. 
 
Consequently, 2006 saw a significant turning point where the factors outlined above 
promoted the adoption of a new, pro-blocking approach. A number of initiatives soon 
followed. One of the first was the CIRCAMP (“Cospol Internet Related Child Abusive 
Material Project”) Action Plan adopted by the European Police Chief Task Force in 
2006. This project, funded under the Safer Internet Plus Programme, assists participating 
countries in establishing national blocking systems. This trend was continued in May 
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2007 with the Commission document “Towards a general policy on the fight against 
cyber crime”
137
 which argued that: 
 
A growing number of illegal content sites are accessible in Europe, covering child sexual abuse 
material, incitement to terrorist acts, illegal glorification of violence, terrorism, racism and 
xenophobia. Law enforcement action against such sites is extremely difficult, as site owners and 
administrators are often situated in countries other than the target country, and often outside the 
EU. The sites can be moved very quickly, also outside the territory of the EU, and the definition 
of illegality varies considerably from one state to another. 
 
In response that document advocated a policy of promoting ‘public-private agreements 





(b) Mandatory blocking proposed 
 
Those initiatives were limited in that they sought to promote voluntary blocking 
schemes. The next initiative was much more ambitious, and sought to require mandatory 
blocking across the EU. This came in the form of a 2009 Commission proposal for a 
framework decision on combating the sexual abuse of children.
139
 With the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty this was replaced with a proposal for a directive
140
 which 
would require the same result – significantly, however, that proposal and the directive 
ultimately adopted differed substantially from the proposal for a framework decision. 
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(c) From legislative to self-regulatory blocking 
 
Proposed framework decision 
 
The Commission’s 2009 proposal for a framework decision included a provision which 
would have required Member States to introduce mandatory blocking: 
 
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to enable the competent judicial or police 
authorities to order or similarly obtain the blocking of access by internet users to internet pages 
containing or disseminating child pornography, subject to adequate safeguards, in particular to 
ensure that the blocking is limited to what is necessary, that users are informed of the reason for 
the blocking and that content providers are informed of the possibility of challenging it. 
 
The reference to “the competent judicial or police authorities” was significant, reflecting 
a conclusion in the Commission’s Impact Assessment that pure self-regulatory systems 
would not be “prescribed by law” as required by Article 10 ECHR. According to the 
Commission: 
 
[E]ncouragement of self regulation by ISPs to block access to Internet pages containing child 
pornography would involve interference in the right to freedom of expression in Article 10 
ECHR (Article 11 of the EU Charter). In accordance with the ECHR, again, as interpreted by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, to respect fundamental rights such interference 
needs to be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society for important interests, 
such as the prevention of crime... the interference in this fundamental right must be ‘prescribed 
by law’, which implies that a valid legal basis in domestic law must exist. This may not always 
be present in a system based exclusively on self-regulation, and therefore this measure risks to 




Consequently the proposed Framework Decision rejected purely self-regulatory systems 
as an option and required that the decision to order blocking should rest with public 
bodies. This, however, met with strong resistance from some national governments who 
feared that it would require existing national systems to be placed on a legislative basis, 
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After the Lisbon Treaty came into force – doing away with the framework decision 
mechanism – it became necessary to recast the proposal as a directive. Significantly, 
when this was done the relevant provision was amended in light of national government 
opposition by deleting any reference to police or judicial authorities. The amended 
provision (now Article 21) then read as follows: 
 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to obtain the blocking of access by Internet 
users in their territory to Internet pages containing or disseminating child pornography. The 
blocking of access shall be subject to adequate safeguards, in particular to ensure that the 
blocking is limited to what is necessary, that users are informed of the reason for the blocking 
and that content providers, as far as possible, are informed of the possibility of challenging it. 
 
The implications of this change were spelt out in a new recital 13 which made it clear 
that Member States would no longer have to adopt legislation but could comply by 
merely “supporting and stimulating Internet Service Providers on a voluntary basis to 
develop codes of conduct and guidelines for blocking access to such Internet pages”. 
That change met with substantial criticism at the time, with civil liberties advocates 
asserting that the fundamental rights concerns expressed in the Impact Assessment had 
been sidestepped in order to ensure that existing national schemes could continue 
unchanged. It was also criticised by the European Data Protection Supervisor who took 
the view that “a code of conduct or voluntary guidelines would not bring enough legal 
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Parliamentary pushback and compromise: Directive 2011/93/EU 
 
Following a strong campaign by civil liberties advocates, the proposal for a directive 
was modified in Parliament to reject mandatory blocking, prioritise takedown of images 
at source and to require a legislative basis for national blocking systems. The eventual 
compromise text in December 2011 met the first two of these demands but left self-
regulatory blocking essentially unaffected. As adopted the relevant provision is Article 
25 of Directive 2011/93/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography which provides that: 
 
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt removal of web pages 
containing or disseminating child pornography hosted in their territory and to endeavour to obtain 
the removal of such pages hosted outside of their territory. 
 
2. Member States may take measures to block access to web pages containing or disseminating 
child pornography towards the Internet users within their territory. These measures must be set 
by transparent procedures and provide adequate safeguards, in particular to ensure that the 
restriction is limited to what is necessary and proportionate, and that users are informed of the 
reason for the restriction. Those safeguards shall also include the possibility of judicial redress. 
 
Recital 47 makes clear that Article 25 is not intended to affect existing national systems 
by stating that the “measures undertaken by Member States… could be based on various 
types of public action, such as legislative, non-legislative, judicial or other”. It goes on 
to say that the Directive “is without prejudice to voluntary action taken by the Internet 
industry to prevent the misuse of its services or to any support for such action by 
Member States”. This is particularly important for the United Kingdom as it indicates 
that the safeguards in Article 25(2) have no application to “voluntary” action by ISPs 
even where this action is “supported” by Member States. 
 
As a result the remaining language in recital 47 about ensuring “legal certainty”, 
“predictability” and “end user rights” is hortatory only. If anything, the Directive 
incentivises national governments to promote self-regulatory systems instead of 
legislating as by doing so they can avoid the safeguards which the Directive would 
otherwise require. In a UK context therefore the requirements for proportionality, 
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transparency and judicial redress will not affect the Cleanfeed system except in the 
unlikely event that the government abandons its settled policy of self-regulation and 
moves to put blocking on a statutory basis.
144
 This is an important outcome for the UK 
government as otherwise the requirement for judicial redress would at a minimum have 
required some form of legislation establishing independent judicial oversight of the IWF 




What conclusions can we draw from this survey of the law? It will be apparent from the 
review of the criminalisation of CAI that there were substantial risks for ISPs in relation 
to hosting until immunities were conferred upon them by the Electronic Commerce 
Directive. In light of such risks it is not surprising that there was enthusiastic take up 
amongst ISPs of the IWF notice and takedown system. 
 
It is also apparent, however, that those risks were largely mitigated after 2002 – before 
the Cleanfeed system was established. Consequently, ISP adoption of that system cannot 
be said to have been motivated by a desire to minimise any risk of prosecution faced by 
them. If anything, the system has attracted more risk. This survey has revealed that UK 
law is – particularly when compared with US law – lacking in protections for ISPs who 
voluntarily block. By adopting the Cleanfeed system ISPs are potentially jeopardising 
their mere conduit status and exposing themselves to risks in defamation and data 
protection without the benefit of any statutory immunities. Their willingness to do so is, 
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It is important to note that not all illegal child pornography is treated equally by the 
IWF. We have seen that the IWF has declined to extend the CAIC URL list system to 
cover non-photographic images – despite the fact that such material is now equally 
prohibited by the law. In response to critics it is sometimes claimed that the IWF in 
carrying blocking is simply enforcing the law enacted by Parliament.
146
 This chapter has 
illustrated that this claim is only partially true – the enforcement is selective and reflects 
a choice as to which material to block. This should not be taken as a criticism – if 
anything, it is an advantage of self-regulation that a body can choose to focus on the 
most serious harms and will be wary of blocking which may not enjoy full public 
support – but it does highlight that the IWF is carrying out an independent assessment of 
the types of images which are sufficiently serious to merit blocking, bearing its own 
reputation and effectiveness in mind. Claims that it is merely a neutral enforcer of the 
law are unsustainable. 
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This chapter describes the development and operation of the Cleanfeed system. It begins 
by setting out the origins of the IWF and the development of its role from its 
establishment in 1996, including its first foray into wider censorship with the 2001/2002 
newsgroup ban. It then focuses on the period from 2004 onwards when the IWF came to 
cooperate with BT, state bodies and subsequently other ISPs in the adoption of filtering 
systems – including filtering systems deployed in other jurisdictions. The chapter next 
turns to the way in which the UK government has sought to persuade (and threatened to 
compel) ISPs to deploy filtering systems from 2006 onwards, looking in particular at the 
2009 episode in which draft legislation to compel the use of filtering systems was first 
leaked and then abandoned. This is followed by an examination of the controversy 
surrounding the blocking of pages on Wikipedia in December 2008. It explores in 
particular the reaction to the blocking, the appeal by Wikipedia, the procedures and 
limitations illustrated by that appeal, the internal decision making within the IWF that 
led to an ad-hoc decision to unblock, and the lessons learned from the incident. 
 
2. Early years, early fears 
 
(i) Computerised child pornography 
 
Our starting point is 1994 when concern over computer content first came to the fore in 
the United Kingdom. In that year the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 
identified
1
 computer pornography as an area in need of control, leading to the adoption 
shortly afterwards of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which extended 
existing obscenity laws to include “pseudo photographs” (including computer generated 
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images) and “data stored on a computer disc or by other electronic means”.
2
 Despite the 
apparent breadth of that provision, however, the risks posed by networked technology 





(ii) Availability online 
 
While it is difficult to establish an exact date when internet content first appeared on the 
domestic regulatory radar, Akdeniz suggests that a turning point was reached in the 
summer of 1995 when a cover story ran in Time magazine entitled “On a screen near 
you: Cyberporn”.
4
 It was at around this time that the issue of internet pornography came 
to prominence in the UK media, with headlines such as “Not in front of the children”
5
, 
“Caught in the sordid net of cybersex”
6
 and the colourful “Flying Bimbo leads blitz on 
cyberporn”.
7
 The issue was also highlighted in July 1995 by “Operation Starburst”
8
 
which involved the arrest and prosecution of nine British men for possession and 
distribution of child pornography using the internet, as well as later that year by the 
action brought by German prosecutors against CompuServe in relation to the distribution 
of child pornography via newsgroups.
9
 The result was to generate public concern as to 
the prevalence of illegal content online and the availability of pornographic content to 
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Whether or not these fears were justified, late 1995 saw what appears to have been the 
first intervention by the executive and one which would set a pattern often repeated 
since. In December 1995 Science and Technology Minister Ian Taylor called on the 
internet industry (in the form of the then newly established Internet Service Providers’ 
Association (“ISPA”)) to block access to illegal content in newsgroups and develop a 
voluntary code of conduct, with the implicit threat of prosecution should they fail to do 
so.
11
 This was followed shortly afterwards by a meeting hosted by the Home Office on 
19 January 1996 to discuss “Regulation of Adult Material on the Internet” and attended 
by representatives of (inter alia) the Home Office, various police services, the Crown 
Prosecution Service, Customs and Excise, the Department of Trade and Industry, 
ICSTIS
12
 and a wide selection of industry representatives from various ISPs and other 
interested parties such as Microsoft.
13
 The letter sent to ISPs inviting them to attend is 
worth quoting at length, as it provides a clear summary of official thinking of the time: 
 
The Internet and similar computer networks are a new and rapidly growing medium for the 
exchange of information. The Government is committed to promoting their use and encouraging 
people to exploit the commercial and other opportunities which are offered by the latest 
information technology. However, there is considerable public concern about the availability of 
pornographic material on the Net. We are concerned about the protection of children and the 
control of unsuitable material, but also that the use of the Internet will be discouraged if it is 
tarnished with an undeserved reputation as a major purveyor of pornography. 
 
At present, apart from the general application of the criminal law, there is no control on the 
material available on the Net and indeed, given the nature of the system and its world-wide reach, 
any regulation of such material would pose considerable difficulty. Nonetheless, the Government 
considers that the risk of children being exposed to harmful material is sufficiently serious to 
justify careful consideration of the options. 
 
Our present position is that we would want to encourage the industry to develop a system of self-





That meeting was followed in January by the commencement of an inquiry by the House 
of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, the results of which were 
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published in July 1996 as the report Information Society: Agenda for Action in the 
United Kingdom.
15
 That report addressed issues of content regulation only to a relatively 
small extent – but where it did so, it echoed views expressed at the January Home Office 
meeting to the effect that what was required in respect of “undesirable content” was a 
system of light touch, flexible self-regulation, perhaps following the existing ICSTIS 





3. Establishing the IWF 
 
(i) Creating a “self-regulatory” body 
 
Events continued to move rapidly in 1996, most importantly in mid August when letters 
were sent to UK ISPs by the Metropolitan Police indicating that they believed that 
certain newsgroups contained illegal pornographic material and requesting ISPs to take 
action if satisfied about the nature and content of those newsgroups.
17
 This was matched 
by a public statement by the Minister for Science and Technology who explicitly warned 
that prosecutions would follow unless ISPs prevented users from accessing pornography 
(particularly child pornography) via newsgroups
18
 – saying “In the absence of self 
regulation, the police will inevitably move to act against service providers as well as the 




This gave rise to concern amongst UK ISPs as to possible criminal liability on their part 
and was the impetus for a meeting on 9 September 1996 when representatives from UK 
ISPs met with the Metropolitan Police and Home Office and which (facilitated by the 
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DTI) resulted in an agreement to establish a new self-regulatory body. That body – 
initially known as the Safety-Net Foundation, which soon became the IWF and is 
referred to as such here – was part of a package of measures agreed by the industry and 
contained in a document entitled R3: Safety Net – Rating, Reporting, Responsibility for 




That document, approved by the ISPA, the London Internet Exchange (“LINX”) and the 
IWF itself, envisaged that the regulation of content would be principles driven rather 
than rules driven and would be based on the following points: 
 
The Internet is not a Legal Vacuum 
 
In general, the law applies to activities on the Internet as it does to activity not on the Internet. If 
something is illegal ‘off-line’ it will also be illegal ‘on-line’, and vice versa… 
 
Free Speech not Censorship 
 
The issue addressed has nothing to do with censorship of legal material or free speech. The issue 
is how to deal with material or activity which society, through democratic process, has deemed to 
be unacceptable in law. The core issue is crime. Legal, but possibly offensive, material raises a 
quite separate issue. Here consumers should have the technological means to tailor the nature of 
their, or their family’s, experience on the Internet according to their individual standards; thus 




Service providers must take a responsible approach to the provision of services. They need to 
implement reasonable, practicable and proportionate measures to hinder the use of the Internet 
for illegal purposes, and to provide a response mechanism in cases where illegal material or 
activity is identified. Service providers should not be asked to take responsibility for enforcement 
of the law. End users should retain responsibility for the content they place on the Internet. The 




By taking appropriate measures, across the industry, service providers can offer protection to the 
end user and to themselves. All responsible service providers wish to hinder the availability of 
child pornography, and to see it removed from the Internet. This clearly protects the public. 
Establishing a common understanding of what steps constitute a reasonable, practicable and 
proportionate approach can also provide a defence for service providers against prosecution on 
charges of knowingly permitting services to be used for the distribution of illegal material. 
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Establishment & Jurisdiction 
 
The law that determines what material or activity is illegal is the law of the country in which the 
consumer is affected by it. These proposals relate to service providers offering access to the 
Internet in the UK. They are designed to avoid any extraterritorial effect. Service providers 
established in the UK will take the UK law as the relevant standard for their UK operation – 
whatever the source of the material... 
 
The reference to self-protection is telling – the key motivation of the industry in signing 
up to this agreement was to provide a defence for service providers against what was 
seen as a realistic risk of prosecution on charges of knowingly permitting services to be 
used for the distribution of illegal material.
21
 Adoption of this approach, carrying the 
implicit imprimatur of the Home Office and Metropolitan Police, effectively provided 





(ii) Illegal v. offensive material 
 
The R3 agreement envisaged a two-fold role for the IWF – to establish a system for the 
reporting and takedown of illegal material on the internet, and to promote rating systems 
by which users could control the viewing of offensive material. This was an important 
distinction which reflected the underlying need for immunity from prosecution – despite 
the early focus of the Home Office on “adult”, “harmful” and “unsuitable” material, the 
commitment made by the ISPs was primarily to the control of illegal material, 
particularly child pornography. 
 
Other objectionable content was the subject of a more limited commitment – to assist 
consumers and especially parents with client-side filtering. This committed the IWF to 
assisting in the development of rating systems and recommended that ISPs “promote 
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PICS enabled software” for accessing the web, “[r]equire all their users to rate their own 
web pages” and “remove web pages hosted on their servers which are persistently and 
deliberately misrated”.
23
 This aspect of the IWF’s remit met with significant opposition, 
particularly in March 1998 when it published a report calling for the development of a 
worldwide rating system to incorporate some element of “policing... to maintain the 
standards and credibility of the system”.
24
 As a result, while some UK ISPs – such as 
Demon Internet – did initially require users to rate their web pages, this was a short lived 





With mandatory labelling gone, therefore, the control of legal but objectionable content 
shifted almost entirely to the user – although ISPs continued to promote filters to their 
users, they themselves played little role in policing content hosted by them which was 
merely “offensive”. Similarly, while the IWF continued to work on the development of 
client side filtering, and was a founder member of the Internet Content Rating 
Association in 1999, it never itself took on the function of classifying or rating offensive 
material and instead left this entirely to third parties – and gradually moved away from 
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Reflecting this and the aims of this research, the remainder of this chapter will focus on 
the developing role of the IWF in relation to illegal content only. 
 
(iii) Procedures and functions 
 
Under the R3 Agreement the primary role of the IWF was to act as a hotline for 
receiving and acting upon public complaints about illegal material online. Although the 
hotline model is now commonplace, at the time this was a pioneering approach based on 
the Dutch model which had been implemented in June 1996.
27
 Under the initial 
agreement, the IWF would consider whether material (particularly child or adult 
pornography) was potentially illegal and if so it would: 
 
 in respect of UK originated material, attempt to trace the source of material and 
to inform the author of the position under UK law, coupled with a request to 
remove the material; where co-operation is not forthcoming, request action from 
the relevant ISP and pass the details to the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS); and confirm the action to the complainant. 
 in respect of non-UK material, details would be passed to the foreign ISP, if it 
could be identified, and to NCIS, who would be able to liaise with the police 




As can be seen, this system originally envisaged that the IWF would first contact the 
source of potentially illegal material in order to request its removal, with escalation to 
the ISP and police as a fallback. This approach was, however, soon abandoned and 
instead IWF procedures were adapted to ensure that reports were made directly to ISPs 
and the police in all cases.
29
 At this point, the relevant ISP would then be effectively 
obliged to take down the material in question, being no longer able to assert that they 
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were unaware of the material and as such potentially facing liability (whether as a 
principal or accessory) for its possession or distribution. In making determinations of 
possible illegality, the IWF were guided by training and advice from the Metropolitan 





The hotline was launched by the IWF in December 1996 and soon began to process 
public complaints – starting relatively slowly with 1,291 complaints in the first full year 
of operation but rapidly building up to 4,297 complaints in 1999 following the 




(iv) Governance and funding 
 
Between 1996 and April 1997 the IWF was run on an interim basis by a steering group 
comprised of the IWF Chief Executive and members from the DTI, Home Office, ISPA 
and LINX.
32
 Following an agreement with government and the industry representatives, 
governance was put on a more permanent basis with the creation of a two tier structure 
under which the IWF had both an Industry Board and a Policy Board. 
 
The Industry Board represented the funders (from the internet industry), and had control 
of financial matters and the day to day operation of the IWF. Membership of that Board 
and voting rights were based on financial contributions. The Policy Board on the other 
hand was a weaker, primarily advisory body comprised of individuals representing 
various stakeholders and constituencies (such as children’s groups, consumer interests, 
and other media regulators), who were appointed on the basis of personal invitation from 
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 In 1999 these included representatives from the British 
Educational Communications Technology Agency (BECTa), NCH Action for Children, 
the Video Standards Council, the Independent Committee for the Supervision of 
Standards for Telephone Information Services (ICSTIS), the Independent Television 
Commission (ITC), the Department of Trade & Industry, the Home Office, the 





Start-up funding was provided by Peter Dawe, founder of Pipex (the first commercial 
UK ISP), who established the IWF as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Dawe charitable 
trust and through that trust funded the setting up and initial running costs. Thereafter, 
running costs were provided by the industry members – by 1999 comprising LINX, 




4. DTI / Home Office Review 
 
In March 1998 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Home Office jointly 
announced that they intended to review the work of the IWF, with the objective being: 
 
to receive a detailed review of the IWF and its work, in order to ensure that forward planning is 
based on a sound understanding of the current situation and likely future evolution of the Internet 





The review was conducted by consultants KPMG and Denton Hall who published a 
report in 1999 which endorsed the core elements of the IWF self-regulation model but 
made a number of recommendations for change. In particular, the report considered 
whether the remit of the IWF should be widened. While rejecting arguments that the 
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IWF should extend its work into areas such as fraudulent advertising and copyright 
infringement, the review did conclude that it should widen its remit in respect of illegal 
racist material.
37
 It also recommended that the IWF should take on a new function in 
relation to newsgroups, by playing a more proactive role in removing illegal material 
from Usenet and advising ISPs to voluntarily ban newsgroups which it had consistently 




In addition, the report identified the industry-dominated structure of the IWF as a 
hindrance and recommended that the “public role” of the body should be reflected by a 
strengthened Policy Board which would have an independent chairman and a majority of 
members from other public bodies or charities and which would replace the Industry 
Board in managing the day to day activities of the IWF. The Industry Board would, in 
turn, be downgraded to an Industry Committee (later to become known as the Funding 
Council) which would represent industry interests and would report to ISPs to agree 








These recommendations were accepted by the IWF, which in January 2000 was 
relaunched with a new governance structure. This introduced a revised Board (with a 
new Independent Chair, Roger Darlington) including four industry and eight 
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(ii) Extended remit 
 
Following the review recommendation, the IWF also implemented a wider role in 
relation to potentially criminal racist material, following consultations with the Home 
Office, CRE, Metropolitan Police, National High Tech Crime Unit and the CPS. Under 
this, the state authorities agreed to provide the IWF with “a careful analysis of the 
relevant law, a study of the relevant off-line court cases, and a mechanism for consulting 
the prosecuting authorities” – in effect replicating and also somewhat expanding the 
existing relationship between the IWF and the Metropolitan Police in respect of child 
pornography and obscenity.
41
 In turn, the IWF would then advise ISPs to remove racist 
material which it determined to be illegal. 
 
(iii) Governance and funding 
 
The IWF re-launch also led to a new understanding of its status, which according to 
Darlington was “acting in a quasi-regulatory role on matters of great public interest” so 
that it should commit itself to higher standards of governance and transparency.
42
 This 
manifested itself first in 2000 in a commitment to publish board papers and minutes on 
the web site.
43
 In April 2001 the IWF board also declared itself to be bound by the 
Human Rights Act 1998, stating that: 
 
The IWF accepts the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights and undertakes to 
be governed subject to the Human Rights Act on the basis that it should be treated as a public 
body. 
 
The same board meeting also determined to adopt governance standards from the public 
sector, resolving that: 
 
                                                 
41




 Internet Watch Foundation, ‘2000 Annual Report’, 2001. Unfortunately, while board minutes continue 
to be published board papers are no longer available. 
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The IWF accepts the Good Regulation Principles published by the Cabinet Office Regulatory 




On the funding front, there were also a number of developments at this time. In relation 
to government funding, the board adopted a policy that such funding was acceptable in 
principle but only in relation to specific projects or campaigns endorsed by the board – 
general government subscriptions would not be accepted.
45
 Funding from Europe did 
not, however, meet the same degree of concern and from June 2000 extensive funding 





(iv) Formalising of IWF role 
 
The final significant development following the re-launch of the IWF was a formalising 
of its role and the provision of a statutory defence to the possible offence of making 
indecent photographs of children. As discussed in chapter 2 the IWF as initially 
established was vulnerable to such charges under the Protection of Children Act 1978, 
which did not provide a public interest defence in respect of the making offence. 
Following input from the IWF, section 46 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 provided 
such a defence and its application to the IWF was confirmed by a 2004 Memorandum of 
Understanding between the CPS and ACPO which specifically permitted the making of 




At this point, therefore, the essential elements of the current structure were in place. 
While there have been changes since – notably in 2005 when it restructured in order to 
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 and again in 2011 when incitement to racial hatred was 
removed from its remit
49
 – in broad terms the IWF has maintained a similar form of 
governance, and in particular continues to be funded in part by industry and in part by 
the EU. 
 




The early role of the IWF in respect of newsgroups was relatively limited. In particular, 
it did not go nearly as far as the Metropolitan Police had demanded in their letter of 
August 1996 when it had requested that 133 newsgroups should be banned outright. 





This approach remained, however, the subject of considerable pressure from government 
and children’s lobby groups and, as has already been seen, the DTI/Home Office Review 
called for a move towards the outright banning of newsgroups. This continued pressure 
led to difficulties for the IWF following its re-launch, causing a controversy which 
spread over two years, led to accusations of censorship, and in many ways presaged the 
later debates over the adoption of the Cleanfeed system. 
 
(ii) Statistical reports to ISPs 
 
In October 2000 the new Chair, following the DTI/Home Office Review 
recommendations, began a consultation process on newsgroup policy. Following a 
lengthy and extensive debate – including external consultation and consideration of the 
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governance and Article 10 EHCR issues – the board adopted in July 2001 a compromise 
position which fell short of “banning” newsgroups, but recommended that ISPs should 
review their policies on which groups they carried, and established a system for 
providing ISPs with a monthly statistical report indicating how many illegal items were 
carried within each group. This board meeting also considered – but rejected – a 
proposal to harness consumer pressure by establishing a list of ISPs which blocked 




(iii) Banning newsgroups 
 
The compromise approach adopted in July 2001 was promptly rejected by children’s 
charities and by the Home Office, which wrote to the IWF immediately thereafter 
calling for the IWF to adopt a list of newsgroups to be blocked and continued to apply 
intense pressure over the summer of 2001.
52
 In the view of the Chair, this issue had the 
potential to threaten the basis of the IWF, so that there was a risk of a loss of 
government support and possible government intervention: 
 
Of course, the IWF is a self-regulatory model, which is independent of government. However, 
self-regulation can only work if we have the respect and support of government. My concern is 
that, if we do not take early steps to take on board the concerns of the children’s groups and the 
public and to reflect the changing opinion among many ISPs themselves, we will lose the 
confidence of key stakeholders, most notably government itself. If that happens, at best we will 
become increasingly less relevant and proposals such as an Internet clearing house will pass us 
by and, at worse, government will be inclined to intervene in a manner which will negate the self-




As a result of this pressure, board meetings in November 2001 and subsequently in 2002 
and 2003 abandoned the approach adopted in July and instead endorsed policies which 
established a system for identifying groups which “regularly contained” child 
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pornography, or which had “names judged to support or condone paedophilic activity”. 
“Regularly” was in turn defined to mean that on average at least one percent of images 
contained in that newsgroup were determined to be illegal.
54
 In respect of these groups, 
the IWF would recommend that ISPs block them, and steps would be taken towards a 
Code of Practice which would require all member ISPs to follow these 
recommendations. Consequently, although that Code of Practice was not eventually 
adopted until January 2004
55
, the new policies amounted in substance to a ban on certain 







The original purpose [of the IWF] was to sift out kneejerk reactions that were going to be 
counterproductive... amid concerns that the police would go wading in there banning 
newsgroups... Now it's trying to set itself up as a regulator and claim that it has some kind of 
legal clout. 




This change in policy sparked strong criticism from civil liberties advocates. Although 
there had been fears in 1996 that the IWF might take on a wide role in controlling 
internet content, these fears had largely been mitigated as time went on to the point 
where one free speech activist could describe the IWF as “mostly harmless”.
58
 Now, 
however, those fears were resurrected and critics claimed that the IWF was caving in to 
government pressure, going beyond its original remit, and doing so in a way which 
lacked any legal basis. In February 2002 Malcolm Hutty (who represented civil liberties 
                                                 
54
 Akdeniz, Internet Child Pornography and the Law, 256–257. 
55
 Internet Watch Foundation, ‘Code of Practice for Full Members’, January 2004. 
56
 For the legal advice as to Article 10 ECHR and whether the banning of newsgroups could be made a 
condition of membership see Internet Watch Foundation, ‘Board Minutes 22 July 2003’, 22 July 2003, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040810234039/http://www.iwf.org.uk/about/policies/minutes_220703.htm; 
Darlington, ‘IWF Newsgroup Policy’. 
57
 Wendy McAuliffe, ‘IWF Lambasted for Plan to Ban Newsgroups’, ZDNet.co.uk, 19 July 2001, 
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/emergingtech/0,1000000183,2091634,00.htm. 
58




interests) resigned from the IWF board in protest.
59
 To understand these criticisms, we 
must first distinguish between those groups blocked on the basis of their names and 




In respect of newsgroups with certain names (for example, alt.binaries.pictures.lolita) 
their prohibition may have been an inevitable outcome in any event, with or without the 
IWF.
60
 As the IWF notes: 
 
IWF received legal advice from the Crown Prosecution Service and from our own independent 
Standing Counsel that, a newsgroup name could, in certain circumstances, be an illegal 
advertisement under the Protection of Children Act 1978 and an ISP which knowingly carries 
such a group name will be committing an offence. Following the July 2002 Board meeting and 
based upon the legal advice, a list of newsgroup names was compiled and the recommendations 
resulting from this policy resulted in IWF advising UK ISPs they should not carry specific 









It was a different story, however, in relation to newsgroups blocked on the basis of 
content. Here critics pointed out that the criterion for blocking – whether an average of 
at least one percent of images contained in that newsgroup were determined to be illegal 
– presupposed banning newsgroups in which the overwhelming majority of content was 
perfectly legal.
62
 At the time Hutty cited alt.binaries.pictures.gillian-anderson, 
alt.binaries.pictures.teen-idols.princewilliam and alt.binaries.pictures.spice-girls as 
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examples of groups which would be banned as a result.
63
 In addition, the secrecy behind 





(c) Wider implications 
 
Moving away from the newsgroup ban itself, however, the episode also gave rise to 
concerns about the overall nature of the new, re-launched, IWF. There was an undoubted 
irony in the fact that a body set up in order to avoid banning newsgroups now found 
itself doing just that. Critics charged that the new board structure meant that the IWF 
had been removed from its ISP roots, so that it was being “built up into a child 
protection lobby”, ignoring civil rights concerns.
65
 The growing powers of the IWF, 
coupled with its willingness to give into Home Office pressure and its new racist 
material remit, suggested to some that it was becoming a de facto state body which 




Consequently, although the change in policy had important practical benefits (freeing up 
analysts to deal with web-based content, rather than fighting a resource intensive and 
ultimately futile battle in respect of newsgroups
67
) it nevertheless meant that the IWF 
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7. Web blocking 
 
Despite this extension of the IWF’s remit, child protection advocates were still 
dissatisfied with the extent to which child pornography was available within the UK. 
They argued that although the use of Usenet had been disrupted, child pornography was 
beginning to move to websites which were hosted outside the UK and therefore beyond 
the reach of police or the IWF.
69
 Consequently, there was some interest on their part in 




(i) BT takes the initiative 
 
As we have already seen, 2001-2002 was a time of intense political pressure on the IWF. 
This was, however, merely one part of wider government pressure on the industry. The 
then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, began in March 2001 by establishing a taskforce on 
improving child protection on the internet, challenging ISPs to go beyond the existing 
work of the IWF.
71
 The Home Office then followed this up in May 2001 with a proposal 
for a government funded “kitemark” scheme for ISPs, which would have provided a star 
rating for ISPs based on a child safety checklist – marking down and exerting consumer 
pressure on those ISPs which didn’t take steps to prevent access to child pornography 
online. The political urgency was enhanced by the June 2001 general election, in which 




Nick Truman, then head of internet and customer security at BT, indicates that this 
initiative of Jack Straw prompted BT to begin work on developing a blocking system 
which would prevent users from accessing child pornography on the web (not merely 
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 Blocking of child pornography websites had been tried elsewhere but had 
been hampered by technological limitations which caused massive over blocking – that 
is, collateral damage to innocent sites which were also blocked.
74
 However, with the 
rollout of broadband enabling new approaches to be taken, BT felt that more targeted 
blocking was possible. 
 
With high level support from within BT, substantial funding (ultimately totalling 
approximately one million pounds) was given to a project to devise a web blocking 
system.
75
 Under the internal title “Cleanfeed” it put together a two stage filtering system 
intended to minimise both false positives and slowdown of connections by looking at the 




(ii) Securing use of the IWF URL list 
 
Having conceived this system, BT also needed to identify which URLs to block. The 
obvious (and indeed only) source was the IWF, which had generated a database of URLs 
hosting child pornography as a result of its hotline function. There was, however, initial 
reluctance on the part of the IWF which changed only when Peter Robbins took over as 




Legal advice was given in November 2002 indicating that the IWF could make this list 
of illegal URLs available to members for the purpose of blocking images to protect 
customers from inadvertent exposure, and it was decided at that point that the URL list 
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would be provided to member ISPs, subject to safeguards being put in place to control 




There were, however, a number of obstacles to be overcome before the system could be 
deployed. According to Truman, BT was worried about the possible implications of 
blocking and therefore enlisted the Home Office in the development of the system for 
the purpose of “political cover”. In particular, there was a concern that wrongful 
blocking might take place – exposing them to liability (either reputational or financial) 
if, for example, a Microsoft domain were put on the list.
79
 For that reason, BT sought to 
build in a number of safeguards into the system. Following negotiations with the Home 
Office and the IWF, BT established the following principles which would govern its use 
of the URL list: 
 
BT does not log the IP addresses of users whose traffic is an attempt to reach a listed URL. 
 
BT has agreed with IWF and the Home Office that an independent academic audit shall be made 
of IWF’s processes and procedures so as to ensure that it is capable of meeting the standards that 
it has set for itself. 
 
As this is an audit of procedures this shall not include examination of any individual decisions 
with regard to particular URLs. 
 
The audit report will be made to the Chair and Chief Executive of the IWF. The Home Office 
will receive a copy of the audit report. BT will not receive a copy. 
 
BT has agreed with the IWF and the Home Office that an independent appeals process shall be 
created for use by persons whose own sites appear on the IWF’s database and who wish to 
challenge that designation. 
 
The adjudicator shall be appointed by POLIT, a unit within the National Crime Squad dedicated 
to online paedophilia. 
 
BT will not confirm whether a particular site is indeed listed (and, indeed, does not know). The 
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The statement that BT would not log IP addresses was particularly significant, as there 
was some police interest at the time in using the system to identify users – this had been 
made impossible, however, by a deliberate design choice on the part of BT in order to 





(iii) Cleanfeed deployed 
 
The BT system was trialled in 2004. Initially this was done quietly, reflecting a BT 
decision that Cleanfeed would not be used as a marketing tool.
82
 This, however, soon 
changed when the children’s charity with which BT was working on the system leaked 





The result was intense media interest, not least as leaked figures claimed that the system 
was blocking “20,000 hits per day”, something which the media took to mean that 
thousands of UK users were attempting to view child pornography.
84
 Unfortunately the 
actual number could not be verified as the steps which BT had taken in designing the 
system (for example, not logging the IP addresses which attempted to reach a blocked 
site) ensured that no conclusive analysis of the figures could be carried out.
85
 However, 
the headline figure was at the least very misleading as a substantial portion of this traffic 
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Following the leak, other ISPs were caught off-guard and were keen to play down the 
functionality of Cleanfeed as they came under pressure to deploy similar systems. ISPA 
in particular briefed the media as to the limitations of the system and the potential 
collateral damage which it might cause, and also questioned the reliability of the leaked 
statistics showing the claimed success of the BT system with a view to showing the 
continued effectiveness of the existing notice and take down system.
87
 The reasons 
behind ISP unwillingness to follow suit were varied, but included a mix of concerns 
about cost (which would be particularly high on a per-subscriber basis for smaller ISPs), 





8. Pressure to adopt blocking systems 
 
(i) Partial industry rollout of “Cleanfeed” systems 
 
Unsurprisingly, following the apparent success of this trial and the proof of concept it 
provided, there soon followed calls for other ISPs to follow BT’s example and to filter 
against the IWF URL list. In this, children’s charities were joined by the Home Office 
and by backbench MPs who kept the spotlight on ISPs. One prominent advocate was 
Margaret Moran MP who used the Ten Minute Rule to introduce a bill in October 2005 
which would have compelled ISPs “to declare publicly whether or not they have taken, 
or are taking, appropriate technical steps to block access to web sites that contain child 
pornography” – framing the issue as one of corporate social responsibility and 
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accountability to the public, and seeking to muster consumer pressure against those ISPs 




Faced with extensive political pressure to block, for the most part ISPs agreed to do so. 
Where they did publicly express any reluctance it was generally to cite commercial and 
practical rather than principled concerns. Consequently, by early 2006 most of the major 





(ii) Legislation threatened 
 
This, however, was still not acceptable to advocates of blocking. John Carr of children’s 
charity NCH, who had been involved in the development of Cleanfeed, was the most 
visible proponent of extending the remit of filtering and claimed that the failure to 
achieve 100% coverage showed that internet self-regulation had reached “its outer 
limits”, making legislation a necessity.
91
 This call was soon taken up by the Home 
Office, which signalled in May 2006 an intention to introduce legislation unless 100% 




This pressure did encourage more ISPs to adopt filtering, and by early 2009 
approximately 95% coverage had been achieved.
93
 A number of smaller ISPs, however, 
remained outside the filtering system citing both cost and the ineffectiveness of the 
system against “paedophiles with minimal technical knowledge” using “simple technical 
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 In response, the Home Office drew up plans to introduce 
legislation which would “compel domestic ISPs to implement the blocking of illegal 




(iii) Mandatory blocking abandoned 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, however, those plans appeared to meet with little support 
elsewhere in the official community. Jim Gamble – chief executive of the specialist 
police Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (Ceop) – stated that the existing 
blacklist was a “fabulous success” but that it was essentially limited to inadvertent or 
novice access and ineffective against “hardcore predators”. Instead, he claimed, the 
problem had largely moved on from websites and towards peer to peer networks, so that 




Similarly, the All Party Parliamentary Communications Group (apComms) came out 
against mandatory blocking in their October 2009 report “Can we keep our hands off the 
net?” In that report they pointed out the limitations of the system – in particular, that it 
was primarily intended to protect against innocent exposure – and recommended against 
legislation on the basis that it would be counterproductive and would deter industry from 




Not long afterwards the Home Office abandoned plans to legislate, on the basis that an 
Ofcom survey had revealed that 98.6% of connections were filtered, which they claimed 
demonstrated that voluntary compliance was substantially working. It did, however, 
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secure a concession from the industry in return, in the form of a commitment that the 
IWF would publish a list of ISPs who were certified as having implemented the 





The Government has also committed to using its own purchasing power to encourage 
take-up, and since March 2010 requires suppliers of internet services to deploy the IWF 
blacklist in respect of any services provided to departments, agencies or quangos.
99
 
Although this only requires suppliers to filter those services which are provided directly 
to public bodies, in practice it is likely to encourage filtering on other services also. 
 
9. URL list scope 
 
The URL list is limited to “child sexual abuse images”, by which the IWF means those 
images prohibited by the Protection of Children Act 1978 as amended by the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003.
100
 This does not include other material falling within the remit of the 
IWF such as criminally obscene adult content or “extreme pornography”. Nor, 
significantly, does it include all forms of “child pornography” prohibited by UK law – 
non-photographic images of children (“virtual child pornography”) have not been 
included by the IWF within the blocking system, due to concerns that inclusion of such 
images would significantly increase the reputational risks to the IWF and members and 
would make the blocking system unworkable.
101
 This undermines the argument that the 
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IWF merely implements the law as it stands by highlighting a significant discretion on 




10. Use of the URL list in other situations and jurisdictions 
 
While we have so far described the use of the URL list in the context of UK consumer 
ISPs, it should be noted that it has been adopted far more widely. The IWF licence 
permits members to make use of the list for blocking outside the UK, and as a result 
there is a significant spill over effect to ISPs in many other countries (such as Ireland) 
where the IWF list is used in the absence of a local list.
103
 In addition, the list is widely 
used in home, workplace and school filtering software and is also used by search engines 
(including both Google and Bing) on a worldwide basis to remove URLs from search 
results.
104
 When considered in terms of numbers of users covered, therefore, the IWF list 
is likely to be the most widely used blocking list ever. English law is, in effect, being 
exported – in a way which may block content which might be legal in other 
jurisdictions. 
 
11. The Wikipedia block and its aftermath 
 
(i) Criticisms of the Cleanfeed system 
 
Soon after BT’s Cleanfeed trial was leaked it came in for criticism. The covert and 
extra-judicial nature of the system coupled with the potential for function creep triggered 
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concerns in a way which essentially reprised the newsgroups debate three years prior.
105
 
These criticisms were amplified over the following years – especially in 2006 and 2007 
– after Home Office plans to achieve 100% coverage came to light.
106
 Even quite 
moderate commentators were prompted to argue, in the words of Edwards, that “[i]f 
Cleanfeed-style technology is imposed on all UK ISPs – by law or voluntarily – it could 
be the most perfectly invisible censorship mechanism ever invented” – but, as Edwards 
also went on to note, these criticisms were limited to a relatively small technical and 




(ii) Blocking of Wikipedia 
 
Journey with us to a state where an unaccountable panel of censors vets 95 per cent of citizens’ 
domestic internet connections. The content coming into each home is checked against a 
mysterious blacklist by a group overseen by nobody, which keeps secret the list of censored 
URLs not just from citizens, but from internet service providers themselves. And until recently, 
few in that country even knew the body existed. Are we in China? Iran? Saudi Arabia? No – the 
United Kingdom, in 2009. This month, we ask: Who watches the Internet Watch Foundation? 




The situation changed significantly on Friday 5
th
 December 2008, when parts of the 
encyclopaedia website Wikipedia effectively vanished from the United Kingdom 
internet.
109
 On that day ISPs serving the overwhelming majority of UK internet users 
simultaneously blocked access to particular pages, bringing public attention to the 
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Following a complaint from a user to the hotline, the IWF had determined that a 
Wikipedia image of a 1976 album cover (“Virgin Killer” by German heavy-metal band 
The Scorpions) featuring a naked pre-pubescent girl was potentially illegal as an 
indecent image of a child under the age of 18. As a result, it added two URLs to the 
blacklist. (Though due to a technical mistake, neither URL blocked the image itself but 





This, in and of itself, may not have been likely to cause a great controversy. The pages 
blocked – relating to an obscure German heavy metal album – were not of great inherent 
interest to the UK internet community. What was significant, however, was an 
unintended side effect of the blocking. By virtue of the technical approach most UK 
ISPs adopted, all traffic for any Wikipedia page or edit (not just for the two URLs) 
suddenly passed through a small number of ISP proxy servers. The result was to make it 
appear to Wikipedia that it was coming under attack from a narrow range of IP 
addresses. Wikipedia responded with automated counter-measures which prevented 
those IP addresses – and therefore almost all UK users – from editing pages or creating 
new accounts. As a result, Wikipedia users rapidly identified the existence of the block 





(iii) IWF stands over the blacklisting 
 
Soon after the blocking started, the IWF confirmed that it was responsible. It issued a 
statement indicating that it had received a complaint in respect of the pages. On viewing 
them, it had determined that the album cover was “a potentially illegal indecent image of 
a child under the age of 18” and as such it was added to the blacklist provided to ISPs 
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“to protect their customers from inadvertent exposure” to such images.
113
 On being 
contacted by the Wikimedia Foundation (which runs Wikipedia) the IWF stood over the 





This did not dampen what had become an increasingly heated issue amongst UK internet 
users, many of whom had viewed the image and saw it as unobjectionable – and who 
pointed out that the album image remained unblocked on many other websites such as 
Amazon. Instead by confirming the existence of widespread filtering it heightened the 
controversy, causing many to ask how a private body with no legislative basis had 
become a de facto arbiter of legality for the UK internet. The result was a storm of 
publicity
115




(iv) IWF backs down 
 
Ultimately, this controversy forced the IWF to back down and to withdraw the 
Wikipedia pages from its blacklist just four days later following an emergency board 
meeting.
117
 Though it still asserted that the image in question was “potentially in breach 
of the Protection of Children Act 1978” and had been properly listed in the first place, 
nevertheless it varied policy so that the URLs would be removed from the list given the 
                                                 
113
 Cade Metz, ‘Brit ISPs Censor Wikipedia over “Child Porn” Album Cover’, The Register, 7 December 
2008, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/12/07/brit_isps_censor_wikipedia/. 
114
 Davies, ‘The Hidden Censors of the Internet’. 
115
 See e.g. Nicole Martin, ‘Wikipedia Founder Considers Legal Action over Ban on “Pornographic” 
Album Cover’, The Telegraph, 9 December 2008, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/3689527/Wikipedia-founder-considers-legal-action-over-ban-on-
pornographic-album-cover.html; ‘Wikipedia Child Image Censored’, BBC News, 8 December 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7770456.stm. 
116
 See e.g. Bobbie Johnson, ‘Wikipedia Falls Foul of British Censors over Alleged Child Pornography’, 
The Guardian, 8 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/dec/08/wikipedia-
censorship. 
117
 Internet Watch Foundation, ‘Board Minutes 9 December 2008’. 
93 
 
“contextual issues involved in this specific case” and “the length of time the image has 




(v) Lessons from the Wikipedia block 
 
What should we make of this incident? The short duration of the block, and the 
relatively insignificant nature of the content blocked, might make it seem rather minor. 
Significantly, however, it exposed to public scrutiny a hitherto low profile blocking 
system and highlighted a debate which had previously been the preserve of a small 
number of industry observers, child protection advocates, academics and journalists.
119
 
In doing so, it also raised fundamental questions about the nature of the system which 
had previously escaped detailed scrutiny. While it did not itself stop Home Office plans 
for mandatory blocking (which continued into 2009) it may have contributed to the 
lukewarm reception such plans received elsewhere in government. 
 




At the very outset, by drawing attention to the borderline nature of images which would 
be adjudicated on (and the fact that the IWF acted on the basis of “potential illegality”) 
the incident undermined the reputation which the IWF had built up as a reliable arbiter 
of legality. As Ozimek notes: 
 
[T]he scene was set for the IWF to take a fall. Gone is its record for 100 per cent undisputed 
blocking. Gone, too, is its reputation for being the undisputed good guy. Many people have 
looked at the image in question and have taken the view that it is not porn, or indecent, or abuse. 
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Having made that judgement, they have started to ask questions about other imagery that the IWF 




It should be said, in fairness to the IWF, the fault here is primarily with the law itself. As 
we have already seen, there have long been complaints that the law is vague and 
overbroad in its terms and indeed has led to raids on art galleries.
121
 Nonetheless, when 
the public took the view that the blocking was unjustified then the IWF became the 






Also jeopardised was the integrity of the process operated by the IWF.
123
 At the outset, 
BT had insisted on an appeals process being established by the IWF as a safeguard. 
Until the Wikipedia case that mechanism had never been tested.
124
 On being tested, 
however, it proved unsatisfactory. 
 
First, it provided a right of complaint only to those “responsible for the hosting or 
content” of the URL in question, with no remedy for the user who was wrongly denied 
access. This privileged the rights of the speaker over those of the recipient of speech 
and, in practical terms, made it substantially more likely that wrongful blocking will 
continue. A site owner, particularly if based outside the UK, may be entirely unaware of 
the blocking, much less the involvement of the IWF, and may have little interest in 
engaging with the intricacies of UK law to overturn the block. 
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Second, it did not provide for any appeal to a court or other independent tribunal – the 
assessment by police was not an adequate substitute. Police judgement in relation to the 
possible illegality of images of children has been criticised in a number of high profile 
cases involving material by prominent artists, highlighting the need for an independent 




Third, the complaint mechanism did not provide for any right to make representations or 
to reply to any police input. In this case, therefore, it transpired that the “appeal” was 
carried out without the involvement of the “appellant”. In the words of Mike Godwin, 
general counsel for the Wikimedia Foundation: 
 
When we first protested the block, their response was, ‘We’ve now conducted an appeals process 
on your behalf and you’ve lost the appeal.’ When I asked who exactly represented the Wikimedia 




Lastly, the Wikipedia block also highlighted that the appeals process is not in fact final 
but can be overruled by a decision of the Board in individual cases, creating a risk that 
the system will favour those with the deepest pockets or most vocal supporters. 
 
To a large extent, the IWF claim to legitimacy was and is a procedural one, relying on 
the fact that it operates a formal mechanism for identifying material to be blocked, along 
with an appeals procedure. In this case, however, the apparently ad hoc nature of the 
decision-making – where the “appeal” was determined without any opportunity for 
Wikipedia to be heard and where the IWF Board eventually set aside the outcome of 
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(b) Parity of treatment for online/offline content 
 
The Virgin Killer album had been available for purchase in the High Street for over 30 
years. There had never been a prosecution relating to it.
128
 Had such a prosecution been 
brought it would have been public and the subject of intense media coverage. A single 
complaint to the IWF, however, was enough to result in an immediate and secret 
nationwide block, with no notice to Wikipedia, which might well have gone unnoticed 
but for the technical side effects. This difference in treatment was, of itself, disturbing to 
those who believed in the principle that, as far as possible, there should be parity of 






What did users see when they attempted to visit the blocked pages? The overwhelming 
majority of ISPs displayed deceptive error messages – usually a “404: File Not Found” 
error which falsely claimed that there was a technical problem at Wikipedia’s end and 
intentionally obscured the involvement of the ISP.
130
 In this regard, the episode 
reinforced earlier complaints about the secret nature of the system – particularly as 
blocking systems in Europe had, in the meantime, moved toward using block pages 




(d) Collateral damage 
 
The claim that hybrid blocking systems (as implemented by BT) could block specific 
URLs with no collateral damage to innocent content was also shown to be overstated.
132
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This point was reemphasised just one month later – in January 2009 – when numerous 
UK users found themselves unable to access the Internet Archive’s Wayback machine 
(an 85 billion page archive of internet history) as a result of one page on that site being 
put on the IWF blacklist. 
 
As with the Wikipedia block, the blame was not to be laid directly at the door of the 
IWF – in this case, the overblocking resulted from one ISP’s proxy server system and 
the way in which it interacted with the Internet Archive’s caching system.
133
 
Nevertheless, this episode reinforced the point that blocking systems in general were 
prone to causing unpredictable collateral damage. 
 
12. After Wikipedia: IWF changes in response 
 
As with the newsgroups ban several years before, the IWF recognised that the Wikipedia 
had done substantial damage to its reputation. In response, under its new chair Eve 
Salomon
134
 it took a number of steps to change the way in which URLs are blacklisted 
and the use of the list by ISPs, as well as to better communicate its aims and operation. 
 
(i) Contextual assessment and blocking of images 
 
One of the first changes was in relation to images such as the Virgin Killer album cover 
which were either of a borderline nature or presented some other risk (such as 
reputational or technical harm) if blocked. The IWF follows police practice by training 
analysts with reference to the Sentencing Guidelines Council classification
135
 of 
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indecent photographs of children, under which such images fall under a five part 
scheme: 
 
Level 1 Images depicting erotic posing with no sexual activity 
Level 2 Non-penetrative sexual activity between children, or solo masturbation by a child 
Level 3 Non-penetrative sexual activity between adults and children 
Level 4 Penetrative sexual activity involving a child or children, or both children and adults 
Level 5 Sadism or penetration of, or by, an animal 
 
Level 1 images – such as the image at the centre of the Wikipedia incident – clearly 
presented the greatest reputational risk to the IWF and consequently in January 2009 the 
board endorsed an emergency interim decision to stop automatically putting such images 
onto the URL list (except in cases where they were being sold commercially).
136
 This 
subsequently hardened into a decision to apply a contextual assessment to images 
generally, which would address situations such as the Wikipedia case, so that decisions 
to block would be made on a case by case basis where there was a risk that blocking 
might trigger an undesirable outcome.
137
 Under the new policy, therefore, decisions as to 
whether images were potentially illegal would take into account the context of the image 
(something which had been absent in the Wikipedia case) while decisions to block 
would also take into account the following criteria: 
 
Consideration will also be given to the following risks potentially associated with adding a URL 
to the IWF URL List i.e. 
a. Creation of significant problems for internet users. 
b. Creation of significant problems for list licensees. 
c. Likelihood of listing leading to increased availability of the image. 
d. Impact on the reputation of website owner and consequential impact on the IWF and its 
Members. 
 
Where such risks are present, the matter will be referred to a committee of the board for 
its decision. 
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(ii) Prioritising takedown 
 
A second strand of the response was to give greater prominence to the removal of 
images at source where possible. A longstanding criticism of Cleanfeed and other 
blocking systems has been that they create a tendency to use a relatively easy tactic – 
blocking – rather than the more difficult but much more desirable approach of 
developing international cooperation and takedown of images at source.
138
 The IWF had 
already taken some steps towards greater international cooperation
139
 but following the 
Wikipedia blocking these intensified, with greater focus being placed on developing 
relationship with hosting companies abroad and in the US in particular.
140
 Significantly, 






One of the ways in which the Wikipedia block most harmed the reputation of the IWF 
stemmed from the lack of transparency associated with the blocking system. In addition 
to governance concerns, the opaque nature of the system fuelled confusion as to its role 
and led to it being blamed in the public mind for many other forms of blocking – even 




To some extent this stemmed from the fact that the IWF had poorly communicated its 
role to the public. More specifically, however, it resulted from the obscure way in which 
the IWF URL list and individual ISP blocking systems interacted. While this lack of 
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transparency had been flagged from an early stage, little had been done about it.
143
 In 
particular, at the time of the Wikipedia block it was often unclear as to what ISPs were 
blocking against the URL list and how they were doing so. Consequently, as part of the 
response to the Wikipedia incident the board set out to improve transparency, despite the 
fact that this had previously been resisted by industry. Perhaps ironically, in so doing it 
also catered to both pro- and anti- blocking lobbies – the pro-blocking constituency 
(children’s charities) having consistently called for greater publicity in order to exert 
consumer pressure on those ISPs which did not block. 
 
(a) Promoting stop pages 
 
The first way in which this was done was through promoting the use of what the IWF 
termed “splash pages” and are generally known elsewhere as stop pages – that is, pages 
which notify the user that their attempt to visit a particular page has been blocked and 
which explain why. From 2010 onwards the IWF has recommended (but does not 
require) that such pages be used – but only where an ISP is blocking at the level of full 
URLs, not at domain level.
144
 The recommended text is as follows: 
 
403: Access Denied 
 
Access has been denied by your internet access provider because this page may contain indecent 
images of children as identified by the Internet Watch Foundation. If you think this page has been 
blocked in error please contact <your service provider>. 
 
While this may improve transparency, it nevertheless leaves open the issue that ISPs are 
not required to use such pages – and indeed, under the IWF rules, may not do so when 
blocking at domain level. Consequently, there remains a real risk that users may find 
themselves blocked without knowing why. 
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(b) Recipients of the URL list and self-certification 
 
As already discussed, a long-standing concern of children’s groups has been to identify 
those ISPs who are using (or not using) the IWF list for blocking purposes. Following 
the Wikipedia incident, this became all the more urgent as the IWF sought greater 
transparency to repair its reputation – and, as we have seen, identifying blocking ISPs 
also formed part of the quid pro quo by which mandatory blocking was averted. For that 
reason, in 2010 the IWF moved towards a two stage system of disclosure regarding use 
of the list – where members licensed to use the list would be listed on the website and in 
addition would be required to take part in a self-certification procedure which tested 




This again, however, contributes to transparency only in a very limited way. It primarily 
addresses the interests of children’s groups and the Home Office by creating a 
mechanism which will test (via dummy URLs) whether the ISPs are living up to their 
commitment by blocking material on the URL list. It does not, however, test in any other 
way how the blocking systems operate – and in particular it does not identify any over-
blocking or collateral damage which might be caused. It would do nothing, therefore, to 
guard against another Wikipedia incident. 
 
(iv) Revised appeals process 
 
A further IWF response to the Wikipedia episode was to introduce a revised appeals 
process
146
 which widened the categories of person entitled to appeal so that: 
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Any party with a legitimate association with the content or a potential victim or the victim’s 
representative, hosting company, publisher or internet consumer who believes they are being 
prevented from accessing legal content may appeal against the accuracy of an assessment. 
 
As before, however, the ultimate appeal is to an outside police agency whose decision is 
final. A truly independent appeal is still lacking. 
 
(v) Independent review of blacklist 
 
One of the immediate responses of the IWF after the Wikipedia block was to explore the 
possibility of a regular review of the content of the blacklist itself, to be carried out by a 
senior independent figure such as a judge.
147
 While this was accepted in principle by the 
board
148
 it was not ultimately implemented – apparently due to difficulties agreeing with 
the CPS a procedure by which this could be done.
149
 Consequently the only outside 
review of the blacklist appears to be a sampling process of current and historic screen 




13. Current developments: towards stop pages and proactive searches 
 
In 2013 the Prime Minister, David Cameron, launched a broad initiative on internet 
safety and children
151
 followed by a “cyber-summit” with the internet industry in 
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Downing Street in November 2013 focusing specifically on CAI.
152
 While the wider 
initiative deals with a variety of issues tangential to this thesis – such as the use of opt-in 
or opt-out parental control filters by UK ISPs
153
 and blocking of certain search terms by 
ISPs
154
 – it also proposes two changes to the Cleanfeed system which should be 
mentioned. 
 
The first of these aims at the greater use of warnings for those seeking to view CAI. In 
response to pressure from the Prime Minister Google and Microsoft have already rolled 





Figure 3 - Google search warning
156
 
                                                 
152
 Samuel Gibbs, ‘UK’s Top Tech Executives Meet for Summit against Online Child Abuse’, The 
Guardian, 18 November 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/18/uk-top-tech-
executives-online-child-abuse. 
153
 Georgia Graham, ‘Embarrassed Husbands Will Have to Discuss Plans to Watch Online Porn with Their 




 Nicholas Watt and Juliette Garside, ‘Google to Tackle Images of Child Sexual Abuse with Search and 







The Prime Minister has sought to match this under the Cleanfeed system by promoting 
the use of stop pages by ISPs, stating that: 
 
What we’ve already done is insist that clear, simple warning pages are designed and placed 
wherever child abuse sites have been identified and taken down so that if someone arrives at one 
of these sites they are clearly warned that the page contained illegal images… These warning 
pages should also tell people who’ve landed on these sites that they face consequences like losing 
their job, losing their family or even access to their children if they continue. And vitally they 
should direct them to the charity Stop it Now! which can help people change their behaviour 




In response, some ISPs which previously did not use stop pages (such as BT) have now 
introduced them.
158
 However many continue to be reluctant to do so
159
 and it remains to 
be seen whether their use will become universal and whether ISPs will start using the 
types of warning sought by the Prime Minister. 
 
A second, potentially much more significant, aspect of this initiative is that the 
government has asked the IWF to begin proactively searching for illegal content to 
block.
160
 According to the Culture Secretary, Maria Miller “Until now, action has only 
been taken by the IWF when a child sexual abuse image is reported. Now, for the first 
time, the IWF has been asked to work alongside Ceop to search for illegal and abusive 
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This addresses an important criticism of the Cleanfeed system as it stands – that by 
relying on ad hoc reports from the public the URL list can only block access in a 
haphazard way. When implemented, therefore, this has the potential to significantly 
increase the effectiveness of the system in preventing inadvertent or casual access. There 
must be a question mark, however, as to the possible effect of an expanded URL List. 
The Wikipedia incident highlighted the collateral damage that can be caused by even 
advanced blocking systems. Since then there have been a number of comparable 
examples
162
 – but overall these appear to be relatively few. It is likely that this is due in 
part to the fact that the URL list contains a relatively small number of URLs at any one 
time. Should the size of the list increase significantly then the risk of collateral damage 
will also increase.
163
 More fundamentally, this change also marks a significant move on 
the part of the IWF away from simply operating an industry hotline and towards an 
active policing role which is likely to be more controversial. The reference to working 
“alongside Ceop” is significant and reflects the fact that, as in other situations, the IWF 






The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) is a prime example of how self-regulation can produce 
excellent results – even in such a sensitive area as combating child sexual abuse images on the 
internet. By successfully cooperating with a wide range of internet players, the IWF has made a 
breakthrough in the United Kingdom. It simply cannot be tolerated that internet users would 
accidentally be exposed to such horrific images. 




IWF falls into a category of ‘least worst’ rather than ‘perfect’. 
– Peter Sommer, 2008
166
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Notwithstanding its relatively short history, informed observers differ significantly as to 
the merits of the IWF and in particular the blocking systems which it facilitates. What is 
striking, however, is a remarkable level of consensus even amongst its critics that the 
IWF has served a desirable function in helping to restrain more intrusive government 
regulation of the internet in the UK. 
 
There is a widely held view – even amongst those who describe themselves as 
suspicious of the IWF – that it provides a “pragmatic solution to reconciling two 
principles: as much Internet freedom as possible and preventing the distribution of 
material which the UK Parliament, as long ago as 1978, decided was illegal”.
167
 This 
view is echoed by many who would prefer not to see the system put on a legislative 
basis.
168
 The majority of those interviewed for this research have said that fears of wider 
censorship are mitigated rather than exacerbated by the current structure of the IWF, 
which has been described as “the saviour of the UK internet from further regulation”.
169
 





These comments about the IWF should not necessarily be taken as approval of the 
Cleanfeed system, where views have been much more mixed, and it is notable that the 
IWF itself has begun to de-emphasise the role of blocking in the wake of the Wikipedia 
incident. It is important, therefore, to separate out the two for the purposes of analysis – 
not least as the manner in which individual ISPs block differ significantly (whether stop 
pages are used, for example). When we do so, the role of filtering becomes significantly 
more problematic and the following two chapters will consider the operation of the 
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Cleanfeed system in more detail, using a three part analytical framework (code as law, 










Technological changes are often disruptive of social and legal structures.
1
 In the case of 
the internet this disruption has challenged the power of the state to enforce national laws 
against online content.
2
 In response, states have adopted new regulatory strategies which 
appear to meet that challenge, but which have in turn been criticised as undermining 
constitutional values, in particular the protections associated with freedom of expression 




An extensive literature has developed within the field of regulatory governance which 
examines this interplay between technological change and state response, considering 
the role of technology both as a subject of regulation and as a regulatory tool in its own 
right.
4
 The literature makes a number of predictions about the impact of technology, the 
types of regulatory strategies which may be adopted, their effectiveness and their impact 
on constitutional values. This chapter examines the operation of the Cleanfeed system in 
light of this literature, with a view to testing and refining these predictions. In particular, 
it: 
 
 Outlines the cyber-libertarian/cyber-paternalist debate as to the extent to which 
the internet is resistant to control by states; 
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 Introduces the practical difficulties (such as anonymity/pseudonymity, 
jurisdictional arbitrage and technological challenges) associated with tackling 
child pornography and other forms of content online; 
 Describes the regulatory strategies suggested by cyber-paternalists (in particular 
intermediary or gatekeeper regulation, and regulation by code or architecture) 
and assesses how these have been used in Cleanfeed; 
 Describes the concerns expressed about such strategies (such as fears of 
overblocking) and considers to what extent those concerns have been borne out 
in the UK context; and 
 Examines claims that effective regulation of the internet requires that these 
regulatory strategies be used, by considering the extent to which these strategies 
(as embodied in Cleanfeed) have proved effective at tackling the distribution of 
child pornography online. 
 
2.  The cyber-libertarian vision 
 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from 
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us 
alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather… 
 
I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you 
seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of 
enforcement we have true reason to fear... 




An early view of the internet was that it was a place beyond the control of states. As 
Barlow’s famous Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace shows, this view 
combined both normative and descriptive elements. The normative claim was founded 
on the argument that state regulation was illegitimate – that the internet created a new 
“cyberspace” which was not the property of any one jurisdiction and was instead a realm 
of the mind. The descriptive aspect, on the other hand, was based on the belief that 
                                                 
5




technological features of the internet meant that governments had no “methods of 
enforcement” that users had “reason to fear”. Instead, so the vision went, new structures 
of governance would emerge from the internet itself, as online communities would 
develop their own systems of self-regulation.
6
 This view came to be dubbed “cyber-
libertarianism”, reflecting its obvious appeal for an internet community which was seen 




Events since then have to a large extent undermined that early vision, and even “virtual 
selves” have proved to be subject to the control of the state – not always, admittedly, but 
sufficiently often that the Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace is now commonly 
the subject of mockery.
8
 To understand why, however, we must first understand the 
claims which the cyber-libertarians made in order to see how their points – so 
convincing to many at the time – were later circumvented. 
 
(i) Legitimacy of regulation 
 
At the core of the cyber-libertarian argument was the bold claim that state regulation of 
the internet was illegitimate – not merely impractical, undesirable or unwise. This was 
an audacious proposition even at the height of cyber-utopianism, challenging as it did 
the powers of democratically elected governments. When examined more closely, it can 
be seen to have three components: one which focuses on issues of jurisdiction and 
applicable law, one which privileges self-governance by “netizens”
9
 over state action, 
and one which deems cyberspace to be a place of thought and speech rather than action. 
Each will be considered in turn. 
 
                                                 
6
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(a) Jurisdiction and applicable law 
 
One of Barlow’s claims was that cyberspace “is a world that is both everywhere and 
nowhere, but it is not where bodies live”.
10
 In this, he echoed the views of lawyers who 
concluded that the cross-border nature of internet activities meant that no one sovereign 
could have any claim to legitimately regulate the online world, and that even “local” 
regulation would have an improper spillover effect into other jurisdictions – for 
example, by requiring US firms to censor material from their US users on the basis that 
it might be illegal in some other jurisdiction such as Germany.  
 
The most famous exemplars of this view were Johnson and Post who in their seminal 
1996 article “Law and Borders – the Rise of Law in Cyberspace” argued that territorial 
claims to jurisdiction were self-defeating. Dealing with the argument that states may 
properly regulate online activity which has effects within their borders, Johnson and Post 
argued that this claim, brought to its logical conclusion, would mean that online 
activities would simultaneously be subject to the laws of all states. Instead, therefore, 
Johnson and Post argued for a vision of cyberspace as a new and distinct place, sitting 
outside national boundaries, to which new and distinct rules should apply. Any other 
solution would invariably result in improper spillover effects, in which the law of one 




(b) Self-governance as a substitute for state control 
 
Even if we accept the premise of cyberspace as a new and distinct place it still raises a 
further question – who should make its new and distinct rules? If no one state can assert 
a right to legislate for the internet then why isn’t the appropriate response for states to 
work together to make new law at a multi-lateral level? The response of the cyber-
libertarians was to argue that self-regulatory structures would grow up within 
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cyberspace, formulated by the “people who cared most about and best understood their 
new creation” with the implication that such structures would enjoy greater legitimacy 
amongst internet users.
12
 Johnson and Post set out their fundamental principle as being 
that: 
 
If the sysops and users who collectively inhabit and control a particular area of the Net want to 
establish special rules to govern conduct there, and if that rule set does not fundamentally 
impinge upon the vital interests of others who never visit this new space, then the law of 




This view relied on the argument that the internet permitted individuals to choose freely 
between different sets of rules within cyberspace, and portrayed this active consent of 
the netizen to online structures as preferable to the “fictional” consent of the citizen to 




(c) “Cyberspace, the new home of mind” 
 
The third strand of the cyber-libertarian challenge to legitimacy of state regulation was 
to portray the internet as a realm of thought and speech alone and thus presumptively 
beyond the realm of state control. As Boyle commented: 
 
The libertarian culture that dominates the Net at present posits that state intervention into private 
action is only necessary to prevent “harms.” Seeing the Net as a “speech-dominated” realm of 
human activity in which harm would be comparatively hard to inflict, libertarians have been even 
more resistant to state regulation of the digital environment than of, the disdainfully named, 





This argument drew heavily on US law – by classifying internet use as “speech” rather 
than “action” the cyber-libertarians sought to bring it within the strong protections of the 
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First Amendment. Ironically, therefore, the idea of a distinct online realm relied in large 




(ii) Practicability of regulation 
 
Quite distinct from these claims about the legitimacy of regulation were claims about the 
practicability of regulation. Here, the cyber-libertarians argued that the nature of the 
internet would preclude government control – short of the draconian step of 
disconnecting a state from the internet entirely. This represented a variety of strong 
technological determinism
17
 in its belief that technology would irresistibly shape social 
practices, and the following passage from Johnson and Post was typical of this view: 
 
[E]fforts to control the flow of electronic information across physical borders – to map local 
regulation and physical boundaries onto Cyberspace – are likely to prove futile, at least in 
countries that hope to participate in global commerce. Individual electrons can easily, and 
without any realistic prospect of detection, “enter” any sovereign's territory. The volume of 
electronic communications crossing territorial boundaries is just too great in relation to the 




When examined closely, this claim can be seen to have a number of different 
components, which will be examined separately. 
 
(a) Jurisdictional arbitrage 
 
A central part of the cyber-libertarian case was that states could not, in the words of 
Johnson and Post, “map local regulation and physical boundaries onto Cyberspace”. 
This seamless nature of the internet appeared to open the door to jurisdictional arbitrage, 
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so that users could, in effect, choose which law applied to their internet use.
19
 Local laws 
against pornography, for example, would be ineffective if users could access sites based 
in jurisdictions such as the United States where the law was more permissive. According 
to cyber-libertarians, therefore, governments would be faced with a dilemma – either cut 
off access to the internet entirely (with resulting economic harm) or face the impossible 




Unlike traditional newspapers, radio or television, the internet did not require 
communications to be filtered via an editor, allowing for a wider range of views to be 
aired and limiting the traditional points at which states could exercise formal or informal 
control.
20
 Unlike the broadcast spectrum, bandwidth was not lacking, undermining 
traditional rationales for the regulation of broadcasting. It became viable to deliver 
content worldwide for even the most niche interest – it was no longer necessary to 
aggregate a critical mass of readers or viewers to make distribution economically 
feasible. Suddenly the tools of broadcasting and mass publication became available to 
almost anyone, and as a result Barlow and others saw the internet as creating “a new 
social space, global and anti-sovereign, within which anybody, anywhere can express to 




(c) Anonymity, privacy and the crypto-anarchist vision 
 
The cyber-libertarian argument also relied on the existence of a network structure which 
was perceived to promote anonymity – or at least pseudonymity.
22
 As a result, so the 
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argument went, governments would find it difficult or impossible to trace the users 
behind any given communication, putting them effectively beyond control. In Lessig’s 
words: “[t]he invisible man doesn’t fear the state... If you can’t know who someone is, 




When coupled with the widespread availability of strong encryption, this appeared to 
some to create the conditions for “crypto-anarchy” – an online world in which public 
key cryptography enabled communications which could not be monitored by states, 
along with digital cash which would be anonymous and untraceable. According to its 
advocates, therefore: 
 
The combination of strong, unbreakable public key encryption and virtual network communities 
in cyberspace will produce interesting and profound changes in the nature of economic and social 
systems. Crypto anarchy is the cyberspatial realisation of anarcho capitalism, transcending 





(d) Volume of communications and rate of change 
 
The complexity of Third Wave society is too great for any centrally planned bureaucracy to 
manage. Demassification, customization, individuality, freedom – these are the keys to success 
for Third Wave civilization. 




In addition to other restraints on states, Johnson and Post argued that monitoring of 
communications was impractical where “[t]he volume of electronic communications 
crossing territorial boundaries is just too great in relation to the resources available to 
government authorities”.
26
 A similar point was often made (and continues to be made in 
respect of filesharing) in respect of controls aimed at individual users and websites, 
where it was argued that the numbers involved would undermine traditional legal 
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controls which were resource intensive and depended on targeting a relatively small 
number of actors.
27
 On a related point, it was also sometimes argued that the speed of 
technological change would also present problems for states – so that legislation could 
not keep pace with developments on the internet, stymieing attempts to pursue online 




Events in the UK have, to a large extent, proved the truth of these points. Where 
perpetrators can be identified, in some cases their numbers have challenged police 
resources. In the 2002 case of Operation Ore, for example, Jewkes and Andrews note 
that 7,200 UK users were suspected of buying child pornography, of whom only 1,200 
were arrested. Even this selective response however was described by police as 
“crippling” their capabilities, taking up all available resources in a way which 




3. The cyber-paternalist response 
 
From approximately 1996 onwards the cyber-libertarian vision was met with a number 
of objections by a group of theorists dubbed cyber-paternalists, who challenged the 
normative and descriptive claims on which it was based, arguing that the internet both 




                                                 
27
 Swire, ‘Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy’. 
28
 See e.g. Bert-Jaap Koops et al., ‘Should Self-Regulation Be the Starting Point?’, in Starting Points for 
ICT Regulation: Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-Liners, ed. Bert-Jaap Koops et al. (The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006). 
29
 Yvonne Jewkes and Carol Andrews, ‘Policing the Filth: The Problems of Investigating Online Child 
Pornography in England and Wales’, Policing & Society 15, no. 1 (March 2005): 48–49. 
30
 Andrew Murray, ‘The Regulatory Edge of the Internet’, International Journal of Information 





(a) Jurisdiction and applicable law 
 
On the normative side, the cyber-paternalist view began by rejecting as overblown 
claims that the internet should be treated as a new world for the purposes of private 
international law, describing it instead as being “functionally identical to transnational 
activity mediated by other means, such as mail or telephone or smoke signal”.
31
 Critics 
such as Goldsmith noted that spillover effects and multiple concurrent jurisdictions were 
nothing new in private international law, and suggested that existing choice of law rules 




(b) Against self-governance 
 
The cyber-paternalist response also attacked the core of the cyber-libertarian argument 
that self-regulation was inherently more desirable in an online environment than rules 
imposed by states. This attack took various forms, but one of the most important was the 
claim that the “bottom up” governance involved in self-regulation would result in the 
systematic erosion of important public and democratic values. Lessig identified this as 
“policy-making by the invisible hand” and argued that profit motives and other factors 
would ensure that “the invisible hand, through commerce [constructs] an architecture 
that perfects control” and thereby restricts liberty.
33
 In a striking analogy, he compared 
the internet with post-Communist Russia and argued that in each case the decline of the 
state did not automatically result in freedom, but instead laid the foundations for a 
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In a similar vein, Reidenberg expressed concern that the cyber-libertarian vision was 
fundamentally anti-democratic. Rather than promoting democracy, he argued, the effect 
of embedding policy rules in the technical infrastructure of the internet was to give a 
small technocratic elite the power to set at naught the legitimate decisions of democratic 
governments. In his view, therefore, there was a democratic imperative to ensure that 
states could exert effective control over information available in their territories, and he 
rejected attempts by US firms to export First Amendment values as showing little 





(c) Limits of the “Realm of Mind” 
 
The cyber-libertarian viewpoint was also dismissed by many who did not share their 
starting point of cyberspace as a “realm of the mind” which should presumptively be 
beyond state regulation. Two distinct aspects to this response can be identified. The first 
is exemplified by Reidenberg who pointed out that this view itself privileged one 
jurisdiction – that the “American belief in information freedom” did not “reflect more 





Perhaps more importantly, however, the idea of cyberspace as a separate realm of speech 
and thought was questioned – even by those otherwise sympathetic to the cyber-
libertarian cause – as neglecting the real world effects which communications have on 
third parties. For example, Hardy, though supporting decentralisation and self-regulation 
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online where possible, argued that contractual governance in cyberspace was inapt 




This point becomes even stronger in the context of child pornography, where recent 
work has developed the argument that the distribution of images of abuse online 
constitutes a form of re-victimisation, particularly where the victim of abuse has to live 
with the knowledge that their image is perpetually available and may even be seen by 
someone they know.
38
 In this context, the early idea that cyberspace is merely a “realm 
of the mind” becomes much more difficult to sustain. 
 
(ii) Practicability of regulation 
 
Turning away from the cyber-paternalist claims about the legitimacy of state regulation 
of the internet we come to the practicability of regulation. Here, the cyber-paternalists 
warned against a naive faith in the ability of technology to undermine government 
power, arguing instead that the growth of the internet created an opportunity for 
governments to consolidate and perfect their power in a way which went beyond 
anything possible offline and which might systematically undermine existing civil 
liberties. If these tendencies were to be checked, they argued, the cyber-libertarians 
would have to descend from their “realm of the mind” and fight battles in the traditional 
political world. 
 
(a) Online activities escaping the reach of offline laws 
 
For five hundred years a struggle was fought, and in a few countries won, for the right of people 
to speak and print freely, unlicensed, uncensored, and uncontrolled. But new technologies of 
electronic communication may now relegate old and freed media such as pamphlets, platforms 
and periodicals to a corner of the public forum. Electronic modes of communication that enjoy 
lesser rights are moving to center stage. The new communications technologies have not 
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inherited all the legal immunities that were won for the old... And so, as speech increasingly 
flows over those electronic media, the five-century growth of an unabridged right of citizens to 
speak without controls may be endangered. 




One of the cyber-libertarian claims was that existing (offline) legislation would soon 
find itself outdated, as government could not move fast enough to legislate for new 
(online) situations. While there was undoubtedly some truth in this point, the result was 
not necessarily to their advantage. As de Sola Pool had presciently observed a decade 
earlier, new communications technologies were frequently more rather than less 
vulnerable to state control. In particular, many legislative protections for freedom of 
expression and privacy had been established with traditional means of communication in 
mind and did not necessarily carry over to the online world. 
 
As a result, the cyber-libertarian vision neglected the fact that technological change 
could permit governments to take measures online which would be denied to them in the 
offline world. Without legislative updates, postal packets might enjoy greater legal 
protection than IP packets. 
 
To some this might have seemed a minor objection. After all, the cyber-libertarian 
position (at least in its strongest form) was based on a belief that governments could not 
control the online world, irrespective of the legal powers they enjoyed. It did, however, 
mean that the cyber-libertarian position was extremely brittle – once a government 
acquired a particular technical capability, failure to update legislation meant that there 
might not be a fallback position in the form of a legal control on the use of that 
capability. 
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(b) Techno-utopianism as a distraction from political action 
 
This brittleness was compounded by a refusal on the part of some cyber-libertarians to 
engage with the political process. For many critics cyber-libertarianism was positively 
harmful to the extent that it encouraged technologists to passively rely on their belief in 
technological determinism instead of actively lobbying for the protections they sought. 
Morrison eloquently expresses this view when she argues that: 
 
Barlow’s piece and others like it promoted self-congratulatory and heroic poses that allowed the 
adherents of the Wired philosophy to see themselves as intrinsic revolutionaries. It is easy enough 
to see the appeal of such a position; it is far less taxing to don a pair of cyberpunk sunglasses and 
gesticulate insultingly to The Powers That Be than it is to put on a suit, prepare to compromise 
and lobby for a position at the legislative table… [I]t distracted passionate, fundamentally decent 





Lessig has expanded on this point further, arguing that a reliance on “technological 
short-cuts” is undesirable as undermining democratic participation: 
 
Of course, my view is that citizens of any democracy should have the freedom to choose what 
speech they consume. But I would prefer they earn that freedom by demanding it through 




One does not have to agree with his apparent feeling that a freedom which is earned is 
more virtuous than one which is given to see the strength of the underlying point that the 
cyber-libertarian view, taken to its logical conclusion, may lead to an unhealthy 
detachment from (or even disdain for) the democratic process. 
 
(c) Remaking the architecture of the internet 
 
Probably the single most important contribution of the cyber-paternalists was their 
recognition that the technology which made the internet resistant to state control was 
                                                 
40
 Morrison, ‘An Impossible Future’, 67. 
41
 Lessig, Code: Version 2.0, 309. 
122 
 
malleable – that the architecture of the internet could be remade in a way which would 




When examined closely, the cyber-libertarian argument relied on a form of strong 
technological determinism and implicitly assumed that technology would inevitably 
remake society via a one way causal chain. In that assumption, however, it overlooked 
the point that the causal relationship is not solely one way – that society could also shape 
technology. In particular, it neglected a well established body of scholarship which 





Seen against this background, claims based on a particular technical architecture of the 
internet became much more problematic. While the cyber-libertarian school accepted 
that the internet was not static, they did hold the belief that the general trends embedded 
in it were inevitable and irreversible. As Dyson et al. put it in their grandly titled 
“Magna Carta for the Internet Age”: 
 
Living on the edge of the Third Wave, we are witnessing a battle not so much over the nature of 




Against this, however, theorists such as Lessig pointed out that the aspects of the 
internet which resisted state control were not set in stone –they were the result of choices 
as to the design of the underlying technology and those choices could be reversed and 
the design changed. For example, governments could mandate the introduction of data 
retention rules, requiring ISPs to track user behaviour – or could require user 
authentication to be built into online transactions. Once this was understood, the cyber-
libertarian claims took on a much more contingent nature.
45
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(d) Three strategies: Code as law, gatekeeper regulation and self -regulation 
 
Building on this insight, the cyber-paternalists argued that a number of regulatory 
strategies could be adopted which would permit states to reassert their authority over the 
internet. In particular, they identified three strategies which intersect in the Cleanfeed 
system. The first of these – the use of code as law – promised more efficient and 
automated enforcement of legal rules.
46
 The second – gatekeeper regulation – appeared 
to provide a reduced workload for governments by enabling them to target a relatively 
small number of actors.
47
 Finally the third – promoting self-regulation – seemed to 
permit regulation which was more responsive and could avoid legal constraints which 




The first two strategies will be considered in the following sections which discuss the 
use of code as law and gatekeeper regulation, outline the criticisms of each, and assess to 
what extent those criticisms have been borne out in the context of Cleanfeed, while the 
issues associated with self-regulation will be dealt with in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
4. Code as law 
 
(i) Introduction and advantages 
 
The issue here is how the architecture of the Net—or its “code”—itself becomes a regulator. In 
this context, the rule applied to an individual does not find its force from the threat of 
consequences enforced by the law... Instead, the rule is applied to an individual through a kind of 
physics. A locked door is not a command “do not enter” backed up with the threat of punishment 
by the state. A locked door is a physical constraint on the liberty of someone to enter some space. 
– Lawrence Lessig, 2006
49
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Following on from the insight that network architecture could be remade, a number of 






) developed this point 
further by arguing that the architecture could be remade in a way which didn’t merely 
facilitate state enforcement but itself effected that enforcement. That is, the software or 
“code” underlying the network can function as a type of self-executing law, one which 
makes targeted behaviour either difficult or impossible, and thus minimises or entirely 
does away with the need for traditional legal enforcement mechanisms such as police 
and courts. By analogy with the offline world one might consider the speed camera 
versus the speed bump: both devices aimed at changing driver behaviour, but the latter 
having the advantage of being self-enforcing, physically preventing drivers from 




This analysis drew on an existing literature from within criminology on situational crime 
prevention
54
 and, insofar as it promised more effective enforcement of the law, had an 
obvious appeal.
55
 Reidenberg, for example, went so far as to say that states had an 
obligation to use this type of regulation (which he described as lex informatica) where 
necessary to achieve an important public policy goal.
56
 Similarly, in the context of CAI 
Taylor and Quayle argued that the use of technical controls could balance what they 
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In addition, code as law also appeared to address a number of cyber-libertarian claims 
about legitimacy and legislative overspill – by using tools such as geolocation and 
filtering, states could ensure that regulation mapped more closely onto geographic 
boundaries.
58
 More generally, it might also be argued (as with situational crime 
prevention generally) that regulation by code is a more humane form of regulation 
compared with traditional law enforcement – that insofar as it prevents crime it spares 
the prospective offender from the stigma and punishment that would be associated with 
a criminal conviction. 
 
Others, however, were warier, and (led by Lessig) have identified risks with this type of 
regulation: many of which have manifested themselves in the context of Cleanfeed. 
 
(ii) Indirection and opacity 
 
[A]fter 1948 local communities shifted their techniques for preserving segregation. Rather than 
covenants, they used architecture... No longer able to effect segregation directly, they used 
zoning laws – geographical architecture, or real space code – to effect it indirectly... Here the 
government is regulating indirectly... [and] gets an effect at no political cost. It gets the benefits 
of what would clearly be an illegal and controversial regulation without even having to admit any 
regulation exists. 




A key criticism of code as law is that it permits governments to regulate indirectly, 
bypassing the legal constraints or political costs which would otherwise apply to their 
actions. In Lessig’s example, by controlling the built environment governments could 
attempt to preserve racial segregation in a way which would otherwise be denied to them 
                                                 
57
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by law, and which would provoke public anger if known. Similarly, in the online 
environment Lessig saw a risk that governments could seek to build in controls into the 
network in such a way that users would experience these restrictions as inherent in the 




Closely related to the notion of indirection is a further concern – that code as law is 
inherently more opaque than other modalities of regulation.
61
 The contrast here is 
especially striking when we consider attempts to control speech. Traditional forms of 
censorship have generally involved at least some elements of transparency. In some 
cases this takes the form of a public index of banned books (such as the infamous Index 
Librorum Prohibitorum
62
); in others, legislation of general application enforced with 
public trials or forfeiture hearings. In each case, however, the fact that a work was 
prohibited was not itself a secret, nor was the source of the power which brought about 





In the case of regulation by code, however, it becomes possible to control content in a 
way which bypasses these mechanisms of transparency. Users can, for example, be 
presented with a deceptive error page which conceals from them the fact that access to a 
particular website has been blocked. Even when users are aware that a block is in place, 
they may often be unaware as to which part of the network chain is responsible for the 
blocking: a library user, for example, might not know whether to blame the library itself, 
the ISP providing connectivity to that library, or some entity further upstream again. As 
a result, accountability becomes difficult where the user is unable to determine who is 
responsible. This is especially true if (as is increasingly common) multiple internet 
filters are in use concurrently. 
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To what extent are these criticisms borne out in the case of Cleanfeed? To answer this 
question it must be remembered that Cleanfeed is a system rather than a single entity – 
as a result there may be differing levels of transparency in respect of different parts of 
the system. 
 
In relation to the IWF itself, it is fair to say that it is generally transparent in its 
operations. Board minutes and operating policies are all available on its website. In 
relation to the Child Abuse Image Content (CAIC) URL list the IWF is open as to the 
criteria which must be met in order for a URL to be added to that list and the manner in 
which it is periodically reviewed, and from time to time reports on the number of URLs 
on that list.
64
 More recently, the IWF has also begun to publish a list of companies 
which receive the list and have voluntarily committed to filtering
65
 and has taken steps 
to promote transparency elsewhere in the system by encouraging those companies to use 
splash pages where material is blocked.
66
 The main exception to this general rule of 





Turning away from the IWF itself, however, there has been little transparency in the 
other parts of the Cleanfeed system. The individual ISPs which receive the URL list and 
block access using that list have been very poor at notifying users of the fact that they 
are doing so. This can be seen most clearly when we consider the use of block pages 
which indicate to users that a particular page has been blocked to them. In this regard, 
the Wikipedia “Virgin Killer” incident acted as a natural experiment which provides us 
with a valuable source of data, in the form of the Wikipedia administrators’ page which 
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recorded how UK users were affected by the blocking.
68
 That page gives us a snapshot 
of how UK ISPs implemented blocking in 2008, summarised below: 
 




    
3 UK “Site blocked”  x 
Be Unlimited 404 error x x 
BT 404 error x x 
Demon Internet Stop page   
Eclipse Internet 404 error x x 
PlusNet TCP RST x x 
TalkTalk 404 error x x 
Telefónica 02 UK 404 error x x 
Tesco.net Unknown x x 
UK Online 404 error x x 
Virgin Media / NTL TCP RST / 502 x x 
Vodafone Block page   
Sky 404 error x x 
T-mobile Redirect to IWF site   
Figure 4 - ISP implementation of Wikipedia blocking 
 
From this, we can see that of 15 ISPs only four notified users that their access was being 
deliberately blocked, with the remaining 11 presenting users with deliberately deceptive 
results intended to create the impression of access being prevented by technical errors. 
In turn, of the four who notified users of the existence of blocking only three explained 
that the IWF was behind the decision to block. Indeed, these figures substantially 
understate the position – three of the four providers who indicated that a block was in 
place were mobile broadband providers and the only fixed line ISP (Demon) had a 
relatively small market share. Consequently, at the time of the Wikipedia block the 
overwhelming majority of UK internet users were being presented with error messages 
which deliberately concealed the blocking system being used, leaving them ignorant as 
to why material was blocked, by whom and what they could do about it if they believed 
it to be wrongfully blocked. 
                                                 
68




At the outset, this approach was justified by BT on the basis that any other approach 
would enable the blacklist to be reverse-engineered.
69
 This justification appears to fall 
down, however, when we consider that some ISPs do serve indications that pages have 
been blocked and indeed in other jurisdictions the use of block pages is well established. 
Other concerns have been cited as justifying a failure to display a block page – for 
example industry representatives have cited a fear that the technical implementation of a 
block page might be defamatory if a site was wrongfully blocked, might serve to worry 
customers, might identify the wrong ISP (where an ISP was reselling connectivity) or 
indeed might generate log files which could subsequently be accessed by police as an 
intelligence tool.
70
 Nevertheless it is striking to note that in 2009 Cleanfeed had not even 
matched the level of transparency in the Saudi Arabia national filtering system which 
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Finally, it must also be remembered that there is a substantial state involvement in the 
adoption of the Cleanfeed system which must also be assessed for transparency. 
Although this is considered further in Chapter 5, it should be noted at this stage that the 
key department – the Home Office – has been shy in addressing questions regarding its 
relationship with the IWF: for example, in the wake of the Wikipedia incident declining 
to give an interview on the Cleanfeed system while also refusing numerous Freedom of 






Another complaint often levelled against regulation by code is that it is prone to false 
positives. In the case of filtering, this manifests itself as overblocking – that is, 
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preventing users from accessing material which falls outside the legitimate remit of a 
particular system.
74
 This is not an inevitable feature of filtering – as hash value based 
blocking systems have shown, it is possible to have a filtering system which is 
sufficiently precise that it will only block the transmission of a file which is identical in 
every regard to the file intended to be blocked.
75
 Such systems are, however, 
computationally demanding and have yet to be deployed in respect of web browsing. 
Instead, the majority of web blocking systems follow the approach of blocking access to 




This approach risks two main types of overblocking. The first relates to the specificity of 
the address which is blocked. Just as a postcode is less precise than the address of a 
particular house, so too a system which blocks at the level of the domain name 
(preventing access to everything hosted at example.com) will be less precise than one 
which blocks at the level of the full URL (blocking access to 
http://example.com/users/johndoe/lolita.jpg, while still permitting access to legitimate 
material elsewhere on that site). In this case, the principle of proportionality would 
generally not be met. The second form of overblocking relates to timing, and depends on 
how often the list of blocked material is updated – in this situation there is a risk that a 
website which previously contained child pornography will continue to be blocked even 
after the offending material has been removed. 
 
Both types of overblocking have proved to be very common in the implementation of 
child pornography blocking systems elsewhere. In one well-known early example, 
Centre for Democracy and Technology v. Pappert
77
, US ISPs required to cut off access 
to approximately 400 child pornography sites ultimately blocked approximately 1.2 
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million websites in the course of complying.
78
 Similarly, the EU funded CIRCAMP 
blocking systems have deliberately chosen to use domain name blocking 
notwithstanding the collateral damage which this causes to legitimate content hosted on 





How does the IWF CAIC URL list fare in comparison? First, it must be noted that its 
subject matter is very narrow and limited to the most serious forms of illegal content. It 
is restricted to potentially illegal “indecent images of children, advertisements for or 
links to such content” and generally contains just 500-800 URLs.
80
 It includes pseudo-
photographs, but does not, for example, include non-photographic images of children 
(such as cartoons)
81
 notwithstanding that these are now also illegal to possess.
82
 IWF 
procedures have been modified after the Wikipedia case so as to no longer automatically 
include borderline images – particularly those that would be classed as level one 
according to the UK Sentencing Guidelines Council.
83
 Also, unlike other entirely 
automated systems of filtering this relatively narrow scope enables it to rely entirely on 
manual intervention and human judgment to designate a URL to be blocked, and makes 
it possible to regularly review each URL. Finally, the blocking list has, since its 
inception, operated at the level of full URLs rather than domain names, allowing ISPs to 
reduce collateral damage. 
 
In relation to the specific content sought to be blocked, therefore, it may be difficult to 
argue that the system is not proportionate and from the outset it has been designed to 
minimise overblocking. As against that, however, the manner in which blocking has 
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been implemented suggests that there are problems which in practice mean that 
overblocking is an issue. 
 
In relation to the IWF list itself, the relatively small number of pages on the list and the 
manner in which they are updated suggest that overblocking is unlikely. That said, the 
Wikipedia incident exposed a flaw in that text pages relating to the album were being 
blocked, while the image files themselves were going unblocked. This appears to have 
been due to a technical misunderstanding on the part of IWF staff, who inadvertently 




Turning from the IWF list itself to its implementation by ISPs, more significant 
problems appear. Hybrid blocking systems, such as those pioneered by BT, are 
sufficiently granular so as to filter at the level of the individual URL.
85
 However, not all 
systems are this sophisticated, and some ISPs have claimed that hybrid filtering of this 
sort can be too expensive to implement. 
 
Consequently at least one ISP, apparently unwilling or unable to incur the cost 
associated with a BT-style hybrid blocking system, has implemented the CAIC list by 
crude IP address blocking, resulting in collateral damage to what may have been many 
thousands of innocent sites which happened to share a host with the blacklisted site.
86
 
Others – notably mobile broadband providers such as O2 – have taken a similarly crude 
approach and have used the CAIC list as the basis for DNS blocking, resulting in 
substantial blocking of unrelated content on image hosting sites.
87
 These examples 
highlight the point examined later in this chapter that intermediaries, faced with 
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difficulties in complying with regulatory demands, will systematically overblock where 
this is the least cost option open to them. 
 
Similarly, not long after the Wikipedia block a further issue arose when numerous ISPs 
blocked any access to the entire of the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine (a site 
which lets users view web pages as they existed in the past) – cutting off UK users from 
a valuable research tool containing approximately 85 billion web pages.
88
 In this case, as 
with the Wikipedia incident, the overblocking was the result of an unexpected technical 
interaction between the ISPs’ proxy servers and the Internet Archive itself – rather than 
being a deliberate decision.
89
 Consequently, it was not something which could be laid 
directly at the door of the IWF. Nevertheless, it illustrates how even a system designed 
to minimise collateral damage can inadvertently operate in a disproportionate manner. 
 
(iv) Eliminating feedback 
 
Another concern which has been expressed about regulation by code generally is that it 
may eliminate elements of feedback which are vital to good governance. This argument 
has a number of dimensions. 
 
The first is a dignitarian one, which suggests that automated enforcement of rules 
objectifies individuals by failing to engage with their moral reasoning. This is an old 
concern in the field of situational crime prevention (SCP), summarised by Smith who 
notes that: 
 
The usual criticism of SCP is that it changes situations without changing people, and is therefore 
superficial and amoral. It is said to be like hiding the tin of sweets from the children, as opposed 
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A variant of this is a fear that automated enforcement may erode self-control by 
depriving individuals of the opportunity to exercise moral judgment
91
 and perhaps even 
encouraging them to push boundaries knowing that automated controls will intervene to 
prevent them going too far. 
 
Both of these concerns have been carried over from the real world into the virtual world, 
and Brownsword in particular has examined whether this use of code might, in his 
words, corrode moral community.
92
 Without entering too deeply into this debate, it can 
be seen that it may have some application to filtering – and indeed Zittrain has suggested 
that where filters are in place then users might be absolved of liability for material which 
escapes the filtering system: 
 
The notion that some content is so harmful as to render its transmission, and even reception, 
actionable – true for certain categories of both intellectual property and pornographic material – 
means that certain clicks on a mouse can subject a user to intense sanctions. Consumers of 
information in traditional media are alerted to the potential illegality of particular content by its 
very rarity; if a magazine or CD is available in a retail store its contents are likely legal to 
possess. The Internet severs much of that signaling, and the ease with which one can execute an 
Internet search and encounter illegal content puts users in a vulnerable position. Perhaps the 
implementation of destination ISP-based filtering, if pressed, could be coupled with immunity for 




While one can see the strength of this point, it does tend to establish the truth of 
Brownsword’s fear that a community in which behaviour is channelled is also one in 
which individuals lose touch with the consequences of choices. Interestingly, prominent 
researchers in the field of child pornography have touched on the same point: Taylor and 
Quayle have expressed support for code based controls which will prevent access to 
child pornography, but also wish to see technology used to “alert the conscience” of 
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If we are to take these points seriously, then the deceptive error messages used by some 
ISPs are wrong in principle – at the least, stop pages should explain to viewers why their 
browsing was interrupted. Indeed, the CIRCAMP project has expressed support for stop 
pages for similar grounds – that they help to instil a sense of responsibility in viewers, as 
well as alerting them to the fact that the internet is a place which is policed in the same 




Another, more prosaic aspect of feedback relates to outcomes – assessing how 
automated enforcement systems are actually working. Here Grimmelman has pointed 
out that when we regulate by software we run the risk of creating systems that fail 
without any human review which can detect that failure.
96
 Tien has similarly pointed out 
that architectural regulation may take away the public process associated with both 
making and applying legal rules.
97
 When considered together, these considerations may 
mean that regulation by software may lose the feedback – from regulator to regulatee 
and vice versa – which is necessary to maintain and improve a system. 
 
In the context of Cleanfeed, is this concern borne out? There is some feedback within 
the system in respect of false negatives – where the IWF does not block a particular page 
containing child pornography then a user who encounters that page may submit a report 
to the IWF via its hotline service seeking to have it blocked. There is not necessarily, 
however, the same feedback in respect of false positives – as we have seen, this depends 
on whether a particular ISP has chosen to implement stop pages. The result may be that 
wrongful blocking goes unnoticed. The Wikipedia blocking was unusual in that the high 
profile of the site affected and the technical side effects guaranteed that blocking would 
be detected by users. The same may not be true of less famous sites. 
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The Wikipedia case also illustrates a further consequence of a lack of feedback. In that 
case, the IWF asserted – correctly – that the image in question was “potentially illegal” 
under English law and therefore properly blocked under its guidelines as they stood.
98
 
What this failed to recognise, however, was a significant public consensus that the image 
was harmless; and a crisis for the IWF resulted when it was suddenly faced with this 
contrary view, forcing it to abandon this particular block. It might well be the case that 
more transparency – such as the use of stop pages – would have allowed for greater 
public feedback in respect of level one images before 2008, potentially allowing for an 





(v) Function Creep 
 
A common objection to regulation by code generally, and filtering in particular, is that it 
lends itself to function creep – that is, expansion beyond its original remit.
100
 The risk is 
colourfully described by Tambini, et al.: 
 
Clearly the presence of an institution invites all sorts of ‘Christmas Tree’ dangers whereby more 
and more categories of content are ‘hung from’ the existing list of illegal content the IWF should 




This is true to some extent of the IWF itself, which has taken on a reporting and notice 
and take down role in relation to the new offence of extreme pornography
102
 – although 
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it has also shed its functions in relation to racist material.
103
 But is it also true of the 
Cleanfeed system specifically? 
 
There has certainly been a great deal of discussion about extending the remit of the 
system. For example, in 2008 the Home Secretary suggested that “terrorist” sites should 
be blocked
104
 while in 2010 the Home Office Sexualisation of Young People Review 
recommended that pro-anorexia sites should also be blocked.
105
 Indeed, Roger 
Darlington – a former Chair of the IWF – has gone so far as to suggest that all harmful 
content (which he describes as content “the creation of which or the viewing of which 
involves or is likely to cause actual physical or possible psychological harm”) should be 
voluntarily blocked by ISPs.
106
 There has been some public support for the suggestion 
that ISPs should track access to child pornography sites for police purposes.
107
 In the 
2011 review of the Prevent counter-terrorism strategy the Home Office has reverted to 
its 2008 thinking and has stated that it wants to: 
 
explore the potential for violent and unlawful URL lists to be voluntarily incorporated into 





Despite these suggestions, however, the IWF blacklist has not (with one very minor 
exception which will be considered later) been expanded beyond its original function. 
Even where the IWF has adopted a takedown role in relation to other illegal content such 
as extreme pornography, it has not been prepared to add that content to the CAIC list.
109
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In fact, not all “child pornography” is blocked – non photographic images (“virtual” 




Why has the remit of the blocking list not been expanded? It is difficult to give a 
complete answer, but a number of factors appear to play a role. First, notwithstanding 
the Wikipedia incident, child abuse images are for the most part uncontentious both in 
the sense that there is a wide public consensus that they should be illegal
111
 and also in 
the sense that there will often be little room for debate as to whether a particular image 
is, in fact, illegal. Other material does not share these attributes, which in the case of 
extreme pornography caused the IWF Board to be nervous of an “increased likelihood of 




Secondly, there are resource implications for the IWF in any expansion of its remit 
generally. In relation to both extreme pornography and non-photographic images the 
Board expressed concern that any expansion of the IWF role could take additional staff 
time and impose additional costs in a way which might undermine the priority given to 
child abuse images.
113
 This may be particularly so given that one would expect those 
images to be much more common. Consequently, children’s groups – who are well 




Resource issues are also implicated in a third reason – the industry simply does not wish 
to pay for the costs associated with a wider function. This point has been made by a 
number of interviewees who have indicated that industry funding acts as a natural check 
on IWF function creep.
115
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Consequently, the point has been forcefully made by many observers that a co-
regulatory model such as that of the IWF may be more rather than less resistant to 
function creep as compared with a system which operated in the public sphere on a 




As already mentioned, there has been one case in which the CAIC list was used for a 
different purpose - the IWF board minutes from January 2007 indicate that the list was 
used in one case as an “intelligence tool” involving “the monitoring of school networks 
to identify devices where an attempt was made to access a URL on the CAIC list”. The 
Board, however, on being briefed expressed concern that this “could lead to the 





This tends to confirm the point that the IWF structure is resistant to function creep – 
when brought to the Board the response was negative, despite the obvious possible value 
of the system for law enforcement, and the two IWF members concerned were prevented 
from using the list for that purpose in future. It should also be pointed out that the IWF 
members who deploy blocking have generally designed their systems in a way which 
minimises logging of user data and thus the possibility that the logs might be used by 




That said, the very existence of the Cleanfeed system has acted as a proof of concept 
which has encouraged blocking generally in the UK – even if it takes place outside the 
IWF structure. Two examples are particularly important. First, in the recent debates on 
the Digital Economy Bill the perceived success of Cleanfeed was used to justify the 
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blocking of sites for alleged copyright infringement – see e.g. the comments of Lord 
Clement-Jones
119
 who in introducing an amendment providing for blocking said that: 
 
site blocking already exists. It is perfectly legitimate to do that. This is not a novel concept. There 
are sites that are identified as being blocked in various fields. I am not saying child pornography 
is equivalent to copyright infringement... If you're infringing somebody's copyright on the web, 
it's something that should not be taking place. 
 
It would not be fair, however, to describe this as function creep on the part of the IWF 
itself – if anything, it tends to reinforce the point that the IWF is resistant to function 
creep, insofar as it involves an entirely different mechanism being used to achieve 
blocking. 
 
The second example, however, is more significant and the decision of the High Court in 
Twentieth Century Fox v. BT
120
 (better known as “Newzbin2”) proves the truth of 
concerns about function creep in relation to particular filtering technologies deployed by 
ISPs. In this case, an action brought by the movie industry succeeded in obtaining a 
High Court judgment requiring BT to use its Cleanfeed system to block access to a 
particular website – Newzbin2 – which they say infringes their copyright. 
 
To appreciate the impact of this judgment, one must go back somewhat. In 2004 – when 
BT initially adopted Cleanfeed – it was obvious even then that there was a risk of 
function creep and in particular that copyright holders would seek to use the system. At 
the time, however, BT believed that it was unlikely to be sued and that it could mitigate 
this risk by discontinuing the use of Cleanfeed if function creep became a reality.
121
 
According to a contemporaneous briefing to LINX members, BT’s views were as 
follows: 
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Scope creep is a serious risk 
 
The Home Office originally indicated to BT that Cleanfeed might be employed to block access to 
other undesirable content. 
 
Wannadoo has already been approached by the British Phonographic Industry (BPI) about 
implementing a system similar to Cleanfeed so as to block access to works allegedly infringing 
copyright. 
 
BT says that if the pressure to extend the scope of Cleanfeed became too great it would simply 
cancel the project... 
 
BT is unlikely to be the defendant of choice for a copyright holder or other party attempting to 
hold an ISP legally responsible for Internet traffic. 
 
The ruling in Newzbin2, however, showed the flaws in this reasoning. Once the 
Cleanfeed system had provided the technical proof that the blocking requested by the 
plaintiffs could be achieved, BT became a natural target for copyright plaintiffs. Indeed, 
according to a representative of the movie industry: “BT was chosen because it's the 
largest and already has the technology in place, through its Cleanfeed system, to block 
the site”.
122
 At this point, the idea that the idea that BT could unilaterally turn off the 
blocking system became unrealistic. To the contrary, the court in Newzbin2 laid great 
emphasis on the fact that: 
 
the order sought by the Studios is clear and precise; it merely requires BT to implement an 
existing technical solution which BT already employs for a different purpose; implementing that 





Does Newzbin2 therefore prove the truth of concerns about function creep in the context 
of Cleanfeed? The answer is both yes and no. Almost all critics who expressed concern 
about function creep predicted that the executive would exert pressure on the IWF to 
expand the scope of its URL list.
124
 As we have seen, however, despite government 
                                                 
122




 Para. 177. 
124
 Edwards, ‘From Child Porn to China, in One Cleanfeed’. 
143 
 
leanings in this direction the IWF has not expanded its blocking function and is unlikely 
to do so. In this regard, fears of function creep by the IWF itself have been misplaced 
and did not give adequate weight to the incentives faced by industry and the IWF and 
the manner in which these have been a buffer against further expansion of state control 
over the internet. 
 
On the other hand, the decision in Newzbin2 proves that the filtering technologies 
implemented by ISPs can be co-opted for other purposes even if the IWF itself is not. In 
this wider sense fears of function creep have been proved correct in relation to 
filesharing – and it seems likely that plaintiffs will seek to expand blocking to other 
areas such as defamation and privacy claims.
125
 Indeed Max Mosley has already argued 
that blocking should be used against news sites which breach press standards. Mr. 
Mosley is best known as the victim of press intrusion involving the videoing of a sex 
session
126
 and is suing Google in a number of jurisdictions seeking a filter to proactively 
block images from that session from search results.
127
 In testimony to the Culture, Sport 
and Media Committee following the Leveson Inquiry he has claimed that filtering 
should also apply at the ISP level, urging that ISPs be required to “cut the wire” to 
offshore news sites which do not abide by a UK code of practice.
128
 Whether or not he is 
successful in this particular claim it nevertheless illustrates the point that once a 
technology of control is in place there will be numerous parties seeking to use it.
129
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The cyber-libertarian promise of disintermediation was, according to the cyber-
paternalists, somewhat oversold. While acknowledging that the internet has resulted in 
some disintermediation, theorists pointed to the growth of entirely new intermediaries, 
who often enjoyed greater capacity to control the actions of their users. In relation to 
private communications, for example, the Post Office may be replaced by ISPs or 
webmail providers who will (as a practical matter) have a greater technical capability to 
screen communications, and may be exempt from older laws prohibiting this. 
 
In addition, the nature of the internet gives rise to a need for new intermediaries. The 
search engine, for example, has no exact counterpart in the offline world, but without a 
listing in a search engine a site might as well cease to exist for many users. Similarly, 
transactions which in the real world could be carried out anonymously and directly by 
cash become impossible online, leading to a situation where the use of payment services 
becomes necessary.
130
 Noting this, cyber-paternalists such as Zittrain pointed to ISPs, 
search engines, hosting providers, domain name providers and other intermediaries as 
new “Internet points of control” and developed theories of gatekeeper regulation to 
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(ii) From mice to elephants: shifting the focus of regulation 
 
The attraction for states of gatekeeper regulation is noted by Swire who uses the analogy 
of elephants and mice in assessing how difficult it is to control behaviour. In short, he 
points out that problems with tackling numerous internet users or individual sites 
(“mice”) can be avoided if states turn their enforcement powers against the relatively 
small number of large, immobile and easily targeted intermediaries such as ISPs or 





This approach is justified by some on economic grounds, with Mann and Belzley in 
particular suggesting that liability should be imposed on intermediaries for the wrongful 
conduct of their users where it can be shown that the intermediary is the least cost 
avoider. In that context, they argued for legislation which would force ISPs and payment 
providers to take active steps to prevent their users from viewing or paying for child 
pornography, saying that: 
 
[G]atekeeper liability is systematically more likely to be effective in the modern internet 
environment than it has been in traditional offline environments... [It is] increasingly cost-
effective for intermediaries to monitor more closely the activities of those that use their networks. 
As it becomes cheaper to monitor activity more closely, it ineluctably becomes relatively more 





(iii) Censorship by proxy? Criticisms of gatekeeper regulation 
 
Against this strategy, others have claimed that intermediary regulation is particularly 
prone to damaging freedom of expression. Kreimer, for example, has expressed 
concerns about what he terms “censorship by proxy” online, arguing that it changes the 
dynamic of censorship.
134
 Unlike traditional forms of content control – which generally 
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target either the speaker or the recipient of speech – intermediary regulation targets 
someone who usually does not have any direct interest in the speech. As a result, that 
intermediary will often lack any incentive to notify either the speaker or the user of the 
fact of censorship – and may similarly lack any incentive to minimise the collateral 
damage caused by the censorship. The experience of ISPs deploying Cleanfeed bears out 
this point, showing that ISPs have tended to act in a way which both conceals the fact of 








When BT initially introduced filtering, they were clear that it was intended to serve a 
relatively modest goal – to “prevent casual web access to URLs listed on the Internet 
Watch Foundation’s “Child Abuse Images” database”
136
 and also “unintentional” or 
accidental access. Their representatives were keen to stress that it “won’t stop a 




The IWF, on its own website, describes the goal as follows: 
 
This initiative is designed to reduce the occasions when innocent internet users might be exposed 
to traumatic and unlawful images, however it may also help to: 
 
 Diminish the re-victimisation of children by restricting opportunities to view their 
sexual abuse. 
 Disrupt the accessibility and supply of content to those who may seek out such images. 
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Despite some political confusion (which tends to oversell the capabilities of blocking), 
this has remained the consistent position of the IWF and technically knowledgeable 
advocates. As Carr puts it: “It was intended to block the guy in his office at home one 
night, pi**ed, mildly curious, who could get himself into jail by going off and looking 




While this goal is expressed in a way which focuses on the wellbeing of the viewer, it 
appears to be closely tied with a concern that viewers will ultimately go on to commit 
“real-world” offences against children – that is, that accidental or casual exposure to 
child pornography will contribute to further offending. Again, Carr has made this 
argument in the UK context: 
 
Many of those who start looking at child abuse images on the internet, or who start collecting 
images they have obtained from the internet, may already have a direct sexual interest in children 
of which they were aware, or they may believe their interest is limited only to looking and 
collecting. For others, the internet will provide their first ever introduction to the idea of having 
sex with children or to child abuse images... The key point is that many of those who come to it 
for the first time, and even many of those with a pre-existing interest, would almost certainly 
never have got involved with the images in the real world, perhaps for a mixture of reasons but 
probably mainly because the amount of effort needed to obtain such images would be a major 
disincentive, or because of their fear of getting caught… 
 
[I]s it really possible to say that, having had their sexual interest in children stimulated, extended 
or created by the kind of exposure to the images the internet allows, some of these same people 
will, in turn, go on to abuse children directly because of that? If it is, the implication is clear: but 




It must be noted, however, that the literature is not conclusive as to whether exposure to 
child pornography does in fact cause “real world” offending. While some authors – such 
as Russell and Purcell
141
 and Bourke and Hernandez
142
 – make a strong argument that it 
does, there appears to be no definitive study.
143
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Consequently, if we take the goal as being to protect users and thereby indirectly to 
protect children – has Cleanfeed been effective in achieving this goal? 
 
Here we are hampered by an almost complete lack of data. In the first instance, there 
does not appear to be any evidence that accidental exposure has been a problem in need 
of a solution. In a recent Dutch study Stol et al. were not able to find any credible 
reports of accidental exposure, noting that: 
 
Where internetters use a spam filter, are not searching for sex sites, do not participate in sexual 
news groups or panels and do not take notice of obscure messages that always seem to pass 
despite safety precautions, the chance of encountering child pornography seems minimal... No 
interviewed expert, authority or other person involved was able to refer to a case in which a 





It may be more likely that what Carr describes as casual viewing has been a problem – 
again, however, we appear to have very little evidence, except for the statistics generated 
by the Cleanfeed system itself. After BT implemented the Cleanfeed system, media 
coverage indicated it was blocking “20,000 hits per day”. By 2009 that figure had been 
raised to 45,000 hits per day.
145
 This headline figure was taken by mainstream media to 
indicate that the system was a substantial success
146
 – but was soon challenged by the 
ISPA on the basis that a substantial portion of this traffic appeared to be generated by 
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The technical approach used by BT has ensured that no conclusive analysis of their 
figures can be carried out. That said, many of those hits appear to be due to foreign 
internet users taking advantage of open proxies situated within the UK – undermining 
arguments that UK users are being protected or that viewing is being deterred.
148
 It 
should be acknowledged at this point that this data is fragmentary and somewhat 
anecdotal – but it also must be said that these limitations are inherent in the nature of the 
system. By shifting enforcement to private ISPs the Cleanfeed system may escape the 
mechanisms (such as regulatory impact assessments and freedom of information 
oversight) which might enable such a system to be the subject of more rigorous 
assessment if publicly operated. 
 
In assessing the effectiveness of filtering systems we must also consider underblocking – 
that is, the extent to which a particular filtering system fails to achieve its regulatory 
goal, by allowing the targeted content to be accessed.
149
 Here, the very limited scope of 
Cleanfeed must be noted. It filters only web traffic and critics have pointed out that it 
fails to deal with equally accessible CAI via IRC, instant messaging or peer to peer 
sources.
150
 Jim Gamble – former chief executive of Ceop – has reported that Cleanfeed 
was a “fabulous success” but that it was essentially limited to inadvertent or novice 
access and ineffective against “hardcore predators”. Instead, he stated that the problem 
had largely moved on from websites and towards peer to peer networks, so that he was 
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Even in relation to web browsing, however, the system may be of less value than might 
first appear. The IWF block list usually contains approximately 500-800 URLs.
152
 The 
list is, however, passive. It is based solely on reports received via the hotline and not on 
any proactive searching by IWF analysts.
153
 Consequently, it is not clear to what extent 
the IWF list covers the full range of websites which might be accessed by the “casual 
viewer”. Do the URLs blocked cover the majority of this content, or only a minority? 
Edwards has suggested that the block list may catch less than twenty per cent of child 
pornography sites, though she gives no source for this estimate.
154
 There appears to be 
no detailed research on this point – and the legal prohibitions on the viewing and 
possession of child pornography would appear to rule out most methods for carrying out 
such research. The result is that there is little evidence one way or the other as to 




Internet regulation is dynamic rather than static and the regulatory target may seek to 
avoid regulation by changing their tactics in response.
155
 In the case of filtering, this may 
be done by using technical means which will allow particular forms of filtering to be 
circumvented. In considering the effectiveness of Cleanfeed, therefore, we must answer 
two questions: how easily can ISP filtering systems be circumvented, and are users 
aware of those means of circumvention? 
 
Experts have for some time pointed out that web blocking is easily evaded and indeed a 
report published by Ofcom in 2011 confirms this, saying “[f]or all blocking methods 
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circumvention by site operators and internet users is technically possible and would be 




This, of course, is not the full story. The fact that blocking can be circumvented does not 
necessarily mean that it will be circumvented – this depends on the motivation and 
knowledge of the affected users. However a 2010 study of convicted child pornography 
offenders in Sweden revealed that all the offenders questioned were aware of the 
existing filtering systems and how to bypass them – significantly, even those who were 
initially unaware of how to do so soon learned under the tutelage of more experienced 
users.
157
 Awareness of techniques such as proxy servers and alternative DNS providers 
was high – both of which would also serve to defeat the UK implementations of 
blocking. 
 
Perhaps ironically, function creep within the UK will ensure the further spread of 
knowledge as to how to circumvent blocking. There is already a growing level of 
awareness amongst internet users of technical controls on their behaviour and how to 
circumvent them. For example, expatriates who wish to view the BBC iPlayer have 
learned how to use VPNs or proxy servers for the purpose of defeating geolocation 
technologies.
158
 The Newzbin2 decision and the cases which followed it have provoked a 
backlash from users who have developed tools to circumvent copyright blocking – tools 
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This chapter has outlined the predictions of both cyber-libertarians (as to factors that will 
limit state regulation of the internet) – and cyber-paternalists (as to the regulatory 
strategies which states may use in response, and the risks which these might pose) and 
considered the UK situation in light of these predictions. In doing so, it has shown that 
many of the cyber-paternalists’ predictions have been borne out in the context of 
Cleanfeed which by deploying both code as law and gatekeeper regulation has 
established a system which is opaque, prone to overblocking, and is capable of being 
captured for other uses also. 
 
It also, however, illustrates that only some of the risks identified by the cyber-
paternalists have manifested themselves. In particular, it is striking that concerns about 
function creep, overblocking and transparency have come true – but more so at the level 
of the ISP rather than the level of the IWF itself. This suggests that in some cases the 
cyber-paternalist predictions have not been sufficiently nuanced, and may need to be 
modified to consider in more detail the incentives faced by intermediaries. Many 
interviewees have suggested that the IWF and Cleanfeed have between them been “the 
saviour of the UK internet from further regulation”
160
 and have argued that 
governmental schemes are “massively less transparent”.
161
 From this perspective, 
intermediary self-regulation in the form of the IWF may in fact help to maximise 
transparency and prevent function creep, as compared with direct legislative 
intervention. This point will be taken up further in the next chapter. 
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Self-regulation is the principle on which the IWF’s operations and structures are founded; it is 
also the government and internet industry’s preferred method of regulating internet content in the 
UK. Self-regulation and multi-stakeholder partnerships are at the core of the IWF’s model, 
operations and success. 




The previous chapter identified three regulatory strategies which have been promoted by 
cyber-paternalists as enabling greater state control of internet content, and examined 
how the Cleanfeed system has made use of the first two of these: code as law and 
gatekeeper regulation. This chapter considers the third strategy – self-regulation (along 
with the closely related concept of co-regulation). It outlines the literature on self- and 
co-regulation, describing its possible advantages and risks when applied to internet 
regulation. It then assesses the operation of the Cleanfeed system against this 
background and considers how it exemplifies both the desirable and undesirable aspects 
of self-regulation. 
 
In particular, this chapter will: 
 
 Introduce self- and co-regulation in the context of the internet and discuss 
difficulties in defining and applying the concepts; 
 Discuss the attractions of self-regulation as a regulatory strategy online and the 
criticisms which have been levelled against it; 
 Outline UK government policy favouring self-regulation on the internet, with 
particular reference to the IWF and Cleanfeed; and 
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 Consider whether the experience of the IWF and Cleanfeed can be used to 
validate, refute or refine predictions regarding the operation of self- and co-
regulation.  
 
2. Defining self- and co-regulation 
 
(i) What do we mean by regulation? 
 
The contrast between the care taken to regulate content broadcast using traditional means—
through dedicated regulators, codes and sanctions—and the near absence of control over access 
to Internet content is striking. 




Before we attempt to define self- and co-regulation, we might first ask a preliminary 
question – what do we mean by regulation itself? In the quotation which starts this 
section the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport claims to have identified a 
“near absence of control over access to Internet content” in the United Kingdom. Given, 
however, that the Select Committee discusses elsewhere in its report the extensive role 
played by bodies such as the IWF and controls such as parental filtering, it seems that 
the Select Committee was in that sentence implicitly adopting a traditional view of 
regulation, one which is both “state-centric” and “rule-centric”
3
 – that is, one which 
privileges the role of the state and which assumes that control should be mediated 




Such a view, however, would be challenged by many as tending to give an inadequate 
picture of regulation in general and internet regulation in particular. Johnson and Post, 
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for example, would dispute the state-centric aspect, arguing that “the community of 
online users and service providers is up to the task of developing a self-governance 
system”.
5
 Lessig has suggested that a rule-centric approach tends to obscure the role 
played by code and architecture as modalities of regulation – modalities which can be 
much more effective and pervasive than traditional rules which rely on the obedience of 
those to whom they are directed.
6
 Yeung has similarly pointed to successful means of 
regulation by communication – termed by her “disclosure”, “exhortation”, “explanation” 
and “exclamation and excoriation” – which may be successful in promoting a desired 




For those reasons, it seems desirable to adopt a wider view of regulation, and for the 
purposes of this chapter the definition of regulation offered by Hood, Rothstein and 
Baldwin will be followed, where they suggest that regulation is characterised by the 
presence of three factors: 
 
There must be some capacity for standard setting, to allow a distinction to be made between 
more or less preferred states of the system. There must also be some capacity for information 
gathering or monitoring to produce knowledge about current or changing states of the system. On 




This definition, focusing as it does on the operation of regulation rather than either the 
regulatory actors or the regulatory tools, appears to be more apt to cover the range of 
regulatory interventions which have characterised the control of internet content in the 
UK. 
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(ii) Introducing self-regulation 
 
We can now consider what we mean when we speak of self-regulation. This is not an 
easy question to answer – as Price and Verhulst note “[t]he initial problem of every 
approach to self-regulation pertains to definition and semantics” in respect of a term 
which is used “almost indiscriminately”.
9
 In addition, the terms self-regulation and co-
regulation have acquired specialised and technical meanings in European law, which 
often differ from national understandings.
10
 Nevertheless, the term self-regulation 
remains in common usage and is helpful as describing an approach to regulation which 
is marked by an avoidance of direct government or legislative control, and instead places 
responsibility for rule making and enforcement on the group regulated.  
 
In a general sense we can begin to define self-regulation by contrasting it with state-
centric modes of governing. In particular, self-regulation can be compared with its 
supposed antithesis of command and control regulation which (in its crudest 
conceptions) involves public authorities issuing orders to individuals or corporations, on 
threat of punishment if those orders are disobeyed. By contrast, the essence of self-
regulation is that it relies on consent and consensus to implement a system whereby 
private entities themselves devise and apply rules and standards to govern their own 
conduct.
11
 As Koops, et al. put it: 
 
In its most extensive form, self-regulation implies that private actors themselves implement the 
applicable norms and rules and, ideally, monitor compliance and enforce the rules in case of non-
compliance. Self-regulation is therefore often used as an argument in proposing a system that is 




This comparison between command and control and self-regulation is, however, apt to 
be misleading. By setting up a false dichotomy between the two forms of regulation, it 
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encourages us to think of each in artificial and idealised terms. Instead, it has often been 
argued that self-regulation is better understood as an umbrella term which covers a range 
of activities with varying mixes of private and state involvement.
13
 For example, in an 
influential taxonomy Black has identified four possible types of state involvement in 
self-regulatory systems: 
 
mandated self-regulation, in which a collective group, an industry or profession for example, is 
required or designated by the government to formulate and enforce norms within a framework 
defined by the government, usually in broad terms; 
sanctioned self-regulation, in which the collective group itself formulates the regulation, which is 
then subjected to government approval; 
coerced self-regulation, in which the industry itself formulates and imposes regulation but in 
response to threats by the government that if it does not the government will impose statutory 
regulation; and 
voluntary self-regulation, where there is no active state involvement, direct or indirect, in 




While Black did not have the internet in mind in devising this classification, it has been 
extended and applied to the internet by others such as Price and Verhulst
15
 and more 
recently Mifsud Bonnici who describes self regulation as encompassing “statutory self-
regulation”, “mandated or delegated self-regulation” and “coerced self-regulation” 
where the state respectively either requires private groups to engage in self-regulation, 
delegates rulemaking and enforcement powers to private groups, or uses political 




(iii) From self-regulation to co-regulation 
 
These definitions of self-regulation have not, however, been universally followed. In 
particular, what Black terms “mandated” or “sanctioned” self-regulation – those cases 
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where there is formal state involvement in the establishment of regulation – would now 




The origins of this term have been traced by Marsden to late 1980s Australia where it 
was first used to describe a hybrid of state and self-regulation.
18
 Since then, it has 
become more prominent in the regulatory and legal literature – particularly in Europe, 
following the 2003 European Union adoption of definitions of self- and co-regulation 





At first glance, this might seem to be a merely semantic difference, one which simply 
changes the label applied to what is otherwise the same activity. There have, however, 
been strong arguments made that the term helps with the analysis of structures in this 
area. Prosser, for example, has argued that the terms self-regulation and command and 
control have come to be used as crude political slogans for or against certain outcomes, 
while in reality there is no such thing as pure self-regulation or pure command and 
control.
20
 Instead, he argues that the concept of co-regulation offers a more sophisticated 
and balanced basis for analysis. In the same way, it can be said that the term co-
regulation better draws our attention to the cooperation and interaction which is present 
in those systems where the state is directly involved, rather than focusing our attention 




Notwithstanding these disagreements as to terminology, there is consensus on a more 
general concept – that there is a continuum from purely private regulation towards 
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regulation characterised by a greater degree of state involvement. This continuum is 
sometimes simplified to focus on a single variable, as in this National Consumer Council 








A more sophisticated visualisation can be found in recent work by Millwood-Hargrave 
and in the following diagram she illustrates the possible degrees of state involvement in 
relation to three variables – the source of the rules or “code” governing a particular 
sector, the body responsible for enforcement of those rules and the enforcement 
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Figure 7 - Millwood-Hargrave diagram of SROs, regulatory type and incentive structure 
 
Even this diagram, however, only begins to capture the complexity of the possible types 
of regulatory structures. Particularly online, there is a remarkable variety of 
arrangements in place. Marsden has extensively surveyed internet governance 
arrangements and has identified twelve types of systems on the self- and co-regulatory 
continuum based on the extent and nature of state involvement:
24
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Informal interchange only – evolving partial industry 
forum building on players' own terms 
Acknowledged self Bebo 
Creative 
Commons 
1 Discussion but no formal recognition/approval 
Ex post standardized self W3C 2 Ex post approval of standards 
Standardized self IETF 3 Formal approval of standards 
Discussed self IMCB 4 Ex ante informal consultation – but no 
sanction/approval/process audit 
Recognized self ISP Associations 5 Recognition of body – informal policy role 
Co-founded self FOSI 6 Ex ante negotiation of body; no outcome role 
Sanctioned self PEGI 7 Recognition of body – formal policy role (contact 
committee/process) 




ICANN 9 Ex ante negotiation with government –with 
sanction/approval/process audit 
Scrutinized co-regulatory NICAM 
ATVOD 





11 Government imposed and co-regulated with 
taxation/compulsory levy 
Figure 8 - Twelve ideal types of self- and co-regulation 
 
(iv) UK and EU definitions 
 
It will be evident from the foregoing that there is considerable debate as to terminology: 
both in relation to the term self-regulation itself and also in relation to where the line 
between self- and co-regulation should be drawn. 
 
Academic disagreement aside, however, the UK government has generally used these 
terms in a reasonably consistent way. This is exemplified by the DTI and Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport 2000 White Paper A New Future for Telecommunications.
25
 
That paper identified co-regulation (as distinct from self-regulation) as existing where 
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self-regulation is accompanied by the active involvement of a governmental regulatory 
body to ensure that a desired regulatory objective was met – which would include 
situations where that body enjoyed a legislative role in setting objectives or imposing 
sanctions where those objectives fail to be met. 
 
This UK governmental understanding can be found in e.g. the 2008 policy document 
Identifying appropriate regulatory solutions, where Ofcom offers the following 
typology of regulation: 
 
No regulation: 
Markets are able to deliver required outcomes. Citizens and consumers are empowered to take 
full advantage of the products and services and to avoid harm. 
 
Self-regulation: 
Industry collectively administers a solution to address citizen or consumer issues, or other 
regulatory objectives, without formal oversight from government or regulator. There are no 
explicit ex ante legal backstops in relation to rules agreed by the scheme (although general 
obligations may still apply to providers in this area). 
 
Co-regulation: 
Schemes that involve elements of self- and statutory regulation, with public authorities and 
industry collectively administering a solution to an identified issue. The split of responsibilities 




Objectives and rules of engagement are defined by legislation, government or regulator, 





An example of co-regulation under this typology is the way in which Ofcom has 
“contracted out” aspects of the regulation of broadcast advertising to the independent 
and non-statutory Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) – subject, however, to a 
legislative “backstop” where Ofcom retains a statutory power to impose sanctions 
should regulation via the ASA not meet the desired standard of effectiveness.
27
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This meaning of co-regulation, as distinct from self-regulation, focuses on the existence 
of some statutory involvement, usually in the form of a backstop or residual power to 
intervene on the part of state authorities to ensure that certain aims are achieved. As such 
it echoes the predominant approach at European level where self-regulation has been 
defined in the 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making as: 
 
the possibility for economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organisations or 
associations to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves common guidelines at European 




While co-regulation is defined as requiring some legislative intervention, being: 
 
the mechanism whereby a Community legislative act entrusts the attainment of the objectives 
defined by the legislative authority to parties which are recognised in the field (such as economic 







These understandings of self- and co-regulation, though they remain open to criticism, 





(v) Situating Cleanfeed on the self-/co-regulatory continuum 
 
Given these definitions, where should we place the Cleanfeed system on the continuum 
from state regulation to self-regulation? Is it best described as being an example of self- 
or co-regulation? The IWF generally labels itself as a “self-regulatory” body though it 
goes on to describe a close partnership with state authorities: 
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We operate independently of Government, but are closely supported by the Home Office, the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Ministry of Justice as well as 
working with the Department for Education and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 




It is unlikely, however, that the IWF has any clear or consistent view as to what it means 
by this term, particularly as in some cases it has gone further and described itself as 
operating in a co-regulatory way. For example, in evidence to the Select Committee on 
European Union in 2000 and again in evidence to the Byron Review in 2007 it described 
its activities as “co-regulation”, working in cooperation with industry and law 
enforcement.
32
 In addition, its understanding of itself as a public body for the purposes 




Of course, the label which the IWF chooses for itself is not conclusive, and some have 
argued that the extensive involvement of government in its activities (particularly when 
we consider the possibility of appeal against IWF decisions to the police) means that it 
should be regarded as co-regulatory.
34
 Marsden in particular has identified a shift in the 
nature of the IWF from its formation, which he describes as a “deliberate and quite 





However, when we separate out the Cleanfeed system from the IWF generally, it 
becomes impossible to describe the system as co-regulatory using our narrower 
definitions of co-regulation as requiring some “legislative act” (the Interinstitutional 
Agreement) or some “legislative backstop” (the Ofcom schema). The IWF’s role in 
advising ISPs to take down material they host might be regarded as co-regulation under 
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the Ofcom analysis insofar as there is a legislative backstop in place, as ISPs may be 
prosecuted should they ignore reports of child pornography reported to them by the 
IWF. In the case of blocking, however, there is neither a legislative basis for blocking, 
nor any backstop in the form of legal consequences for ISPs who choose not to block, 
and consequently the blocking scheme could not be called co-regulation. 
 
This result might seem counterintuitive, given the extensive links between the state and 
the IWF in relation to blocking, but highlights one advantage of the narrower definitions 
of co-regulation – by demanding a legislative basis before a system can be described as 
co-regulatory these definitions place the focus on issues of legitimacy and parliamentary 
oversight and deny the rhetorical advantage of “co-regulation” to those systems which 
rely on informal and therefore unenforceable links with the state. 
 
3. The lure of self-regulation 
 
(i) A presumptive starting point 
 
Self-regulation has become increasingly pervasive as a form of internet governance, to 
the point where Koops et al. have concluded that it has become the presumptive starting 
point.
36
 From the late 1990s onwards governments have adopted policies which favour 
self-regulation where possible.
37
 Indeed, in 2002 the Vatican went so far as to say that 





In the United Kingdom, this approach was most notably set out in the 2001 e-Policy 
Principles, issued by the Cabinet Office’s “e-Envoy”, which established eight principles 
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intended to guide policy makers throughout central government.
39
 The third of these 
established a general presumption in favour of self-regulation, on the basis that this 
“generally provide[s] a more rapid and flexible means of responding to changing market 
needs, and achieving international consensus, than is possible through legislation”. The 
e-Policy Principles explicitly cited the IWF in making this recommendation – by 2001 
the IWF had already become, in the official mind, an example of best practice. 
 
This recommendation was, however, nothing new in the UK context. As we have 
already seen in chapter 3, from the early days of the internet the government had 
pursued a consistent policy of “legislative forbearance” in relation to internet content – 
i.e. a reluctance to legislate in a way which would create a new regulatory regime – 
instead preferring to promote self-regulatory solutions.
40
 This policy – a deliberately 
“light touch”
41
 on the part of the state – had been frequently articulated and applied even 
before the e-Policy Principles were adopted. 
 
At the outset, as the establishment of the IWF shows, government policy towards 
internet content was very different from existing policy towards traditional audio-visual 
(broadcast, film or video) content. Traditional audio-visual content was generally 
regulated in detail by sector-specific legislation.
42
 In the case of the internet, however, a 
preference was expressly stated for “voluntary” industry regulation over statutory 
intervention, and for application of the general law rather than sector-specific rules.
43
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 It should be noted that the treatment of content differs from other aspects of cyberspace which have not 
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In 2000, for example, the White Paper A New Future for Telecommunications 
recognised that the proposed super-regulator Ofcom might have a role to play in relation 
to internet content, but rejected the suggestion that it should be given statutory powers 
comparable to those which it would enjoy in respect of content on the broadcast media, 
stating: 
 
OFCOM should ensure continuing and effective mechanisms for tackling illegal material on the 
Internet, such as those being pursued under the auspices of the Internet Watch Foundation. It will 
also promote rating and filtering systems that help Internet users control the content they and 
their children will see… [I]t is important that there are effective ways of tackling illegal material 
on the Internet and that users are aware of the tools available, such as rating and filtering systems, 
that help them control what they and their children will see on the Internet. Research suggests 




This model was adopted in the Communications Act 2003, which was carefully drafted 




This national approach has also been paralleled at EU level where, since 1996, there has 
been a strong preference towards self-regulation in relation to online content generally 
and child pornography in particular.
46
 Consequently the series of Safer Internet 
Programmes adopted from 1999 onwards have focused on self-regulation – and indeed 
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Why did self-regulation achieve such prominence, both in the UK and internationally, as 
a favoured regulatory tool? When we assess the cyber-libertarian/cyber-paternalist 
debate outlined in Chapter 4 we see that two linked objections were made to state 
regulation of the internet – that it was both impracticable and illegitimate. On the face of 
it, the use of self-regulation appeared to address both dimensions of that debate by 
apparently providing a method of regulation which was both effective and was 
legitimated by the involvement and consent of those governed. In this section we will 
first consider the practicability claim. 
 
To begin, it might be helpful to look more closely at the e-Policy principles document as 
this provides us with a typical governmental perspective as to the benefits of self-
regulation.
48
 In its references to actors “closest to the market” enabling “rapid and 
flexible means of responding to changing market needs” and “achieving international 
consensus” we see the key pragmatic arguments in favour of self-regulation: that it 
captures the expertise of industry participants, that it enables regulation which is more 
responsive to changing conditions and technologies, and that it enables norms to be 
drawn up and enforced on an international basis, not merely limited to a particular 




At the heart of almost every argument in favour of self-regulation is the argument that it 
enables faster and more responsive regulation.
49
 At its crudest, this tends to rely on the 
argument that the pace of change online has outrun the conventional lawmaking process 
– if regulation is to keep up, so the argument goes, then non-statutory measures must be 
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taken. This is not, however, an argument which is new in the context of the internet – 
Baldwin and Cave, for example, identify it as one of the arguments behind self-
regulation generally – and in more nuanced versions of this argument it is often claimed 
that self-regulation allows for changes in conditions to be responded to by means of 
incremental and evolutionary change rather than the intermittent step changes which are 
associated with legislative intervention.
50
 The comments of Darlington, a former chair of 
the IWF, are typical of many in the UK industry: 
 
My personal position is totally opposed to all forms of state blocking of generic categories of 
material on the Internet. I am most uncomfortable with the use of a constitution or statute to 
regulate such a fast-moving and complex medium as the Internet. My strong preference is for co-




A further variant of this argument notes that self-regulation tends to focus on outcomes 
rather than particular processes, thus providing participants with flexibility to choose the 
most effective means available to achieve the mandated goals. In an environmental law 
context, for example, Sinclair has noted that historically command and control 
regulation has often been overly prescriptive and inflexible regarding particular 
technical systems with the result that “regulators may have inadvertently prevented the 
development of more effective technological solutions”.
52
 By comparison, self-
regulatory solutions may leave provide participants with greater choice as to how to 
solve a particular problem, thus promoting more innovative responses. This flexibility 
can be seen in the context of the IWF URL list itself where, as we have seen, industry 
participation has led to steady incremental development: from an internal database for 
IWF use only, to use for site blocking by ISPs, to use in parental and school filtering 
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(b) Specialist knowledge 
 
Closely related to the flexibility argument is one based on specialist knowledge – that 
self-regulation harnesses industry expertise and therefore addresses the objection that 
governments lacked the knowledge necessary to regulate the internet. This argument is 
common throughout self-regulation generally, usually coupled with the argument that 
the skill set necessary to regulate a particular industry cannot simply be “bought in” but 
must be based on continued direct involvement with the sector.
54
 This argument has 
particular weight in the case of the IWF where its position at the intersection of industry, 
child protection and law enforcement has led to internationally recognised expertise in 
relation to child abuse material and matters such as hosting, payment services and even 




(c) Internalisation of objectives 
 
By encouraging industry to participate in the drawing up of standards self-regulation has 
also been said to cause industry to internalise the values being promoted, encouraging 
voluntary compliance and thereby reducing the need for enforcement.
56
 As compared 
with legislation, the argument runs, self-regulation is more likely to cause industry to 
feel a sense of ownership of rules and to implement them with an enthusiasm which goes 
beyond mere grudging compliance.
57
 This point was accepted by the All Party 
Parliamentary Communications Group in relation to the IWF and in October 2009 it 
concluded that compulsory blocking against the IWF URL list should be avoided lest 
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(d) Cost reduction 
 
A central part of the appeal of self-regulation is the perception that it can result in lower 
costs for both the state and industry participants. In the case of the state, self-regulation 
offers the possibility of outsourcing the costs associated with the generation and 
enforcement of norms. These can be significant, particularly when we consider not 
merely the direct financial costs of information gathering, rule creation and enforcement 
but also the intangible costs in e.g. parliamentary time and political capital. This has, 




In the same way, industry has also generally welcomed self-regulatory initiatives on cost 
grounds, notwithstanding the way in which it can shift costs from the state. In part this 
will be because the industry itself is better placed to engage in information gathering and 
rule formation and can do so at lower cost than the state. More generally, however, the 
cost/benefit analysis will often be seen to favour self-regulation as offering a light touch 
regulatory regime which might serve to ward off more intrusive and costly legislative 
intervention – an industry sponsored body will naturally devise rules which it sees as 




(e) Uniform international outcomes 
 
One of the key cyber-libertarian arguments was that national regulations could easily be 
avoided by jurisdictional or regulatory arbitrage: that is, by users simply moving to 
services and sites based beyond the reach of particular national laws. This mobility, it 
was argued, meant that attempts to control internet content would require difficult and 
coordinated international action at state level, thus hindering enforcement efforts, or else 
would require states to block access to foreign sites.
61
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By contrast, as self-regulation can be adopted on an international basis it appears to have 
substantial practical advantages over legislation: it can achieve comparable outcomes 
between nations with very different legal systems, minimising the possibilities for 
jurisdictional arbitrage without the need for time consuming and politically difficult 
harmonisation of laws, and reducing the perceived need for the use of geolocation, 




This argument is less important in the context of CAI, where substantial international 
harmonisation has already taken place. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the 
IWF URL list has (without any apparent conscious design on the part of the IWF) 
already achieved substantial international take up in a way which confirms the validity 
of this point. Among the international users of the list are mobile providers who use the 
IWF list in jurisdictions where there is no domestic blocking list, search engines such as 
Google, and home and school filtering software.
63
 Consequently, even though the URL 
list was devised and is administered with UK law in mind, in practice it has become a 




(a) Consent of the governed 
 
Turning from practicability to legitimacy, self-regulation seemed (at least in part) to 
answer the arguments of those who claimed that cyberspace was properly a separate 
place beyond the legitimate control of any government.
64
 Self-regulation – though it 
might be promoted by governments – allowed for the possibility of governance by 
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internet actors themselves in a way which appeared to meet Barlow’s promise that 
“[w]here there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them and 
address them by our means”. In doing so, it also appeared to offer an inbuilt safeguard 
by allowing users the ability to vote with their feet – by moving to a different online 




Can this point be made in relation to the Cleanfeed system, given the government 
pressure on ISPs to deploy the system or face legislative intervention? The argument 
might be made that notwithstanding government pressure it is still voluntary, as 
demonstrated by the few, smaller ISPs who have yet to deploy the technology. 
Consequently some would say that as with other forms of self-regulation the system is 
legitimated by the consent of those who participate in it – and that it is more desirable 
than legislative intervention for those who mistrust the role of the state in controlling 
speech.
66
 This reflects arguments commonly made in the context of other bodies such as 
the Press Complaints Commission – that by serving as a buffer against direct state 




(b) Decoupling governance from individual jurisdictions 
 
As we have already discussed, online self-regulation decoupled governance from 
national legislation, and allowed new regulatory systems to develop on an international 
basis. As such it arguably had a legitimating as well as a practical effect. It appeared to 
minimise (at least in part) the conflict of laws and legislative overspill arguments which 
were so convincing to early authors such as Johnson and Post.
68
 In principle, at least, in 
a self-regulatory system the issue of conflicting obligations may be less likely to arise 
and similar results can be achieved internationally notwithstanding the laws of different 
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countries. Likewise, if a self-regulatory system is not founded in national law then it is 
less vulnerable to the cyber-libertarian complaint that online regulation involves states in 
improperly extending their reach beyond national territory. 
 
(iv) Resistance to function creep 
 
A common libertarian view is that self-regulatory forms of content regulation are 
preferable as restricting the ability of states to add new categories of content to be 
censored. Mueller, for example, has identified the “saving grace of privatised 
governance” as the “ability of users and suppliers to vote with their feet”, suggesting that 
if blocking is put on a statutory basis it is likely to become more rather than less 
pervasive. Instead, he argues, voluntary utilisation decisions can establish effective 
accountability for bodies engaged in blocking, giving blacklists created by anti-spam 
activists as an example.
69
 From a different perspective Zittrain and Palfrey nevertheless 
reach a similar conclusion when they argue that collective self-regulation enables the 
industry to present a united front to excessive state demands, limiting the ability of 




The question of function creep was already considered in chapter 4, where we noted that 
predictions of function creep have only partially been borne out in the case of the 
Cleanfeed filtering system. Despite frequent kite-flying by politicians who propose 
expanding the system, the URL list itself remains limited to its original purpose. In 
chapter 4 we identified one reason for this as being the self-regulatory nature of the 
system, which has led to three distinct constraints on any expansion of the remit of the 
system: IWF fears of reputational damage, industry resistance to funding any expansion 
and, significantly, fears on the part of children’s groups that any expansion would 
undermine child protection. This has been the case from quite early on in the history of 
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the IWF – for example, during the 1998 review of the structure of the IWF Childnet was 
very clear in its submission that:  
 
IWF’s terms of reference should maintain an absolute priority on protecting children. Specifically 
they should not be extended to include civil matters. IWF should only take responsibility for any 





For these reasons, it seems fair to say that in this case self-regulation has in fact resulted 
in function creep being avoided for the reasons which Mueller and Zittrain and Palfrey 
have identified. This is a view echoed by Edwards, who has argued that more generally: 
 
by mediating, and providing a central hotline for, complaints about internet content, the IWF 
effectively protects ISPs from having to deal with complaints from the public about pornography 
and hate speech... as part of daily business, and from being distracted by frivolous or unfounded 
ones. In this context, the IWF might well actually act in defence of free speech, since the IWF 
will (one hopes) have the sense and experience to throw out complaints about entirely legal 
Internet images or content, where a small ISP, lacking legal advice and as best-practice risk 




4. Criticisms of self-regulation 
 
These claims in favour of self-regulation have not, however, gone unchallenged and 
internet self-regulation of content brings to the fore concerns regarding accountability 
and the blurring of the public/private divide. Particularly from the mid-1980s onwards, 
UK public lawyers have paid special attention to these issues which Page summarised in 
1986 as having three aspects: 
 
First, there is the idea that these authorities, or some of them at least, wield significant powers 
which may be abused to the detriment of their own members, third parties or the public at large: 
they may be exploited, or their interests may be otherwise insufficiently taken into account... 
 
Secondly, there is the recognition, documented more fully below, that government has resorted to 
self-regulation on an increasing scale as an alternative to direct regulation by itself. This 
recognition engenders a number of reactions. The first, and perhaps most important, is that resort 
to self-regulation somehow involves government in sliding out from what properly ought to be its 
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own responsibilities, responsibilities which cannot be discharged effectively by anyone else... 
The increasing resort on the part of government to self-regulation gives rise to two other fears. 
First, because its role as sponsor of self-regulation may conflict with its role as guardian of the 
public interest, the fear that self-regulation may be subject to less external supervision and 
control than it ought to be; secondly, the contradictory fear, that resort to self-regulation may 
mean that government is able to deny responsibility for the control which it may in fact 
exercise... 
 
The final idea to be distinguished is that some associations, quite apart from their relationship 
with government, exercise governmental functions and should therefore, like government itself, 




Some of these points have been answered, at least in part, by the widening scope of 
judicial review following the decision in R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex p. 
Datafin
74
 which established the potential reviewability of bodies with no “visible means 
of legal support” and the extent to which the IWF may be subject to judicial review or 
other public law remedies will be considered in chapter 6. In this section the wider 
issues presented by self-regulation will be addressed. 
 
(i) Who is the “self” in self-regulation? 
 
The most fundamental criticism of self-regulation is that it may not involve genuine self-
governance, but merely a different form of hierarchical regulation in which third parties 
find their activities controlled by industry actors. Despite this, however, analysis of self-
regulation has tended to focus on the business sector alone, neglecting the role (if any) 




This criticism is not unique to the online environment, but is especially significant in 
that context given the freedom of expression and privacy issues at stake. Consequently, 
one might ask whether internet content regulation in the UK should properly be termed 
“self” regulation at all, characterised as it is by intermediaries such as ISPs regulating 
what users can publish or access, with limited input from users themselves whether 
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collectively or individually. Cleanfeed therefore triggers the legitimacy concerns 
identified by Ogus
76
 who notes that: 
 
The capacity of [a self regulatory authority] to make rules governing the activities of an 
association or profession may itself constitute an abuse if it lacks democratic legitimacy in 
relation to members of the association or profession. The potential for abuse becomes intolerable 




In expressing this concern, Ogus is typical of a wider set of theorists in the mid 1990s 
who observed with some trepidation the growth of self-regulation in the UK and argued 
that a shifting of power from the state was taking place in an environment of limited 
controls on self-regulatory bodies. This was perhaps best articulated by Black who 
argued for the need to “constitutionalise” self-regulation, ensuring respect for public law 




(a) Consent from users? 
 
We have already noted the argument that self-regulation can be legitimated by the 
consent of the participants. In the internet context, however, there is a crucial difference 
from other self-regulatory systems: here, the speech being regulated is not just that of the 
ISPs themselves but also that of their users and third parties. Consequently, we cannot 
simply rely on the consent of the ISP, but must also examine whether those most directly 
affected – the users – also consent. 
 
In principle, one might say that consent is possible through market mechanisms – as 
where users have a choice between competing providers where some operate filters and 
some do not. But it is not possible to say that there is any real consent on the part of UK 
internet users when the system lacks the transparency which would make consent 
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possible. In particular, we have seen that Ofcom does not require that the use of 
Cleanfeed be revealed by ISPs
79
 and that it is only since 2010 that the IWF has 
published a list of members which use the URL list.
80
 Even now, however, there is still 
no guarantee of transparency as to how a particular member may be using the list – for 
example, whether it is blocking at the URL level or merely using a crude DNS or IP 
blocking approach – and consequently users are not in a position to make an informed 
choice between ISPs. 
 
In any event, given that the overwhelming majority of UK ISPs use the Cleanfeed 
system, even those users who might be aware of the system and which ISPs participate 
in it may have no choice but to use those ISPs regardless. The theoretical possibility of 





(b) User and civil rights representation in the Cleanfeed system? 
 
It might also be argued that self-regulatory schemes could be legitimated with regard to 
users in a different way – by ensuring greater representation in the bodies responsible for 
drawing up and enforcing rules. Indeed many of the earlier approaches to internet 
governance assumed that this would be the norm. An example is the 2001 Council of 
Europe Recommendation on Self-Regulation Concerning Cyber Content.
82
 This 
document did not see self-regulation as a threat to fundamental rights, but rather as 
primarily protective of fundamental rights by safeguarding users against illegal and 
harmful content. Consequently, it recommended that: 
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1. Member states should encourage the establishment of organisations which are representative of 
Internet actors, for example Internet service providers, content providers and users. 
 
2. Member states should encourage such organisations to establish regulatory mechanisms within 
their remit, in particular with regard to the establishment of codes of conduct and the monitoring 
of compliance with these codes. 
 
3. Member states should encourage those organisations in the media field with self-regulatory 
standards to apply them, as far as possible, to the new communications and information services. 
 
4. Member states should encourage such organisations to participate in relevant legislative 
processes, for instance through consultations, hearings and expert opinions, and in the 
implementation of relevant norms, in particular by monitoring compliance with these norms. 
 
5. Member states should encourage Europe-wide and international co-operation between such 
organisations. 
 
Notably absent from these recommendations were any measures to safeguard against 
abuses of power by self-regulatory organisations themselves, which seem to have been 
overlooked. By contrast, later recommendations of the Council of Europe have paid 




The reference in the recommendations to “organisations which are representative of 
Internet actors” including “content providers” and “users” is important in a UK context, 
where self-regulation in the guise of the IWF has developed in an entirely different 
manner so that the involvement of users is essentially limited to the function of reporting 
illegal content via the hotline function.
84
 While the precise governance of the IWF has 
varied over time, its core structure has in substance remained the same since 2000 and 
involves governance by a board of ten comprising an independent chair, six independent 
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trustees and three industry trustees. The industry trustees are in turn elected by the 
Funding Council, comprising all industry members who fund the IWF.
85
 Examining this 
structure against the recommendations of the Council of Europe reveals a significant 
gap: within the IWF there is no provision for representation of users as such.
86
 Instead, 
the role of the IWF and its industry roots suggest that internet content regulation is 
viewed as a matter to be negotiated between business and children’s groups rather than 




In addition, while the independent trustees come from a range of backgrounds there is no 
current trustee representing user or civil liberties interests
88
 and only one past board 
member – Malcolm Hutty
89
 – could be described as fitting this category.
90
 It is also 
striking that it was during the brief tenure of Malcolm Hutty that many of the 
fundamental rights safeguards were adopted – for example, the commitment of the IWF 
to be treated as a public body.
91
 It is deeply undesirable that user rights should be left to 
be represented in this essentially ad hoc way.
92
 This is particularly so given that (at the 
time of writing) three of the five independent members have a policing or prosecution 
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Granted, the amorphous nature of internet use means that it may be difficult to identify 
user representatives – and the near universal use of the internet means that user interests 
might be viewed as aligned with those of the wider population. Nevertheless, it is 
striking that there is no formal representation within the IWF for e.g. the Open Rights 
Group as an organisation dedicated to fundamental rights issues in an online context. 
There are undoubtedly competing interests and conflicting rights at stake in relation to 
decisions being made by the IWF and these do not appear to be adequately represented 
at board level. While industry members may share many of the interests of users 
generally, experience has shown that there are areas (such as transparency in blocking) 
where they are diametrically opposed. 
 
(ii) Removing regulation from public law scrutiny 
 
Another core criticism is that self-regulatory systems may enable governments to 
establish systems for controlling speech which (by operating through private law) evade 
the constitutional constraints and judicial scrutiny which would limit state action.
94
 
These criticisms are especially strong in relation to what Mifsud Bonnici terms 
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“mandated” or “coerced” self-regulation – that is, systems adopted and applied in 




Lambers, for example, describes this as “tilting” where the “classical vertical state-
citizen relationship on which... freedom of speech is founded, is short circuited since a 
second private party shifts between the state and the user: the ISP”. He graphically 




Consequently, he argues, the relationship between state and citizen becomes instead a 
relationship between ISP and user – one which is governed by private law only, to the 




A particularly good illustration of his argument comes from the Dutch system, adopted 
in 2007, which involved ISPs voluntarily blocking access to domains designated by the 
police, using DNS blocking. A study commissioned by the government found that this 
was unlawful and contrary to Article 10 ECHR in that it lacked any specific legal basis – 
ultimately forcing it to be abandoned.
97
 Remarkably, however, the response of the Dutch 
government was not to provide a legal basis, but instead to try to further privatise 
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Figure 9 - Lambers’ model of “tilting” legal relationships 
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blocking. The tactic adopted was to seek to persuade ISPs to develop a purely self-
regulatory scheme – in which the sites to be blocked would be designated by a private 
body rather than by the police – thus deliberately avoiding the safeguards which would 




Is this criticism valid in relation to Cleanfeed? The IWF is conscious of these concerns 
and despite its nominally private status, it has accepted that it is “a public body” for the 
purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights and has undertaken to be 
governed subject to the Human Rights Act 1998.
99
 Although it is not clear whether this 
concession would be binding if a judicial review were brought, it might provide the basis 
for such an action notwithstanding the lack of “any visible means of legal support” for 
the IWF. This argument would rely on the well developed line of caselaw to the effect 
that certain formally private bodies will nevertheless be subject to judicial review where 
they carry out a public law function – a principle which has been applied to self-
regulatory schemes which affect third parties.
100
 It would also be reinforced by the 
separate but largely parallel provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998, which in section 
6(3)(b) imposes obligations on “any person certain of whose functions are functions of a 
public nature”.
101
 This point will be considered further in chapter 6 where it will be 
examined within the broader context of the availability of judicial review as against the 




(iii) Accountability and legitimacy 
 
We consider the IWF to be both an accountable and a transparent organisation. We have put in 
place a whole series of procedures and mechanisms to ensure utmost accountability and 
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transparency. The Board comprises a majority of non-industry members. The Chair is an 
independent appointee. We have in place good governance arrangements; we are a charitable 
organisation, and therefore are subject to the jurisdiction of the Charity Commission; we have 
regularly engaged independent experts to examine our processes and procedures; and taken 




– Ian Walden, 2009 
 
The IWF dislikes being called a censor, and, strictly speaking, it isn’t one. But, on the other hand, 
there cannot be the slightest doubt that it is involved in a process whose end result is self-
censorship by ISPs understandably terrified of being accused of distributing child pornography… 
[A]lthough it was originally set up and now operates with strong governmental support, its 
workings have never been the subject of any sustained parliamentary or public scrutiny or debate. 
But, there again, why should they be? The IWF does not enjoy even the dubious status of a 
quango, and indeed takes considerable pains to stress that it is a purely private body. The 




– Julian Petley, 2009 
 
A related complaint levelled at self-regulatory systems is that they often lack 
accountability and legitimacy. In some cases this overlaps with complaints about 
transparency and openness – as in Lessig’s concerns about “truth in blocking”
105
 – with 
critics concerned that users will not know what is being blocked, by whom, or how. In 
other cases, however, the concern is not that citizens will be unaware of particular 
actions or decisions, but rather that they will have no input into those actions nor 
methods to challenge them. 
 
This line of criticism generally focuses on the shifting source of regulation – away from 
public bodies which are bound by constitutional constraints and subject to judicial 
review and towards private bodies such as ISPs which are exempt from these restrictions 
– and we have already mentioned the issues which this presents. 
 
However, accountability through traditional administrative law mechanisms such as 
judicial review is merely one variety of accountability. Freeman, for example, has 
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pointed out that accountability may be ensured in relation to “private” actors by other 
mechanisms which might in some cases be adequate alternatives: 
 
Importantly, private actors are often already constrained by alternative accountability 
mechanisms that go largely unrecognized in administrative law. A private decision maker’s 
internal procedural rules, market pressures, informal norms of compliance, third party oversight 
and the background threat of agency enforcement might hold private actors to account for their 
performance, even in what seem to be voluntary, self-regulatory systems. Although these forms 
of accountability may not satisfy the traditional administrative law demand for accountability to 
an elected body, they nonetheless may play an important role in legitimizing, or rendering 




If we take this wider view, it might at first seem that there are significant and effective 
alternative accountability mechanisms in place for the IWF and the Cleanfeed system. 
There is certainly very significant accountability to the industry. Although only a 
minority of the IWF’s board represent the internet industry, the industry ultimately 
controls the purse strings. Membership of the IWF is voluntary, as is deployment of the 
Cleanfeed system: dissatisfied ISPs are free to disengage if they are unhappy with the 
direction taken. Other mechanisms have also been used within the IWF to ensure 





There is also substantial de facto accountability to different arms of the state. The IWF is 
crucially dependent on official recognition and support to enable it to carry out its 
functions. Were any of these to be withdrawn it is hard to see how it could continue to 
function. For example, its legal basis for exemption from liability for possession of child 
pornography relies on a 2004 Memorandum of Understanding between the Crown 
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Prosecution Service and the Association of Chief Police Officers.
108
 Without this the 
legal risks to the IWF could render its work impossible. Similarly, in order to vet staff 
the IWF was obliged to approach the Home Office for the ability to seek enhanced 
disclosures (CRB checks) under Part 5 of the Police Act 1997. As Walden points out, 
since reorganising as a charity in 2004 the IWF is subject to the oversight of the Charity 
Commission. In addition, the IWF is in receipt of very substantial funding from official 
sources – in 2008/09 for example the Hotline function was subsidised by an EU grant 




There is a noticeable absence here however: there is no apparent mechanism in place to 
ensure accountability to the affected users except indirectly, insofar as they might be 
heard via ISPs or via the state. As already mentioned, there is not a single trustee who 
could be described as representing a user or civil rights perspective. 
 
A similar complaint can be made about processes within the IWF. Laidlaw has 
examined other aspects of IWF governance and has concluded that human rights 
oversight is lacking, noting that not one of the annual reports, strategic plans, and board 
minutes available to her mentions human rights.
110
 Similarly, she points out that human 
rights issues do not feature in the audit process relied upon by the IWF as establishing its 
legitimacy. Consequently she argues that, even considered simply as a private company, 
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Interestingly, the IWF was particularly stung by her criticism and in reply commissioned 
a human rights audit of its practices.
112
 This ad hoc response – while desirable in itself – 
does however tend to reinforce her wider point that human rights compliance should be 
built in at a structural level and not merely addressed in an ad hoc or haphazard way. 
The audit was carried out by former DPP Ken Macdonald (now Lord Macdonald) but 




The question of legitimacy also merits further attention. Thus far we have been assessing 
legitimacy primarily in relation to legal validity and in accordance with constitutional 
and human rights norms. Black, however, has suggested that this approach is often 
unsuitable for assessing new patterns of governance.
114
 She notes that: 
 
Where regulatory regimes are largely non-legal and where, as in transnational regimes, infusing 
them with law is problematic, using only a legal concept of legitimacy will lead us to a dead end: 
such regimes will necessarily lack legitimacy and any potential for legitimacy in legal terms. 
They may, however, still be regarded as perfectly legitimate by others. The Forest Stewardship 
Council or Responsible Care, for example, are seen as legitimate by a number of market actors in 




This point applies with equal force in the context of the IWF and the Cleanfeed system, 
both of which are undoubtedly regarded as legitimate by many observers, 
notwithstanding the problems we have already discussed. Black argues, therefore, that 
we should understand legitimacy not just in normative terms but also in sociological 
terms – to recognise that “[l]egitimacy means social credibility and acceptability” so that 
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an organisation is legitimate if it is “perceived as having a right to govern both by those 




If we apply her reasoning to Cleanfeed, we end up with a more empirical and pragmatic 
approach to legitimacy, one which would ask in our case whether the IWF has 
succeeded in earning and maintaining perceptions of legitimacy amongst the 
communities (government, ISPs and internet users) it serves – an approach which might 
help us understand the potential harm to the IWF’s reputation and legitimacy caused by 
e.g. the Wikipedia blocking. Using this form of analysis also helps to draw out the point 
that legitimacy is not necessarily something measured along a single dimension only – 
government agencies, ISPs and users may have very different views of the legitimacy of 
the Cleanfeed system. 
 
On that point, it has to be noted that a perceived lack of legitimacy will itself hamper the 
work of the IWF. The Mobile Broadband Group made this point in submissions to the 
All Party Parliamentary Communications Group, noting the backlash which resulted 
from the Wikipedia incident and arguing that actions which were resented by the public 
could be expected to be ineffective: 
 
There have been discussions with the Home Office, for example, about the use of blocking for 
radicalisation sites. It was concluded that such an approach would be just too contentious and 
actually counter-productive, when there is no consensus among the wider population as to the 
legitimacy of blocking. By way of illustration, the IWF has had recent experience of the public 
objecting to the blocking of an image (albeit Level 1 illegal) that had been in the public domain 
for 30 years. The IWF’s action led to the image being posted many many times, perhaps 
thousands of times, more. Whatever the rights and wrongs of that particular incident, it was a 
very clear demonstration of how power has shifted from government and corporations to the 





For that reason, we see a very significant incentive for the IWF to ensure legitimacy at 
least in the sense outlined by Black – without public support, blocking is likely to be 
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counterproductive. This has led to an extremely cautious approach on its part regarding 




In Chapter 4 we considered the complaint that regulation by code resulted in a lack of 
transparency in relation to the operation of the Cleanfeed system and we examined how 
the technical and practical operation of the system was opaque to UK users. A similar 
complaint can be made that self-regulation masks the state role in the system. This is 
strikingly borne out in the case of Cleanfeed by a recent response from the Home Office 
to a freedom of information request regarding its involvement with the IWF: 
 
I regret to inform you that the Home Office does not hold the information that you have 
requested regarding the relationship between the IWF and the Home Office. The IWF is a self 




This response – that there are no “formal” links – may be true in a very narrow sense, 
but is belied by the very close relationship between the Home Office and the IWF. As 
we have seen in chapter 3, the Home Office was the midwife to the birth of the IWF, 
commissioned the report which led to its restructuring in 1999, led the push for 
mandatory blocking against the IWF URL list, and recently asked the IWF to expand its 
reporting mechanisms to cover “extreme pornography” under s.63 of the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Given these links, the Home Office reply to the 
freedom of information request is disingenuous and is typical of other responses by the 
Home Office to attempts to scrutinise its relationship with the IWF.
119
 While there is 
significant information publicly available about that relationship, it is striking that it is 
the IWF itself which makes that information available (through, for example, its public 
board minutes) rather than the Home Office. Consequently – and ironically – it is the 
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self-regulatory body which better meets the spirit of freedom of information laws, 




(v) Compliance with the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law Making 
 
A number of these concerns regarding self-regulation have received special treatment in 
EU law. Senden has charted the development of a “better regulation” agenda within the 
EU which, over the approximate period from 1998 to 2003, moved towards greater use 
of self- and co-regulatory policy tools.
121
 This process led to a number of different 
policies being adopted – notably the July 2001 White Paper on European Governance 
and the June 2002 Action Plan “Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory 
Environment” – but for our purposes the most significant of these is the December 2003 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making.
122
 This agreement between the 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission established for the first time general 
criteria as to when self- and co-regulation should be used as policy instruments. It 
explicitly recognised a need to ensure democratic legitimacy and transparency and 
therefore provided in Article 17: 
 
The Commission will ensure that any use of co-regulation or self-regulation is always consistent 
with Community law and that it meets the criteria of transparency (in particular the publicising of 
agreements) and representativeness of the parties involved. It must also represent added value for 
the general interest. These mechanisms will not be applicable where fundamental rights or 
important political options are at stake or in situations where the rules must be applied in a 
uniform fashion in all Member States. 
 
This is an important provision – by its references to transparency, publicity of 
agreements and representativeness of parties it sets high standards for self-regulatory 
mechanisms generally but also expressly rules out the use of self- or co-regulatory 
mechanisms where “fundamental rights... are at stake”. It is striking, however, that it has 
not influenced European policy towards internet content which has continued to rely 
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heavily on self-regulation – and indeed recently has moved even further in this 
direction.
123
 The criticism here is that content regulation of its very nature involves 
restrictions of freedom of expression but is not being assessed against the standards set 
out in the Interinstitutional Agreement.
124
 The point is particularly acute in relation to 
Directive 2011/93/EU which promotes self-regulatory blocking in a way which the 
Commission had previously found likely to breach Article 10 ECHR.
125
 Consequently, 
there is a strong argument that European involvement in this area – particularly 
Directive 2011/93/EU – has the effect of facilitating blocking in a way which does not 






In the previous chapter we examined the cyber-libertarian/cyber-paternalist debate and 
we considered two of the regulatory tactics which were said by cyber-paternalists to 
enable greater state control of internet content. We concluded that those two tactics – 
code as law and gatekeeper regulation – when used in the context of Cleanfeed had 
manifested only some of the risks identified for them, and that the incentives faced by 
ISPs and in particular the IWF shaped the application of these tactics in a way which 
was not always recognised in the literature. 
 
In this chapter we examined the third tactic in this regulatory triad – self regulation – 
and the way in which it has been used in the context of the Cleanfeed system. We 
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assessed how many of the same criticisms in relation to code as law and gatekeeper 
regulation (notably the possible effect on transparency, legitimacy and accountability) 
may apply to self-regulation, but also identified benefits to self regulation and in 
particular considered how the requirement for industry participation acts as a check on 
the IWF and therefore indirectly on state action. Consequently, it might again be 
concluded that the incentives of industry actors can operate to minimise the risks 
associated with self-regulation. 
 
Given the deficiencies in accountability and transparency we identified in both chapters, 
there appears to be a clear need for reform of the Cleanfeed system, though this chapter 
cautions against a rush to greater state involvement in the operation of the IWF. 
However, the extent to which reform must take place and the nature of reform required 
will depend on the legal obligations which already apply to ISPs, the IWF and the state. 
The next chapter will consider these obligations and in particular will consider to what 
extent public law can already intervene to control the operation of the Cleanfeed system, 








In previous chapters we outlined the way in which the UK government has promoted 
self- and co- regulatory solutions in the online space, reflecting a deliberate policy 
choice to minimise the use of legislation. We also saw claims that this approach – 
especially where coupled with the use of gatekeeper regulation and technological 
enforcement tools – tends to undermine constitutional values by restricting fundamental 
rights while also insulating regulation from legal scrutiny. In this chapter we examine 
those claims by assessing the extent to which the law might enforce fundamental rights 
and public law norms as against the IWF, ISPs and the state itself. 
 
We begin by considering the threshold question as to whether and how English law 
might regard the IWF and the Cleanfeed system as having a public dimension. In 
particular, we will consider whether the IWF may exercise a “public function” for the 
purposes of judicial review; whether it might be considered a “public authority” under 
the Human Rights Act 1998; and whether it could amount to an “emanation of the state” 
for the purposes of European Union law. Following this we then consider the extent to 
which the UK faces a positive obligation under the ECHR which may require it to 




2. Research context 
 
Because, as a technical matter, the government in such cases is not technically mandating such 
speech restrictions and because such restrictions are “voluntarily” undertaken by private ISPs at 
the behest of the government in cooperation with “private” organizations like the IWF, these 
speech restrictive actions are technically outside the scope of applicable national laws protecting 
citizens’ free speech rights, like the UK’s Human Rights Act. 
– Dawn Nunziato, 2011
2
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The literature on internet freedom sometimes paints with a very broad brush, making 
generalised claims about technological and governance trends without adequately 
considering national conditions. Nunziato exemplifies this with her assertion that the 
Cleanfeed system exists beyond the scope of the Human Rights Act – a claim that is not 
supported by any analysis of English law and which, it will be argued later in this 
chapter, is inconsistent with the authorities. Such a wide approach may be necessary 
when considering the international picture as a whole. However, when applied to 
particular national contexts it can mean that arguments for reform neglect the actual 
conditions on the ground. Nunziato, for example, argues for the export of the First 
Amendment “state action” doctrine to the UK while entirely overlooking the 
considerable domestic jurisprudence which already exists regarding the attribution of 




It is desirable, therefore, to test the general predictions which have been made about 
internet freedoms with a view to seeing whether these predictions have been borne out in 
the English context. This requires us to consider whether the use of self-regulation has in 
fact resulted in the Cleanfeed system being insulated from judicial challenge by looking 
in more detail at the availability of remedies. When we do so, it becomes striking how 
little has been written on this point – or indeed on the wider question of judicial 
oversight of internet self-regulation in England. 
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Most of the leading pieces on the IWF and Cleanfeed, for example, note that challenges 
to the actions of the IWF may be problematic but do not discuss this point further.
4
 
Indeed, on a close examination of the literature only four authors appear to have 
considered in detail the ways in which the English courts might apply public law norms 




Why is this? A lack of source material may play a part. To date there is no English case 
law regarding the application of public law norms to internet self-regulation. There has 
been no litigation regarding the IWF, while the only attempt to judicially review 
Nominet failed at the leave stage – though apparently on the basis of failure to exhaust 
remedies rather than amenability to judicial review – leaving us without the benefit of a 
determination on its public or private status.
6
 Another possible reason is the IWF 
concession that it is a public body for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, discussed 
further below, which may have discouraged detailed consideration of its status. 
 
In any event, this chapter will address this gap in the literature by considering in more 
detail whether the Cleanfeed system should be understood as being already within the 
realm of public law. It should be noted, however, that the focus of this chapter will be on 
the application of public law norms – for example, whether the IWF will be subject to 
judicial review. The content of those norms – for example, whether a right to be heard 
might be required before a blocking decision is made or whether overblocking might 
result in a breach of Article 10 ECHR – will be considered in chapter 7.  
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In the United Kingdom, as in other liberal democracies, the last decade has been a period of quiet 
revolution in public administration. Successive governments elected on political platforms 
promising to “roll back the state” have presided over changes in the mode of governance which 
have transformed the relation between public and private... Activities previously subject to close 
administrative controls have been deregulated, and other activities formerly carried out directly 
by public bodies have been “contracted out” to the private sector... 




To understand the way in which the law might control the operation of the Cleanfeed 
system it will be helpful to begin by setting it within a wider context. Since the early 
years of the Thatcher government, public law in the United Kingdom has had to deal 
with significant changes in the nature of the state. Trends such as privatisation, 
outsourcing and deregulation have led to a “contracting state” – “contracting” in the 
sense of shrinking, in the sense of contracting out functions to the private sector and also 
in the sense of using contracts as a tool of governance.
8
 More recently these have been 
characterised as leading to a new form of “decentred governance” or a “post-regulatory 
state” in which the state and legislation are no longer necessarily viewed as central to 
regulation and where more emphasis is placed on approaches such as self-regulation, 




Against this background the UK preference for online self-regulation is not an outlier 
but instead exemplifies a more general approach whereby the state has withdrawn from 
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the delivery (though not necessarily the oversight) of a wide range of functions.
10
 In 
particular, the work of the IWF in assessing legality might be said to reflect a move 
towards “bottom-up” privatisation – one where a governmental activity is taken on by a 




Following these trends and their blurring of the public/private divide, one of the most 
difficult questions in English law has come to be that of deciding when public law 
standards (and through them fundamental rights) should be applied to functions which 
might be described as governmental but are placed in the hands of private actors. This is 
particularly challenging in the context of self-regulation where the law has struggled to 
develop a principled basis to reconcile the need to regulate abuses of power with the 




Surveying this much-litigated area, we can say that there are three distinct but related 
approaches which will determine whether the actions of a private body can be attributed 
to the state, depending on the type of right which is asserted and the type of remedy 
sought.
13
 The first is judicial review, as a freestanding remedy available in respect of the 
exercise of “public functions” even by an otherwise private body. Second, the Human 
Rights Act 1998 makes available a cause of action against a “public authority” which 
acts in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right, where the term public 
authority is defined to include “any person certain of whose functions are of a public 
nature”.
14
 Third, under European Union law it may be possible to enforce certain rights 
as against an “emanation of the state” under the principle set out in Foster v. British 
Gas.
15
 Each of these will be outlined in turn before being applied to the case of the IWF. 
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(ii) Judicial review and public functions 
 
In one sense, then, there is no ‘constitutional’ background to the protection of human rights in the 
private sphere in England. England’s is a legal system in which areas where Parliament has not 
occupied the field (and where European Community law does not apply), including much of the 
private sphere, are regulated – or not regulated – by the common law and equity. At least in the 
private sphere everyone enjoys freedom to do as they will unless there is a positive law to the 
contrary. 




One of the most significant aspects of English law, highlighted by Oliver, is that it does 
not have a general doctrine whereby human rights are enforceable as between private 
actors unless there is some pre-existing legal relationship between them. This is so 
notwithstanding that a body may exercise significant power over an individual or even 
an entire industry. Instead the dominant position remains that fundamental rights have 
vertical effect only – amounting to a check on the power of the state – rather than having 




Given this fact, one of the few mechanisms open to an individual who claims that their 
rights have been violated by a private body has been to argue that the body should be 
regarded as carrying out a “public function” within the meaning of Part 54 of the Civil 
Procedure Rules, which defines a “claim for judicial review” to include “a claim to 
review the lawfulness of... a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the exercise of 
a public function”.
18
 This concept, as applied by a line of case law from R. v. Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin
19
 onwards, will determine when such an 
exercise of power is reviewable as a matter of public law. This will enable a challenge 
on the basis of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety and – more recently – 
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also on the developing
20





grounds – while they do not themselves directly provide for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights – do protect procedural rights and enable the court to assess whether 




When, then, can it be said that a body exercises a “public function” so as to make it 
amenable to judicial review? Until relatively recently the law focused solely on the 
source of the power exercised by the body, asking whether it was rooted in statute or the 
prerogative. The result, in the case of industry self-regulatory bodies, was that they were 
viewed as creatures of private agreement which therefore fell outside the scope of 
judicial review. As Parker CJ put it in R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex 
parte Lain: “Private or domestic tribunals have always been outside the scope of 
certiorari since their authority is derived solely from contract, that is, from the 




This approach was modified in 1986 by Datafin. In that case the Court of Appeal found 
that the function of the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, a non-governmental and 
self-described “self-regulatory” body, was nevertheless amenable to judicial review. In a 
judgment which expressed considerable concern about unfettered private power Sir John 
Donaldson MR began by noting that the term self-regulation was a loaded one, which 
very often comprised the regulation of others: 
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“Self-regulation” is an emotive term. It is also ambiguous. An individual who voluntarily 
regulates his life in accordance with stated principles, because he believes that this is morally 
right and also, perhaps, in his own long term interests, or a group of individuals who do so, are 
practising self-regulation. But it can mean something quite different. It can connote a system 
whereby a group of people, acting in concert, use their collective power to force themselves and 
others to comply with a code of conduct of their own devising. This is not necessarily morally 




The Master of the Rolls then turned to look at the considerable de facto power exercised 
by the Panel, notwithstanding its lack of any “visible means of legal support”
26
, and took 
a wide view of the decision in Lain as articulating a functional test towards judicial 
review – one which looks to the nature of the power being exercised.
27
 In determining 
whether a power is subject to judicial review the Master of the Rolls identified the only 
essential points as being (a) that there should be a “public element” and (b) that judicial 
review is excluded in relation to “bodies whose sole source of power is a consensual 
submission to its [sic] jurisdiction”.
28
 Beyond these, the Master of the Rolls described 
the case law as enumerating a number of factors determining amenability to judicial 





Using this analysis the court determined that the Panel was amenable to judicial review, 
finding that it performed an important public duty, exercised “immense power” over 
citizens whether or not they had technically assented to its jurisdiction and was obliged 
to act judicially but was beyond the effective control of private law remedies. Most 
importantly, the court noted that the Panel was backed up by considerable indirect 
statutory recognition and support so that it could be said to form part of a wider 
governmental regulatory system. According to the Master of the Rolls: 
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As an act of government it was decided that, in relation to takeovers, there should be a central 
self-regulatory body which would be supported and sustained by a periphery of statutory powers 
and penalties wherever non-statutory powers and penalties were insufficient or non-existent or 
where EEC requirements called for statutory provisions. 
 
No one could have been in the least surprised if the panel had been instituted and operated under 
the direct authority of statute law, since it operates wholly in the public domain. Its jurisdiction 
extends throughout the United Kingdom. Its code and rulings apply equally to all who wish to 
make take-over bids or promote mergers, whether or not they are members of bodies represented 
on the panel. Its lack of a direct statutory base is a complete anomaly, judged by the experience 
of other comparable markets world wide… [T]he position has already been reached in which 
central government has incorporated the panel into its own regulatory network built up under the 




The limits of the “regulatory network” approach in Datafin can be seen in R. v. 
Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan.
31
 That case was in some 
ways very similar to Datafin, in that it involved a self-regulatory body which exercised 
effective control over an important industry, where those wishing to take part in 
horseracing had no realistic alternative but to submit to the Club’s Rules of Racing and 
its Disciplinary Committee. Here, however, the Court of Appeal held that these factors 
were not sufficient. Central to this finding was a distinction between powers which 
affect the public and governmental powers – the latter requiring some greater element of 
state involvement. Sir Thomas Bingham MR could therefore characterise the Club as not 
being subject to judicial review despite the fact that it regulated a “significant national 
activity” so that if it did not exist “the government would probably be driven to create a 
public body to do so”.
32
 Despite this, the Master of the Rolls held that the necessary 
degree of state participation was lacking – unlike the Takeover Panel, the Jockey Club 
had not been incorporated into a wider governmental scheme nor given statutory support 
for its powers: 
 
But the Jockey Club is not in its origin, its history, its constitution or (least of all) its membership 
a public body. While the grant of a Royal Charter was no doubt a mark of official approval, this 
did not in any way alter its essential nature, functions or standing. Statute provides for its 
representation on the Horseracing Betting Levy Board, no doubt as a body with an obvious 
interest in racing, but it has otherwise escaped mention in the statute book. It has not been woven 
into any system of governmental control of horseracing, perhaps because it has itself controlled 









horseracing so successfully that there has been no need for any such governmental system and 
such does not therefore exist. This has the result that while the Jockey Club's powers may be 




Hoffman LJ likewise differentiated the decision in Datafin and other cases regarding the 
judicial review of self-regulatory bodies on the basis that those cases involved “a 
privatisation of the business of government itself... [by] private bodies established by the 




The Aga Khan decision also confirmed that Datafin had not established a purely 
functional test for judicial review – the source of power remained important insofar as 
the applicant had a contractual relationship with the Club which afforded him an 
adequate private law remedy in cases of abuse of power (though the members of the 
court reserved their position as to whether a public law remedy should be made available 
if private law remedies were inadequate). As a result, the test for judicial review remains 
a relatively narrow one which requires significant government involvement – the fact 
that a respondent exercises considerable private power, even over an entire industry, is 
not enough. In the words of Hoffman LJ, the courts remain reluctant to “patch up the 





(iii) Public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998 
 
The limits of Datafin and its progeny were a cause for some concern when the Labour 
government delivered on its commitment to “bring rights home” through the 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. In 
particular, the narrow scope of judicial review left it unclear whether traditional state 









functions (such as the provision of healthcare) would be subject to human rights 




Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 addressed this point by attempting to clarify the 
human rights obligations of non-state bodies. Section 6(1) introduced the new concept of 
a “public authority” and provides that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way 
which is incompatible with Convention rights. The term public authority is not fully 
defined, but section 6(3)(b) includes in the concept “any person certain of whose 
functions are functions of a public nature”. 
 
As explained by the House of Lords in Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote PCC v. Wallbank
37
 
this creates a twofold classification. On one side are bodies such as government 
departments, local authorities, the police and armed forces which are so closely 
identified with the state as to amount to “core” public authorities. These are governed by 
section 6(1) without reference to section 6(3)(b) and thus are subject to the requirements 
of the Convention in everything they do.
38
 On the other side the House of Lords 
identified section 6(3)(b) as creating a category of “hybrid” public authorities – those 
which exercise both public functions and non-public functions. Such bodies are also 
obliged to respect Convention rights under section 6(1), but only when carrying out a 
public function – under section 6(5) such a person is not a public authority in relation to 
a particular act “if the nature of the act is private”. 
 
At first glance, this appeared to create a statutory scheme which resembled the post-
Datafin case law on judicial review of private bodies, with a similar focus on the public 
nature of a particular function, and indeed the Court of Appeal in Aston Cantlow itself 
relied heavily on that case law for guidance. In the House of Lords, however, this was 
criticised on the basis that it neglected the international law origins of the rights 
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protected in the 1998 Act. In particular, their Lordships took the view that the test to be 
applied was one which mirrored the approach which would be taken in Strasbourg with 
regard to state liability – as Lord Rodger put it, one must look “behind the Act to the 
Convention itself”.
39
 He went on to say that the intention of the Act “was to make 
provision in our domestic law to ensure that the bodies carrying out the functions of 
government in the United Kingdom observed the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Convention” and therefore “the essential characteristic of a public authority is that it 
carries out a function of government which would engage the responsibility of the 




That is not to say that the judicial review case law is of no use in this context, and indeed 
Lord Hope explicitly noted that it might well be helpful as to whether a particular power 
constitutes “a function of a public nature”.
41
 It does, however, mean that the 1998 Act by 
no means parallels the Datafin test. 
 
Lord Nicholls expanded on the approach to be taken under the 1998 Act by identifying 
four particular factors which would identify a “governmental” function for the purposes 
of the ECHR, holding that: 
 
[T]he statute does not amplify what the expression “public” and its counterpart “private” mean in 
this context. But, here also, given the statutory context already mentioned and the repetition of 
the description “public”, essentially the contrast being drawn is between functions of a 
governmental nature and functions, or acts, which are not of that nature. I stress, however, that 
this is no more than a useful guide. The phrase used in the Act is public function, not 
governmental function... 
 
What, then, is the touchstone to be used in deciding whether a function is public for this purpose? 
Clearly there is no single test of universal application. There cannot be, given the diverse nature 
of governmental functions and the variety of means by which these functions are discharged 
today. Factors to be taken into account include the extent to which in carrying out the relevant 
function the body is publicly funded, or is exercising statutory powers, or is taking the place of 
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Applying these factors the House of Lords held (by a majority) that the plaintiff 
parochial church council was not acting as a public authority when it served a notice on 
the defendants calling on them to repair the chancel of the parish church but rather was 
merely acting to enforce a private law liability. 
 
The House of Lords has elaborated further on this test in YL v. Birmingham City 
Council
43
. In this case Birmingham City Council was under a statutory duty to make 
arrangements for the provision of care and accommodation for YL, who suffered from 
Alzheimer’s disease. It did so under a contract with Southern Cross Healthcare Ltd., a 
private business operating a residential care home. Ultimately the relationship between 
YL’s family and staff in the home broke down, at which point Southern Cross sought to 
terminate YL’s right to remain. The question then arose whether YL could assert the 
Article 8 right to a family life as against Southern Cross.  
 
This question – in essence, whether Southern Cross should be treated as a hybrid public 
authority – was tried as a preliminary issue and decided in the negative by a 3-2 
majority. While the majority and the minority were agreed that the presence of coercive, 
disciplinary or regulatory functions were strong indications that a body is a public 
authority, they differed when it came to the more difficult case of outsourced service 
delivery where these factors tend not to be present.
44
 In deciding that Southern Cross 
was not a section 6(3)(b) public authority, the majority placed most emphasis on the 
commercial nature of the enterprise and the contractual nature of its relationship with the 
Council. In an oft-quoted passage, Lord Scott summarised these points by noting that: 
 
Southern Cross is a company carrying on a socially useful business for profit. It is neither a 
charity nor a philanthropist. It enters into private law contracts with the residents in its care 
homes and with the local authorities with whom it does business. It receives no public funding, 
enjoys no special statutory powers, and is at liberty to accept or reject residents as it chooses 
(subject, of course, to anti-discrimination legislation which affects everyone who offers a service 
to the public) and to charge whatever fees in its commercial judgment it thinks suitable. It is 
operating in a commercial market with commercial competitors... [T]he fees charged by Southern 
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Cross and paid by local or health authorities are charged and paid for a service. There is no 




Lord Mance similarly placed reliance on the effect which a public authority finding 
would have on the ability of Southern Cross to run its business, suggesting that the 
duties which might arise as a result would fit uneasily with “the ordinary private law 




By contrast, Lord Bingham and Baroness Hale would have held that Southern Cross was 
a hybrid public authority, seeing those in residential care as particularly vulnerable to 
human rights abuses and the outsourcing of this type of formerly public function as 
precisely the type of case which section 6(3)(b) of the 1998 Act was intended to capture. 
Indeed, the dissenters went so far as to describe the approach of the majority in 
separating the (public) arrangement of care by the Council from the (private) delivery of 




In any event, the particular outcome in YL was promptly reversed, with legislation 
passed to deem a private care home under contract with a local authority to be exercising 
“a function of a public nature”.
48
 However, YL remains the subject of significant 
criticism, not least because it appears to reject a clear Parliamentary intention in relation 
to outsourced public functions. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has since called 
for wider legislative change to restore what it describes as “the original intention of 
Parliament, that all private bodies exercising public functions should be subject to the 
duty to act compatibly with human rights”.
49
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There has been surprisingly little litigation since YL considering whether a particular 
body is a hybrid public authority for the purposes of the 1998 Act, with the only reported 
decision being that of the Court of Appeal in R. (Weaver) v. London & Quadrant 
Housing Trust.
50
 In that case a divided court (Rix LJ dissenting) found a private 
residential social landlord (RSL) to be a hybrid public authority which was carrying out 
a public function in deciding to terminate a tenancy for rent arrears. Despite some 
similarities to YL the majority (Collins LJ and Elias LJ) held that the earlier case could 
be distinguished – while this was also a case of outsourced delivery of a service, they 
took the view that it was removed from the private law and commercial context of YL. 
Specifically, the majority held that the RSL was a non-profit, charitable body which by 
delivering subsidised housing was engaged in an inherently public function. They 
stressed the fact that payments to the RSL were subsidies, not merely payments for 
services, and noted that the RSL worked very closely with local government and was 
subject to very close statutory regulation in matters such as the allocation and 
management of properties. Consequently, the termination of the tenancy was held to be 
so bound up in the public function of the provision of social housing that it must also be 
seen as a public act.
51
 This result, along with the judicial divisions in both Weaver and 
YL itself, highlights the fact sensitive nature of the test established by Aston Cantlow and 
the continued difficulties which the courts face in applying it. 
 
(iv) Emanation of the state and European Union law 
 
The final way in which the actions of the IWF might be treated as having a public law 
character is through the European law doctrine of direct effect. As is well known, a 
Member State may not rely on its own failure to perform its obligations under a directive 
and consequently an individual may be able to assert rights conferred by an 
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unimplemented directive against the state. This vertical direct effect will in turn apply 
not just against central government but also against a wider set of public bodies.
52
 In 
English law these are usually referred to as “emanations of the state”, though this phrase 
is not one endorsed by the ECJ and has been criticised as potentially misleading.
53
 This 
doctrine of direct effect, established in Marshall v. Southampton Area Health 
Authority
54
, differs very substantially from both judicial review and the Human Rights 
Act in that once a body is regarded as an emanation of the state then it is subject to direct 
effect in relation to all its functions, public and private alike. It therefore ensures that an 
individual can rely on a directive against the state “regardless of the capacity in which 




Whether a body will be treated as part of the state for the purposes of direct effect is a 
matter of European law primarily determined by Foster v. British Gas.
56
 In that case the 
ECJ set out a wide understanding of the state, holding in paragraph 20 that: 
 
a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted 
by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose 
special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between 
individuals is included in any event among the bodies against which the provisions of a directive 




In Foster itself, therefore, the House of Lords ultimately held that British Gas fell within 
this test so as to be bound by European equality law in relation to retirement ages, on the 
basis that British Gas provided a public service, did so under the control of the state 
which was entitled to dictate its policies and benefit from its surpluses, and enjoyed 
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The test in Foster is not, however, the only basis on which a body can be treated as an 
emanation of the state. The language in paragraph 20 – stating that such a body “is 
included in any event among the bodies [against which direct effect may be relied 
upon]”
59
 – suggests that other factors may also have the effect of causing a body to be 
treated as an emanation of the state. This has been accepted by the Court of Appeal in 
Rolls-Royce Plc v. Doughty
60
 where Mustill LJ held that Foster “was not intended to 
provide the answer to every category of case. The words ‘is included among’... make 
this clear enough”. Notwithstanding this, Mustill LJ went on to say that in most cases the 
Foster test would be decisive: 
 
Nevertheless, at least in a case of the same general type as Foster the Court's formulation must 
always be the starting point, and will usually be the finishing point. If all the factors identified by 
the Court are present it is likely to require something very unusual to produce the result that an 
entity is not to be identified with the state. Conversely, although the absence of a factor will not 
necessarily be fatal, it will need the addition of something else, not contemplated by the formula, 
before [direct effect] has a prospect of being brought into play. 
 
In that case Rolls Royce was found not to be subject to direct effect. Despite being 
entirely state owned, the Court of Appeal took the view that it was a commercial 
undertaking, trading with the state at arm’s length rather than providing a public service, 
and did not enjoy any special powers of the type referred to in Foster. 
  
By contrast, in National Union of Teachers v. St. Mary’s Church of England (Aided) 
Junior School
61
 Schieman LJ for a unanimous Court of Appeal held that a voluntary 
aided school had to be regarded as an emanation of the state because it was responsible 
for providing a public service on foot of a statutory instrument and was under the control 
of the state insofar as its activities were closely regulated by both the Secretary of State 
and the relevant Local Education Authority. While the court accepted that the school did 
not enjoy any “special powers beyond those which apply between individuals”, this was 
held not to be an absolute requirement where other indicia of public status were present. 
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The earlier decisions in Foster and Rolls-Royce were distinguished on the basis that both 
involved commercial undertakings in which the state held a stake – not the provision of 
an inherently public service such as education – though in neither of those cases had the 
court relied upon this factor.  
 
(v) Assessing the public status of the IWF 
 
[W]e have, at most, some separate substantive and adjectival public laws, but we do not have a 
coherent divide between public and private law or laws. 




From our brief survey of the different tests used in the context of judicial review, the 
Human Rights Act and direct effect it will be clear that there is no single method by 
which to determine whether the courts would treat the actions of the IWF in 
administering the Cleanfeed system as being public in nature.
63
 This is, perhaps, to be 
expected. Each test has evolved to serve a very different purpose: there are substantial 
differences between the narrow Diceyan concept of legality served by judicial review
64
, 
the Human Rights Act aim of ensuring compliance with international legal obligations
65
 
and the doctrine of direct effect whether conceived as a form of estoppel against the state 




Nevertheless, there are significant overlaps between the tests which make it appropriate 
that we should consider them together. As Woolf CJ noted in Poplar Housing and 
Regeneration Community Association Ltd v. Donoghue
67
, in borderline cases such as this 
“there is no clear demarcation line which can be drawn between public and private 
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bodies and functions… the decision is very much one of fact and degree”.
68
 It will be 
helpful to carry out a holistic assessment of the public status of the IWF before reaching 
a conclusion regarding each of the three tests. 
 
(a) Why look behind the IWF acceptance that it is a “public body”? 
 
The IWF accepts the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights and undertakes to 
be governed subject to the Human Rights Act on the basis that it should be treated as a public 
body. 




The IWF, in accepting that it is subject to the Human Rights Act, is essentially telling a future 
court that they would be susceptible to judicial review. 




As a preliminary matter it might be objected that it is unnecessary to examine the public 
status of the IWF given the 2001 board resolution that it should be regarded as a “public 
body [sic]” for the purposes of the Human Rights Act.
71
 Thus, the argument might run, 
any person wishing to challenge an action of the IWF could simply rely on that 
concession, obviating the need to consider the issue in any detail. At first glance this 
argument has some appeal. Certainly, the existence of this concession would make it 
substantially easier for anyone wishing to bring an action under the Human Rights Act. 
But there remain a number of reasons why it is still important to consider the issue. 
 
First, the concession is a narrow one. It applies only to the Human Rights Act. Despite 
Walden’s comments (which carry particular weight from a former board member of the 
IWF) it does not concede amenability to judicial review per se, nor does it accept IWF 
status as an emanation of the state for the purposes of direct effect. 
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 The term “public body” does not appear anywhere in the 1998 Act – presumably the reference is to a 




Also, the IWF is not bound by this resolution and might later seek to resile from it or cut 
back its scope. There is a recent example of such an official change of mind in the case 
of the Office of the Independent Adjudicator. That body in the space of two years went 
from assuring the public that its decision making was constrained by the possibility of 
judicial review
72
 to arguing before the Court of Appeal
73
 that it was not amenable to 
judicial review in relation to the substance of its work.
74
 While it would be undesirable 
for a body to withdraw a commitment of this sort – particularly if it had been relied upon 
as part of an argument that further regulation is unnecessary – there would be nothing to 
prevent it barring some unusual facts which might give rise to an estoppel. 
 
Finally, it was not inevitable that the IWF would adopt this posture and it would be 
undesirable to allow our analysis to rely heavily on a matter which could easily have 
gone the other way. The same reasoning applies more generally when we remember that 
the IWF is just one aspect of an internet system within the UK which depends heavily on 
self-regulation – if the results of this research are to help shed any light on other aspects 
of that system (such as the role of Nominet in domain name registration) then we should 
avoid overreliance on narrow factual circumstances to the exclusion of wider issues of 
general principle. Not all “self-regulatory” bodies will be so obliging as to admit their 
public status and it is significant that Nominet, for example, has not made a comparable 
concession. 
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(b) The “but for” test 
 
[Speaking of the IWF] If it didn’t exist the state would be forced to create it. 




One of the most important criteria applied by the courts in determining whether a 
function is subject to judicial review is counterfactual – if the body in question didn’t 
exist, would the state take on that function? An affirmative answer is not conclusive 
(witness the decision of the Court of Appeal in Aga Khan) but is strong evidence in 
favour of amenability to review.76 In R. v. Advertising Standards Authority, ex p. The 
Insurance Service77 for example the ASA was held to be reviewable notwithstanding that 
“it has no powers granted to it by statute or at common law, nor... any contractual 
relationship with the advertisers whom it controls” largely because it was “clearly 
exercising a public law function which, if the Authority did not exist, would no doubt be 
exercised by the Director General of Fair Trading”.78 
 
Applying this to the IWF, it is clear that its role in assessing and adjudicating on 
complaints of illegal material would, if not performed by it, be taken on by the state. 
Indeed, while the “but for” test is often criticised as being fictional in nature, the case of 
the IWF is unusually well suited to it.
79
 The IWF was established in direct response to 
state pressure and the closing words of Chief Inspector French’s 1996 letter to all ISPs – 
“We trust that with your co-operation and self regulation it will not be necessary for us 
to move to an enforcement policy” – set out the settled intention of the police to step in 
should the industry not take its own action.
80
 This has remained the position since. For 
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example, in 2011 the IWF transferred its responsibility for handling complaints of 
incitement to racial hatred (which had never sat easily within its remit and for which 
there was little enthusiasm
81
) to the “True Vision” service established by ACPO to 
centralise reports of hate crime – showing interchangeability between public and private 




(c) Public funding and non profit status 
 
In both the Human Rights Act and direct effect case law some weight has been put on 
whether bodies are intended to be profit making and the nature of any state funding they 
receive. YL in particular has made it clear that payment for services delivered as part a 
contract on commercial terms with a public body is not in itself a subsidy, while more 
recently in Weaver the receipt of a state subsidy and charitable status were factors which 
weighed heavily in the finding that a Registered Social Landlord should be treated as a 
hybrid public authority. Similarly, cases such as Rolls-Royce have held that a body is 
less likely to be treated as an emanation of the state for the purposes of direct effect if it 
is engaged in an arm’s length commercial relationship with the state. 
 
In the case of the IWF these factors would weigh heavily in favour of public status under 
both categories. From its inception it has been a not for profit organisation and since 
2005 it has enjoyed charitable status.
83
 While it does “commercialise” the child abuse 
image database in the sense of charging licensing fees to filtering companies which wish 
to use it in their products, this has been done primarily on a cost recovery basis.
84
 It has 
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since 2000 also consistently received a substantial subsidy from public funds, albeit 
from the European Safer Internet programmes rather than directly from national 





(d) Statutory powers  
 
Also central to judicial review, the Human Rights Act and direct effect is a consideration 
of the extent to which a body enjoys direct statutory powers. This takes different forms 
throughout the case law – from the Foster requirement of “special powers beyond those 
which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals”
86
 to the 
acceptance in YL that if a body possesses coercive, disciplinary or regulatory powers 




This factor would not be met in the case of the IWF which does not enjoy any de jure 
power of this sort. At most one might point to its recognition by the CPS and ACPO 
Memorandum of Understanding as a suitable body for reporting illegal images for the 
purposes of the defence under section 46 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
88
 However, 
that MoU does not provide it with any statutory power. Instead, it merely serves as 
evidence in favour of a defence which might be available to individuals who promptly 
report CAI to the IWF. Consequently it would most likely not be sufficient to meet the 
Foster requirement of special powers, making it very unlikely that direct effect could be 
established against it. The decision in National Union of Teachers would not be an 
authority to the contrary – while in that case the school did not enjoy any special powers, 
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it nevertheless was very closely regulated in its activities by the state as part of a 
statutory framework and also had a formal legal basis in recognition by statutory 
instrument – both factors which would be lacking in the case of the IWF. 
 
Direct effect aside, however, the de facto power exercised by the IWF would still be 
consistent with amenability to judicial review. An analogy might be drawn with the case 
of the Press Complaints Commission which has in effect conceded that it is a public 
authority for the purpose of the Human Rights Act and is amenable to judicial review, 
notwithstanding its lack of statutory powers.
89
 Similarly, the Advertising Standards 
Authority was found to be reviewable in R. v. Advertising Standards Authority, ex parte 
Insurance Services plc
90
 at a time before it enjoyed any statutory recognition. 
 
(e) Integration into regulatory schemes and official oversight 
 
The IWF... is supported by the Police and CPS and works in partnership with the Government to 
provide a 'hotline' for individuals or organisations to report potentially illegal content and then to 
assess and judge that material on behalf of UK law enforcement agencies. 




Given the lack of direct statutory powers of the IWF, it is important to consider whether 
it should nevertheless be treated as having a public status due to the way it fits into a 
wider public framework. In Datafin one of the key factors cited by Donaldson MR was 
the way in which the Takeover Panel had been incorporated by central government “into 
its own regulatory network”; similarly in the context of the Human Rights Act Woolf CJ 
held in Poplar Housing that “[t]he more closely the acts that could be of a private nature 
                                                 
89
 R. (Ford) v. The Press Complaints Commission [2001] EWHC Admin 683: “The Commission correctly 
in my view accepts for the purposes of the present permission application, that it is arguable whether it is a 
Public Authority for the purposes of Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”) and is 
amenable to judicial review.” 
90
 (1989) 133 Solicitors Journal 1545, QBD. 
91
 Crown Prosecution Service and Association of Chief Police Officers, ‘Memorandum of Understanding 
Between Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
Concerning Section 46 Sexual Offences Act 2003’. 
217 
 
are enmeshed in the activities of a public body, the more likely they are to be public”.
92
 
In Poplar Housing, therefore, the Court of Appeal was willing to accept that the housing 
association was to be regarded as carrying out a public function in managing social 
housing, particularly as it was so closely associated with Tower Hamlets which had both 
established it and continued to exercise significant control over its activities. 
 
In this context, the close links between state authorities and the IWF would point to a 
finding of public status. The description by the CPS and ACPO of the IWF “assessing 
and judging material on behalf of UK law enforcement agencies” is itself telling and is 




At an operational level we see this in the close working relationship between the IWF 
and the police. UK police forces direct complaints of online illegality in the first instance 
to the IWF, and in assessing those complaints IWF analysts apply standards of legality 
which reflect the general law and work on the basis of training from police.
94
 Appeals 
against IWF decisions regarding legality ultimately lie to the police.
95
 In 2010 the IWF 
entered into a “Service Level Agreement” with ACPO which is said to “provide a 
protocol for the management of investigations into criminal content” hosted in the UK 
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We also see this at a strategic level, when we consider the structure and accountability 
mechanisms under which the IWF operates. The current shape of the IWF heavily 
reflects the 1999 governance review commissioned by the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Home Office
97
 and periodic audits of the IWF’s work indicate a 
significant element of accountability to the state. For example, the IWF itself described a 
2004 audit of its work in the following terms:  
 
Police Commander David Armond (Met Police) and Professor David Wall (Leeds University) 
were commissioned by the Home Office to inspect and review of our operational procedures, 




In the same way a 2011 audit was described by the IWF as being “to [provide] 
independent reassurance to… Members, Government and parties with a particular 
interest in IWF affairs” and was carried out by a five person group three of whom were 




(f) Public or governmental function 
 
In light of the above discussion it is also clear that the single most important indicium of 
public status for the purposes of both judicial review and the Human Rights Act – 
variously described as the presence of a “public element” or “public duty” (Datafin), a 
“governmental” function (Aga Khan) or a “function of government” (Aston Cantlow) – 
is present in this case insofar as the IWF is engaged in closely assisting the law 
enforcement process. Such a finding would not mean that every action carried out by the 
IWF should be regarded as public. Under section 6(5) of the Human Rights Act it would 
not be a public authority in relation to a particular act “if the nature of the act is private”. 
In this case however the actions of the IWF in relation to Cleanfeed – receiving and 
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adjudicating on complaints of illegality, adding URLs to a block list and distributing that 
list to ISPs – should all be regarded as public rather than private in their nature. 
 
(g) Policy factors against public status 
 
The majority of factors point in favour of a finding that the IWF should be regarded both 
as a hybrid public body and as amenable to judicial review. But before reaching a 





In R. v. Chief Rabbi, ex parte Wachmann
100
 Simon Brown J. accepted that as a matter of 
public policy it would be inappropriate for the court to engage in judicial review of a 
religious function – in that case, determination of whether a person was morally and 
religiously fit to hold rabbinical office. The court therefore held that this factor could be 
taken into account in finding that the function in question should not be regarded as one 
that had a “truly public character”.
101
 This reflects a wider policy, one which seeks as far 
as possible to respect the rightful autonomy of voluntary groups, in particular regarding 
adjudication on their own internal rules.
102
 In the case of the IWF block list, however, 
this issue would not arise – insofar as the IWF is merely applying the general law, rather 
than criteria of its own, review by the court would if anything serve to promote its 
activities and would not undermine any independent discretion. 
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Particularly in the judicial review case law there is often a focus on whether other causes 
of action would be available to a claimant should a body not be regarded as public and 
cases such as Aga Khan have held that the existence of a private law remedy will weigh 
against amenability to review. The present case is however more akin to Datafin in that 
the most affected parties – site owners who are wrongfully blocked – are unlikely to 
have any contractual or other private law remedy against the IWF, making this a factor 




(h) Conclusion on public status 
 
Laidlaw has suggested that “there is a strong case that the IWF is a public authority 
under the HRA”.
104
 With the benefit of a fuller analysis and additional material not 
available to her – particularly the minutes of the board meeting which undertook to be 
governed in accordance with the HRA
105
 – we can go further again and say that it would 
be very surprising if the IWF were not found to be a public authority for that purpose 
and it is also very likely that the IWF would be amenable to judicial review, though 
probably not subject to direct effect. 
 
(vi) Limits of a finding of public status 
 
This conclusion is, however, still not a complete answer to those critics who charge that 
the Cleanfeed system is insulated from legal scrutiny or avoids constitutional norms. 
Instead, it requires us to reframe our question from “does public law regulate the 
Cleanfeed system?” to “does public law effectively regulate the Cleanfeed system?” 
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Two particular limitations must be noted. First, we have thus far assessed the position of 
the IWF only. However, the Cleanfeed system is a diffuse one which also includes ISPs 
who enjoy considerable autonomy in how they implement the block list. For example, an 
ISP may choose to use a technology which overblocks, to block additional sites of their 
own choosing or to provide a deceptive error message to users instead of a stop page.
106
 
These actions by ISPs will have significant effects in their own right, but being outside 
the hands of the IWF would escape any judicial scrutiny. A public law remedy would 
not be available against ISPs which (unlike the IWF) have not conceded that they are 
bound by the Human Rights Act and do not have the same extensive interaction with the 
police and other state authorities. 
 
Secondly, MacSithigh has highlighted a more general limitation of an approach based on 
an ad hoc finding of public status for the purpose of judicial review or the Human Rights 
Act – while such a finding might allow challenges to particular acts of the IWF, it would 
still leave the IWF outside the scope of other public law control mechanisms such as the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000.
107
 In this he echoes the concerns of many public law 
writers who caution against a legalistic overreliance on the courts. As Cane has pointed 
out: “judge made administrative law is only the tiny tip of a huge iceberg of norms by 





For these reasons, the availability of judicial review is at best only a partial response to 
those critics who charge that the Cleanfeed system privatises government censorship.
109
 
For these critics the complaint is not just that the system might escape judicial oversight 
(though that is a key element) – in addition they fear that it allows the executive to act 
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outside parliamentary control while at the same time minimising political accountability 
as well as public law oversight in a more general sense. The exceptional, expensive and 
episodic remedy of litigation does little to address these wider points and can act only ex 
post, not ex ante. In addition – as we will discuss further in chapter 7 – the individual 
nature of judicial review and the relatively narrow scope of the rights which might be 
asserted mean that any litigation is unlikely to be able to tackle the wider structural 
issues presented by the Cleanfeed system. 
 




[T]he Convention is mainly concerned not with what a State must do, but with what it must not 
do; that is, with its obligation to refrain from interfering with the individual’s rights. 
Nevertheless, utilising the principle of effectiveness, the Court has held that even in respect of 
provisions which do not expressly create a positive obligation, there may sometimes be a duty to 
act in a particular way. 




We have so far considered whether the actions of the IWF and ISPs should be attributed 
to the state. We now consider a related but distinct issue – even without such a finding, 
might the state have a duty to intervene to secure Convention rights as against private 
entities such as the IWF and ISPs? In the context of the ECHR such a duty is termed a 
“positive obligation” and has historically been a relatively infrequent occurrence: for the 
most part, the Convention aims to provide a safeguard against interferences by public 
authorities. Nevertheless, a growing body of Strasbourg case law has been willing to 
develop positive duties in particular contexts, making it possible that such a duty could 
be applied in the context of online speech also.
111
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The wording of Article 10 does not at first seem favourable. By providing that “[t]his 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and 
ideas without interference by public authority”
112
 it is most naturally read as applying to 
restrictions imposed by the state rather than by private actors. Indeed, one of the leading 
books on positive obligations from 2004 devotes just two pages to Article 10, reflecting 
the relatively limited jurisprudence on this point at the time.
113
 Despite this, a line of 
case law has seen the European Court of Human Rights gradually expand a number of 
positive obligations in relation to freedom of expression, applying the general doctrine 





(ii) Case law 
 
Our starting point is 2000 when two cases found for the first time that positive 
obligations could arise on the part of the state under Article 10. In the first of these, 
Fuentes Bobo v. Spain
115
, the applicant was a producer with the Spanish public 
broadcasting company who was dismissed for criticism of the company’s management 
in a critical newspaper article and in remarks on radio programmes. This dismissal was 
upheld in later litigation. He claimed that his right to freedom of expression under 
Article 10 had been infringed, while the Spanish government replied that the television 
company was in form a private company and therefore its actions could not be attributed 
to the state. Despite this, however, the Court found that the state had a positive 
obligation in certain cases to protect the right to freedom of expression which extended 
to safeguarding the right from threats stemming from private persons. Accordingly in 
this case the court found that the applicant’s dismissal was so disproportionate in nature 
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that to find it lawful did not meet “a pressing social need” and therefore constituted an 
interference with his right to freedom of expression. 
 
Shortly afterwards in Ozgur Gundem v. Turkey
116
 the court expanded on this in the 
context of a Kurdish newspaper which had been the victim of a series of attacks 
including the killing of journalists and distributors. The applicants alleged that these 
attacks were part of an orchestrated campaign by the state. Against this background the 
Court held that there was a positive obligation on the part of the state to ensure respect 
for freedom of expression. The failure either to provide adequate protection or to 
properly investigate the allegations of state collusion meant that Turkey had failed in its 
obligation to protect the newspaper in its exercise of freedom of expression. In an 
important paragraph the Court sets out factors to be applied in determining whether a 
positive obligation arises under Article 10: 
 
The Court recalls the key importance of freedom of expression as one of the preconditions for a 
functioning democracy. Genuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on 
the State's duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, even in the 
sphere of relations between individuals... In determining whether or not a positive obligation 
exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of 
the community and the interests of the individual, the search for which is inherent throughout the 
Convention. The scope of this obligation will inevitably vary, having regard to the diversity of 
situations obtaining in Contracting States, the difficulties involved in policing modern societies 
and the choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. Nor must such an 





In 2001 Tierfabriken v. Switzerland
118
 extended the doctrine further again. In this case a 
private television company which enjoyed a monopoly within Switzerland refused to air 
an animal rights commercial, regarding it as a form of political advertising banned under 
national law. Switzerland argued that the company was acting in a private capacity and 
enjoyed the contractual freedom to refuse advertising as it wished. Nevertheless, the 
Court accepted that this constituted an infringement by the state. While stating that it did 
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not “consider it desirable, let alone necessary, to elaborate a general theory concerning 
the extent to which the Convention guarantees should be extended to relations between 
private individuals inter se”
119
 the court held that where domestic law made lawful this 
treatment of the applicant then it had to be regarded as, in effect, a state sanctioned 
prohibition on political speech.
120
 Significantly, the Court rejected the argument of the 
state that there were “various other possibilities to broadcast the information at issue”, 
finding that the applicant had no ability to reach the entire public other than through the 
monopoly broadcaster.
121
 It also rejected the argument that the finding of a positive 
obligation amounted to a “right to broadcast” which risked interfering with the rights of 





2003 saw an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to expand the doctrine which is of 
particular relevance for our discussion. In Appleby v. UK
123
 the applicants were 
campaigners against a planned development on a public playing pitch. They sought to 
collect signatures in a shopping centre which served as the local town centre. This had 
been built by a public entity on public land but was then sold to a private company. The 
owner of the shopping centre refused permission to the applicants, leaving them with 
little effective access to locals (though on one occasion a sympathetic shop owner 
allowed them to set up a stand). The resulting claim in Appleby was both direct and 
indirect. The direct claim was that the state was responsible for the denial of freedom of 
expression in that it had transferred a public space into private ownership without 
securing the rights of the public to use the space for communication – by entering into 
an agreement with the new owner, for example. The indirect claim was that the state had 
failed in a positive obligation to secure the exercise of freedom of expression within the 
shopping centre. According to the applicants, therefore: “[a]ccess to the town centre was 
                                                 
119
 Para. 46. 
120
 Para. 47. 
121
 Para. 77. 
122
 Para. 78. 
123
 App. no. 44306/98, judgment of 6 May 2003. 
226 
 
essential for the exercise of those rights as it was the most effective way of 




In rejecting this claim, the Court refused to accept the invitation of the applicants to 
follow case law from the United States and to designate the shopping centre as a “quasi-
public” space in which freedom of expression rights could be asserted. While accepting 
the general principle that a positive obligation could be asserted against the state in 
relation to freedom of expression, it held that the property rights of the owner were also 
in play and declined to create a right of entry to private property for this purpose unless 
it could be said that a bar on access to property “had the effect of preventing any 
effective exercise of freedom of expression” or “the essence of the right has been 
destroyed” – giving the US example of Marsh v. Alabama as involving a “corporate 
town where the entire municipality is controlled by a private body”.
125
 Here, however, 
the Court found that the other channels still available to the applicants meant that they 
had not been “effectively prevented from communicating their views to their fellow 




While Appleby is the most important decision for our assessment of the IWF, a number 
of more recent decisions must also be mentioned which show an increasing willingness 
on the part of the Court to impose positive obligations on member states in relation to 
freedom of expression. 
 
In the 2008 decision Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, the Court considered 
the right of an apartment dweller to use an indoor satellite dish as an aspect of the right 
to receive information. While this case concerned a private law dispute between tenant 
and landlord regarding the terms of a tenancy agreement prohibiting satellite dishes, the 
Court held that Article 10 was implicated where, as here, a judicial decision had the 
effect of preventing a person from receiving transmissions. The Court relied also on the 
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fact that the applicants had no other means open to them to receive the transmissions in 
question (news from their native Iraq), holding that the availability of newspapers and 




Shortly afterwards in the 2009 decision of Manole v. Moldova
128
 the Court considered 
complaints of censorship in a state-owned monopoly broadcaster and held that the 
failure to put in place laws preventing censorship of journalists in that broadcaster 
constituted an infringement of their rights under Article 10. According to the Court: 
 
a positive obligation arises under Article 10. The State, as the ultimate guarantor of pluralism, 
must ensure, through its law and practice, that the public has access through television and radio 
to impartial and accurate information and a range of opinion and comment, reflecting inter alia 
the diversity of political outlook within the country and that journalists and other professionals 
working in the audiovisual media are not prevented from imparting this information and 
comment. Where the State decides to create a public broadcasting system, the domestic law and 




This decision, as with Tierfabriken before it, reflects particular concern on the part of the 
Court in relation to dominance over the media. While Manole relates specifically to a 
state-owned broadcaster the Court noted that its reasoning applied equally whether 
censorship is public or private, stating that if “a powerful economic or political group in 
a society is permitted to obtain a position of dominance over the audiovisual media and 
thereby exercise pressure on broadcasters and eventually curtail their editorial freedom” 
this would similarly undermine Article 10.
130
 The reference to the State as the ultimate 
guarantor of pluralism is of particular importance in this context as it signals that 
legislation may be required to ensure that a plurality of views are represented in the 
media even though this might restrict the rights of media owners. 
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Most recently, the 2010 decision in Saliyev v. Russia
131
 has further examined the 
interaction between property rights and freedom of expression. In this case the applicant 
had written a newspaper article for a Russian municipal newspaper which alleged 
corruption in the takeover of an energy company. Shortly after publication the 
newspaper then withdrew and destroyed all remaining copies. According to the editor 
(who resigned over the incident) this was due to the fact that certain “untouchable” 
politicians were named in the article and exerted pressure to have the edition withdrawn. 
 
In finding that an infringement under Article 10 had taken place, the Court considered 
the extent to which a “right of access” to the press could be said to exist as a positive 
obligation, balancing ownership rights and editorial considerations. The Court reiterated 
its earlier rulings that there is no general right of access to the media
132
 so that “privately 
owned newspapers must be free to exercise editorial discretion in deciding whether to 
publish articles, comments and letters submitted by private individuals or even by their 
own staff reporters and journalists” and the “State’s obligation to ensure the individual’s 
freedom of expression does not give private citizens or organisations an unfettered right 
of access to the media in order to put forward opinions”.
133
 The approach may be 
different “where the press is, de jure or de facto, in the hands of a monopoly, especially 
a Government monopoly” where an obligation to provide a pluralistic service may 
arise.
134
 However, in the absence of monopoly power the newspaper could properly take 
into account wider editorial considerations: 
 
Even if a newspaper is created to provide a public service it may have its own editorial policy and 
must not necessarily be neutral in its views. The choice of the material that goes into a 
newspaper, the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper and the 
treatment of public issues and public officials – whether fair or unfair – constitute the exercise of 
editorial control and judgment. Therefore, if the editor-in-chief had refused to accept the 
applicant's article when it was submitted for publication, the Court would analyse this situation 
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The Court therefore held that an infringement would not have taken place if the editor 
had refused the article when it was submitted for publication as the newspaper in 
question did not have a monopoly over the printed press in the region and was subject to 
effective competition. However, once the article had been published this was no longer a 
case of “right of access” and instead became a direct interference with the applicant’s 




(iii) Applying positive obligations to ISPs 
 
Despite the growing case law in this area, no decision of the Court of Human Rights 
deals specifically with the issue of positive obligations to safeguard freedom of 
expression online. Nor has any clear position been taken by the other Council of Europe 
institutions. The risks of filtering by private entities have been highlighted by the 
Committee of Ministers – notably in the 2008 Recommendation on Respect for Freedom 
of Expression and Internet Filters
137
 and the 2010 Declaration on Network Neutrality.
138
 
In those documents the Committee of Ministers has urged states to implement 
safeguards in relation to private filtering, but in each case it has stopped short of 





Turning to the surprisingly sparse literature, there is no agreement as to whether or how 
the Court might develop a positive obligation to protect speech against ISP interferences. 
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At most, there is a consensus that the decision in Appleby will be central to such an 
assessment – but considerable disagreement as to how it should be applied. 
 
The most detailed case against positive obligations is made by Sluijs who examines the 
issue in the wider context of net neutrality. His claim is that Appleby shows a judicial 
concern for property rights which makes it very unlikely that states would be obliged to 
regulate private ISP filtering. He asserts that the Appelby reasoning – by referring to 
“destroying the essence” of the right under Article 10 – would justify intervention only 
if “an ISP blocks all expression on its network” so that it “shut[s] down its operations in 
a way that no Internet use would be possible”.
140
 As a result he predicts that “a majority 
of network management practices by European ISPs will escape the scope of Article 10 
altogether”.
141
 Sluijs also suggests that ISP network management should itself be 
regarded as protected expression (relying on the decision in Autronic v. Switzerland
142
 
confirming that Article 10 applies to the means of transmission as well as the content) 
though conceding that in most cases this will be a relatively “low level”
143





In the case of the Cleanfeed system, however, there are a number of features which 
mean that Appleby is not an entirely apt authority and Sluijs’ comments would often be 
inapplicable. In the first place, it should be noted that Sluijs is writing in the context of 
network neutrality generally and focuses on the case of unilateral action by an individual 
provider. A system such as Cleanfeed – which involves state-prompted concerted action 
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which results in a near universal effect on the population – would raise more significant 
issues for Article 10 and would be more likely to trigger the plurality concerns which the 
ECtHR has identified in cases such as Tierfabriken. The individual may be able to vote 
with their feet to avoid traffic management by individual ISPs – however, this market 
response is unavailable in the Cleanfeed system. The situation here is closer to that in 
Manole v. Moldova where the Court has held that in the case of monopoly or dominant 
media power the state must intervene so as to guarantee a pluralistic service.
145
 Laidlaw 
therefore argues that once a site is blacklisted by the IWF “the censorship is absolute, 
destroying entirely the essence of the right [with] no alternative options available”.
146
 
This point is strengthened when we recall that the IWF URL list is also used by search 
engines such as Google so that a decision to block may prevent a user from learning that 
a page even exists. 
 
Secondly, the relevance of Appleby is weaker than it might at first glance appear. It is 
notable that the Court in Appleby relied on the proprietary rather than expressive rights 
of the centre owner in justifying the exclusion of the applicants. This reflects the fact, 
highlighted by van Hoboken, that the Court has not recognised a general Article 10 right 
not to transmit or facilitate speech.
147
 In Saliyev v. Russia, for example, the Court 
stressed that the limited nature of the right of access to the press is based largely on the 
right of newspapers to exercise their own editorial policy and judgment.
148
 In the case of 
ISPs – who are overwhelmingly passive carriers of content created by others which they 
do not select – there is no equivalent countervailing right. Indeed van Hoboken makes a 
strong argument that such a right on the part of ISPs would be incompatible with the 
principle of end-user autonomy which has been developed by the Council of Europe in 
the Recommendation on Respect for Freedom of Expression and Internet Filters and the 
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Declaration on Network Neutrality.
149
 Consequently, he argues that the nature of the 
balancing exercise involved must focus on any harm to property rights
150
 – something 
which will be more difficult to show in the context of an ISP than a land owner. It is 
easy to see that a land owner will suffer a significant limitation of their rights by being 
forced to facilitate certain uses of their property – it is less easy to see how a network 
operator could be prejudiced in their proprietary rights by being required to allow users 




In any event, even if ISPs do enjoy expressive rights under Article 10 as regards the 
blocking of content it will be very difficult for them to argue that this is a strong factor 
against the existence of a positive obligation when they have long portrayed themselves 




Third, the balancing test applied in Appleby relied heavily on the alternatives available 
to the applicants and noted that their argument was in essence that they were entitled to 
use “the easiest and most effective method” even though “[i]t also remained open to 
them to campaign in the old town centre and to employ alternative means, such as 
calling door-to-door or seeking exposure in the local press, radio and television”.
153
 This 
aspect of Appleby is in tension with the Court’s rulings in the field of audiovisual media 
and in both Tierfabriken and Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden the Court has 
not accepted arguments that there is no violation of Article 10 where other channels of 
communication remained open. Instead, the Court has relied on the particular 
effectiveness and reach of certain types of media to hold that they lack adequate 
substitutes – which would suggest that internet communications should also be regarded 
as not having effective substitutes. 
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Taking these factors together, it is likely that the Court would find a positive obligation 
to protect freedom of expression online against private action in the particular context of 
the Cleanfeed system where quasi-private action has resulted in one body having the 
ability to make blocking decisions with near-universal coverage of the UK population. 
Again, however, this would be only a partial response to criticisms of the system. 
Significant hurdles would face a litigant who sought to assert a positive obligation in this 
context. Most fundamentally, there would be no cause of action under the Human Rights 
Act. The essence of any claim would have to be that the state had failed to provide a 
legislative framework which protected Article 10 rights against private actions by ISPs. 
Such a claim would, however, be barred by section 6(6) of the Human Rights Act which 
ensures that the failure to make primary legislation shall not be the basis for an action 
under the Act.
154
 Consequently, while the existence of a positive obligation might 
inform any other causes of action open to a victim of blocking it would not itself give 
rise to any basis for a domestic claim.
155
 A claim based on a failure to legislate would 




We began this chapter by noting the literature which suggested that the Cleanfeed 
system was questionable in that, inter alia, it avoided judicial review and the application 
of fundamental rights. Our survey of the law has considered these claims in detail and 
demonstrated that they are only partially true: the mechanisms of judicial review and an 
action under section 6 of the Human Rights Act are open to those who suffer harm as a 
result of the operation of Cleanfeed, and it is likely that there is a positive obligation on 
the part of the state to ensure that Cleanfeed is compatible with the requirements of 
Article 10 ECHR. 
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However, to say that the law can examine Cleanfeed is not the same as saying that it can 
do so effectively. We have identified the structural limitations of judicial review and 
Human Rights Act claims as well as the narrow effect of the positive obligation under 
Article 10 and we see that in each case the remedies which might be available are 
restricted in their scope. This point will be developed further in chapter 7 where it will 
be argued that the specific rights which might be asserted against blocking systems will 
do little to ensure good governance in their operation. 
 
There is therefore considerable merit to the argument that the IWF and the Cleanfeed 
system should be brought within public governance norms by legislation.
156
 An analogy 
might be drawn with ACPO which has been the subject of similar controversy – having 
extensive policing functions while being a private company limited by guarantee, and 
enjoying a powerful yet largely non-statutory position within policing in the UK as a 
whole.
157
 Despite this anomalous position ACPO has been brought within a number of 
public law norms – being the subject of judicial review in its operation of the “National 
Domestic Extremism Database”
158
 and made amenable to the Freedom of Information 
Act in 2011
159
 – and it might be argued that the IWF could be treated similarly. 
 
Against that, it should be stressed that neither the positive obligation of the state under 
Article 10 nor wider concerns about blocking demand that the entire operation of the 
IWF should be put on a statutory basis or that the IWF should become a conventional 
public body. Indeed, were this to be done it might very well be counter-productive. We 
have seen in chapters 4 and 5 that the self-regulatory nature of the IWF has both helped 
to stave off function creep and has delivered a level of transparency which significantly 
exceeds that of the Home Office on the same issue, despite the latter being subject to the 
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Freedom of Information Act. We have argued that these outcomes are largely due to a 
need to secure industry support – a factor which would be lost if the IWF were to be 
established on a statutory basis. Instead, alternative means of ensuring good governance 
should be considered. Korff and Brown, for example, suggest that exemptions from 
intermediary liability might be made conditional on ISP adherence to principles such as 
transparency and fair procedures.
160
 An approach of this sort, coupled with the existing 
possibility of judicial review, could deliver significant improvements without the risks 
associated with establishing a statutory filtering system. 
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In the last chapter we considered whether the operation of the Cleanfeed system could 
be regarded as subject to public law for the purposes of applying fundamental rights 
standards. In this chapter we move on from that threshold question to address the 
substantive points which it raises regarding the ability of public law to regulate blocking. 
What standards should apply to internet blocking? To what extent are these already 
recognised in fundamental rights norms? Would the Cleanfeed system as currently 
administered meet those standards? 
 
We do so first by surveying the literature which attempts to set standards for the use of 
internet blocking, considering both academic commentary and recommendations from 
international bodies. We then turn to English law to consider the ways in which 
domestic law regulates the use of internet blocking in other contexts. Finally we apply 
the European Convention on Human Rights to the Cleanfeed system to see to what 
extent it already embodies standards capable of governing internet blocking and whether 
the Cleanfeed system would comply with those standards. 
 
It should be noted at the outset that this chapter is necessarily selective. In particular, 
only the European Convention on Human Rights will be considered. While other 
fundamental rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights are also relevant, the ECHR is the only one which has been transposed into 
English law and is therefore the most appropriate instrument to consider.
1
 Similarly, the 
focus is on the most significant ECHR rights: freedom of expression under Article 10 
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and to a lesser extent the right to a fair trial under Article 6. While the right to a private 
life under Article 8 is also implicated by some forms of blocking (as discussed in chapter 
2 in relation to data protection) this issue does not appear to arise under the Cleanfeed 
system as currently implemented and therefore will not be considered. Similarly, issues 
under Article 13 ECHR regarding the right to an effective remedy will be mentioned 
only in passing. 
 
2. Identifying standards by which to assess internet blocking 
 
(i) The case for new standards 
 
In view of the fact that legislation concerning the Internet, which has to be seen against a 
background of rapidly changing new technologies, is particularly dynamic and fragmented, it is 
difficult to identify common standards based on a comparison of the legal situation in Council of 
Europe member States. 




The quotation above from the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Yildirim notes that internet blocking presents new problems and that there is no 
consensus as to how it should be evaluated. That decision turned on one particular aspect 
of filtering – the extent to which it may result in false positives or overblocking of 
legitimate material – but it exemplifies the wider structural issues which were 
considered in chapters 4 and 5. Many of these factors, such as inherent opacity and the 
technological choices embedded in filtering, are individually problematic and would 
merit special attention in any event – but when taken together the challenges they 
present multiply. 
 
Reflecting this, there is a growing literature which recognises the difficulties presented 
by filtering and sets out to develop standards to assess it – standards which, if not 
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entirely new, must at least flesh out more general human rights norms.
3
 In this section 
we review that literature with a view to identifying the questions we should ask when 
assessing the fundamental rights compliance of filtering systems. 
 
(ii) Procedural approaches 
 
There is a wide consensus that procedural guarantees are central to legitimising 
blocking. This reflects the experience that filtering tends to be a particularly arbitrary 
and opaque process, so that even in democratic countries “censorship decisions are often 
made by private entities and without public discussion, and appeals processes may be 
onerous, little known, or non-existent”.
4
 Consequently it is not surprising that most 
commentators see procedural safeguards as the greatest area of concern. 
 
Typical of the procedural proponents is Nunziato, who argues for the international 
export of the due process values associated with the First Amendment.
5
 She suggests 
that a focus on procedure avoids the contentious substantive question as to what should 
be blocked by each country and leaves open the possibility of reaching international 
consensus as to how blocking should take place. She identifies three criteria to be met 
for a filtering system to be acceptable: transparency and appealability of the initial 
decision to block certain material (including notice to the affected parties); limits on the 
discretion as to what should be blocked; and prompt judicial review in an adversary 
proceeding before any final decision to block is implemented.
6
 Subject to these criteria, 
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 See e.g. Derek Bambauer, ‘Cybersieves’, Duke Law Journal 59, no. 3 (2009): 477; Derek E. Bambauer, 
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4
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5
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6
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she claims that filtering should be regarded as a desirable tool to ensure that state 
restrictions on content do not have an illegitimate extraterritorial effect. 
 
A limiting aspect of the Nunziato approach is that it is court-centric – it presupposes that 
procedural safeguards should primarily be enforced through litigation, notwithstanding 
the cost and practical difficulties this is likely to create. By comparison, similar work by 
Bambauer looks to wider mechanisms of control.
7
 In general terms, Bambauer agrees 
that filtering is a desirable governmental tool. His approach is again process focused and 
looks to four criteria: 
 
The first criterion is openness: does the country admit to filtering the Internet and describe clearly 
its rationale for blocking?... 
 
The Framework’s second prong is transparency: is a country clear about what material is filtered, 
and is it specific about the criteria that determine blocking?... 
 
The third criterion is narrowness: how closely does empirical data about what a country actually 
blocks match the government’s description of its censorship?... 
 
The Framework’s fourth criterion is accountability: to what degree can citizens influence 
policymaking on what is censored? What measures or structures push officials to respond to 





As compared with Nunziato, his criteria are significantly more helpful in that they 
consider a broader set of factors which might constrain filtering – rather than simply 
looking to the courts, for example, Bambauer also asks to what extent filtering bodies 
might be subject to other democratic constraints and also considers the way in which 




                                                 
7
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In addition, Bambauer also engages with the question of how these general criteria 
might be turned into concrete legal requirements. In a detailed piece he has set out five 




First, Bambauer argues that standing to seek filtering orders should be limited to the US 
Attorney General, as a means of ensuring that filtering is limited to the most serious 




Second, he seeks procedural protections to include notice before the fact in all cases, for 
both the points of contact for the relevant web pages and also the domain owner, with at 
least 90 days’ notice being given before blocking takes effect. He also includes periodic 
review within these procedural protections, so that a filtering order should automatically 
expire after at most one year unless it is shown still to be necessary. To minimise the 
administrative burden on the state, he suggests that the focus of filtering orders should 
be on the content itself rather than on location – so that “if a site hosts child pornography 
images at one location, and faces a filtering order, the government should be able to 
readily obtain a modified order, without the procedural requirements listed above, if the 




The third requirement is one of heightened proof, requiring “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the targeted content is illegal – a standard which should apply to each 
individual page or URL that the government seeks to censor, and a higher standard than 
the “preponderance of evidence” approach otherwise used in domain forfeiture cases. 
 
Fourth, Bambauer points to the risks of overblocking and would require that any 
filtering order be limited to the blocking of full URLs only – ruling out the use of DNS 
or IP address based filtering systems. He would also require that ISPs display block 
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pages – ideally including a link to the blocking order itself, but at a minimum explaining 




Finally, Bambauer would require public funding to reimburse the costs incurred by ISPs 
in establishing and running blocking systems – with a view to forcing the state to 




Taken together, Bambauer argues that embedding these requirements in law would 
legitimate filtering and argues that this type of “hard censorship” (legally mandated 
censorship) is normatively preferable to existing types of “soft censorship” (by which he 
means “voluntary” censorship implemented in response to state pressure). In essence, his 
argument is that this type of filtering is already happening and therefore should be 
regularised by being put on a proper and more restrictive legal footing. There is some 
force to this point, but it is also remarkably optimistic in its implicit assumption that a 
new system would substitute for, rather than simply add to existing filtering.  
 
While there is considerable value in the procedural safeguards which Nunziato and 
Bambauer propose, a wider problem with their work is that by focusing narrowly on 
procedure they address only the initial implementation of filtering systems to the 
exclusion of second-order effects. Both, for example, neglect the knock on effect which 
normalising filtering might have and the likelihood of function creep once systems have 
been established. They might reply that their proposals – by placing existing “voluntary” 
filtering on a formal legal basis – are nevertheless preferable to the status quo. This may 
well be true at the outset but (as Cleanfeed illustrates) the need to persuade ISPs to 
participate can help to keep filtering practices in check. Where a legal basis is 
established and the need for persuasion removed that restraining factor disappears.
15
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 In the same way, formalising filtering might lead to technologies which allow circumvention – such as 




(iii) Assessing proportionality 
 
A key criticism of procedural approaches is that they may obscure the threshold question 
as to whether blocking is a proportionate response to a particular problem. By 
comparison, Reidenberg offers a wider framework for considering “technological 
enforcement instruments” of all kinds.
16
 He suggests that those instruments (such as 
filtering, but also including other tactics such as “electronic sanctions” in the form of 
denial of service attacks targeting overseas hosts) should be assessed according to the 
legal authority justifying their use, their intrusiveness, and four further criteria. The 
relevant passage is worth quoting in full: 
 
Like other police powers of the state, legal authority is a pre-requisite for the exercise of coercive 
powers. Each mechanism implicates important civil, political and sovereign rights. As a threshold 
matter, states must have a legal process in place to authorize the use and choice of technological 
enforcement tools. For the choice to use a technological instrument or to deploy a specific type of 
instrument, the basic principle guiding these decisions should be that a state only use the least 
intrusive means to accomplish the rule enforcement. 
 
Four factors must be considered to determine whether and how to use technologies for rule 
enforcement. First, a state must weigh the magnitude of any threat to public order. If a threat is 
significant, a state may be justified in taking more drastic measures, such as an electronic 
blockade. Second, the urgency of any threat is significant. If continuing rule violations pose 
imminent danger to a state’s public order, a state will have a stronger justification to use more 
serious measures, such as electronic sanctions. Third, a state must evaluate the effectiveness of 
the tool. If a tool will not be effective against the rule violation, then the collateral implications 
may outweigh any justificatory use. Last, a state must consider the ultimate enforcement goal. If 
the state seeks the cessation of offending activity, the technological enforcement tool may be 




Here Reidenberg – although generally an advocate of filtering – makes the important 
point that the initial decision to use filtering must first be justified as a proportionate and 
effective response to a particular problem. A system which is either disproportionate or 
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ineffective cannot be legitimised by being adopted democratically and administered in a 
procedurally fair manner. 
 
(iv) International norms 
 
Turning away from the academic literature we now consider the standards which 
international organisations have proposed to guide national implementations of filtering 
systems. 
 
(a) International Telecommunications Union 
 
The first set of standards comes from a perhaps surprising source – the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). While the ITU is not known for advocacy of freedom 
of expression, it has for some time been involved in promoting filtering as an online 
child protection measure and in 2009 issued guidelines on the implementation of child 
abuse material filtering.
18
 In these it expresses concern that filtering systems will be 
ineffective if they lose public support and recommends that the basis on which blacklists 
are adopted must be clearly set out so that there should be no room for suspicion of 
government manipulation. It goes on to say that: 
 
It is important that the list of known sites and Usenet News groups is tested frequently, updated 
and verified to ensure accuracy. The list should not be cumulative; rather, a multi-layered 
retesting procedure will help to ensure public confidence in the operation of the list. It is also 
important to ensure that guidelines on list criteria be transparent. Some countries utilize an 
independent means of auditing the performance and operation of the list. Lastly, a mechanism 
should exist to allow for an appeal against inclusion on the list. The only sites on the list should 
be those which allow the publishing or display of content which is illegal according to the 
national laws of the country concerned. When a site is blocked, a STOP page should be displayed 
to the user. This STOP page has the dual function of giving information as to the reason the site 
was blocked (illegality of content) plus acting as a prevention vehicle that reminds the 
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These guidelines might be taken as a starting point for filtering systems, though they 
remain quite basic in some ways – for example, by assuming that blocking should take 
place at the level of the site rather than on a per-page basis, and by failing to specify that 
there should be a legal basis for the filtering system, audits and appeals. That caveat 
aside, the majority of these standards are already met by the Cleanfeed system as a 
whole with the notable exception of the stop page which is merely recommended – not 




(b) Global Network Initiative 
 
The Global Network Initiative (GNI) is a multi-stakeholder group of internet companies, 
civil society organisations, academics and investors which has, since its launch in 2008, 
worked on safeguarding freedom of expression and personal privacy against state 
actions.
21
 The participation of Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! and Facebook on the industry 
side along with groups such as Human Rights Watch, the Center for Democracy and 
Technology and the Berkman Center for Internet and Society gives it credibility, though 
it remains hampered by the fact that other internet firms such as Twitter remain outside. 
Recommendations from the GNI nevertheless have the potential to be significant – 
where implemented by participating companies they can have a substantial effect on the 
practice of censorship without any need for domestic legislative action. 
 
The GNI represents a self-regulatory response by industry which seeks to promote 
accountability and legitimacy. It sets out to do this by adopting a general set of 
principles
22
 supplemented by detailed implementation guidelines.
23
 Although the general 
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principles are somewhat vague, they are fleshed out considerably by the implementation 
guidelines which amongst other things provide that: 
 
When required to restrict communications or remove content, participating companies will: 
 
 Require that governments follow established domestic legal processes when they are 
seeking to restrict freedom of expression. 
 Interpret government restrictions and demands so as to minimize the negative effect on 
freedom of expression. 
 Interpret the governmental authority’s jurisdiction so as to minimize the negative effect 
on to freedom of expression… 
 Request clear written communications from the government that explain the legal basis 
for government restrictions to freedom of expression, including the name of the 
requesting government entity and the name, title and signature of the authorized 
official… 
 Challenge the government in domestic courts or seek the assistance of relevant 
government authorities, international human rights bodies or non-governmental 
organizations when faced with a government restriction that appears inconsistent with 
domestic law or procedures or international human rights laws and standards on freedom 
of expression… 
 
Participating companies will seek to operate in a transparent manner when required by 
government to remove content or otherwise limit access to information and ideas. To achieve 
this, participating companies will, unless prohibited by law: 
 
 Clearly disclose to users the generally applicable laws and policies which require the 
participating company to remove or limit access to content or restrict communications. 
 Disclose to users in a clear manner the company’s policies and procedures for 
responding to government demands to remove or limit access to content or restrict 
communications. 
 Give clear, prominent and timely notice to users when access to specific content has 
been removed or blocked by the participating company or when communications have 
been limited by the participating company due to government restrictions. Notice should 
include the reason for the action and state on whose authority the action was taken. 
 
These detailed provisions, to the extent that they are followed by participating 
companies and others influenced by the GNI, can substantially enhance oversight of 
filtering systems. By requiring clear legal authority before filtering will be implemented 
they have the potential to reduce the informal demands and pressures which 
governments may otherwise use. The commitment to notifying users of how filtering 
demands are treated and to indicate where content has been blocked is particularly 
important, both for its own sake and as an instrumental measure which will permit users 




One notable limitation of the GNI for our purposes is the way in which it focuses on 
direct state action and sees “voluntary” measures as outside its remit. Nevertheless, there 
is some indication that the transparency engendered by the GNI will carry over to these 
restrictions also. For example, although Google does not regard its participation in the 
IWF as falling within the scope of the GNI (treating it as a voluntary act on its part 
rather than a governmental requirement) it applies similar standards of transparency to 





(c) Council of Europe 
 
The Council of Europe has been active in developing standards regarding fundamental 
rights online and, as we have already seen, has moved from an uncritical promotion of 
self-regulation
25
 towards an approach which is more sceptical of the risks which it poses 
to freedom of expression.
26
 It has also specifically addressed the case of filtering and has 
consistently taken the view that general filtering (as distinct from filtering what children 
can see) threatens rights under Article 10 ECHR and should be used only in limited 
circumstances and subject to careful controls. The 2003 Declaration on Freedom of 
Communication on the Internet first set out this position, providing that: 
 
Public authorities should not, through general blocking or filtering measures, deny access by the 
public to information and other communication on the Internet, regardless of frontiers. This does 
not prevent the installation of filters for the protection of minors, in particular in places accessible 
to them, such as schools or libraries. 
 
Provided that the safeguards of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are respected, measures may be taken to enforce the 
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removal of clearly identifiable Internet content or, alternatively, the blockage of access to it, if the 




Since then, this principle has been substantially expanded on in the 2008 
Recommendation on Measures to Promote Respect for Freedom of Expression and 
Information with regard to Internet Filters which provides one of the most 




The starting point is awareness of internet filters, which is described as a key factor to 
enable users to exercise their fundamental rights. In particular, therefore, the 
Recommendation requires that users must be “informed that a filter is active and, where 
appropriate, be able to identify and to control the level of filtering… Moreover, they 
should have the possibility to challenge the blocking or filtering of content and to seek 
clarifications and remedies”. The Recommendation then sets out eleven general 
principles for all types of filters: 
 
In co-operation with the private sector and civil society, member states should ensure that users 
are made aware of activated filters and, where appropriate, are able to activate and deactivate 
them and be assisted in varying the level of filtering in operation, in particular by: 
 
(i) developing and promoting a minimum level of information for users to enable them to 
identify when filtering has been activated and to understand how, and according to which criteria, 
the filtering operates (for example, black lists, white lists, keyword blocking, content rating, etc., 
or combinations thereof); 
 
(ii) developing minimum levels of and standards for the information provided to the user to 
explain why a specific type of content has been filtered; 
 
(iii) regularly reviewing and updating filters in order to improve their effectiveness, 
proportionality and legitimacy in relation to their intended purpose; 
 
(iv) providing clear and concise information and guidance regarding the manual overriding 
of an activated filter, namely whom to contact when it appears that content has been 
unreasonably blocked and the reasons which may allow a filter to be overridden for a specific 
type of content or Uniform Resource Locator (URL); 
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(v) ensuring that content filtered by mistake or error can be accessed without undue 
difficulty and within a reasonable time; 
 
(vi) promoting initiatives to raise awareness of the social and ethical responsibilities of those 
actors who design, use and monitor filters with particular regard to the right to freedom of 
expression and information and to the right to private life, as well as to the active participation in 
public life and democratic processes; 
 
(vii) raising awareness of the potential limitations to freedom of expression and information 
and the right to private life resulting from the use of filters and of the need to ensure 
proportionality of such limitations; 
 
(viii) facilitating an exchange of experiences and best practices with regard to the design, use 
and monitoring of filters; 
 
(ix) encouraging the provision of training courses for network administrators, parents, 
educators and other people using and monitoring filters; 
 
(x) promoting and co-operating with existing initiatives to foster responsible use of filters in 
compliance with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; 
 
(xi) fostering filtering standards and benchmarks to help users choose and best control 
filters. 
 
Of these, points (vi) to (xi) might be regarded as aspirational but points (i) to (v) are 
quite concrete recommendations of particular importance – as the Wikipedia experience 
shows, problems with blocking can lie as much in the detailed implementation of a 
system as the fact of its existence. 
 
The Recommendation goes on to specifically address the use of internet filters by the 
state and establishes seven additional requirements: 
 
In this context, member states should: 
 
(i) refrain from filtering Internet content in electronic communications networks operated 
by public actors for reasons other than those laid down in Article 10, paragraph 2, of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights; 
 
(ii) guarantee that nationwide general blocking or filtering measures are only introduced by 
the state if the conditions of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Human 
Rights are fulfilled. Such action by the state should only be taken if the filtering concerns specific 
and clearly identifiable content, a competent national authority has taken a decision on its 
illegality and the decision can be reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal or regulatory 





(iii) introduce, where appropriate and necessary, provisions under national law for the 
prevention of intentional abuse of filters to restrict citizens’ access to lawful content; 
 
(iv) ensure that all filters are assessed both before and during their implementation to ensure 
that the effects of the filtering are proportionate to the purpose of the restriction and thus 
necessary in a democratic society, in order to avoid unreasonable blocking of content; 
 
(v) provide for effective and readily accessible means of recourse and remedy, including 
suspension of filters, in cases where users and/or authors of content claim that content has been 
blocked unreasonably; 
 
(vi) avoid the universal and general blocking of offensive or harmful content for users who 
are not part of the group which a filter has been activated to protect, and of illegal content for 
users who justifiably demonstrate a legitimate interest or need to access such content under 
exceptional circumstances, particularly for research purposes; 
 
(vii) ensure that the right to private life and secrecy of correspondence is respected when 
using and applying filters and that personal data logged, recorded and processed via filters are 
only used for legitimate and non-commercial purposes. 
 
In this regard the Recommendation sets particularly high standards for the use of filters 
by member states. In particular, it makes it clear that the use of general filtering will be a 
restriction on the right of freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR and will 
therefore require both justification under Article 10(2) and compliance with Article 6 in 
relation to the decision to block (by a “competent national authority” – not a private 
entity) and availability of review by an independent body. At points (iii) and (v) the 
Recommendation raises issues often overlooked in the context of filtering, by asking 
member states to introduce measures to prevent deliberate abuse of filters and to provide 
for “recourse and remedy” in relation to wrongful blocking. 
 
Significantly, in relation to remedies the Recommendation specifies that this should 
“include” suspension of filters – suggesting that there should be not merely an appeal 
mechanism but also provision for compensation in the event of harm suffered by those 
who are wrongfully blocked. This reflects the right to an effective remedy under Article 
13 ECHR which requires that pecuniary damages should in principle be available for an 
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(d) United Nations Human Rights Council 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue, in 2011 reported 
to the UN Human Rights Council on the application to the internet of Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
30
 This report found that the “unique 
and transformative nature” of the internet provided an unparalleled opportunity to 
promote the right to freedom of opinion and expression, but expressed concern as to the 
way in which states are restricting information online without any legal basis and 
delegating censorship to private entities.
31
 In relation to filtering, La Rue was “deeply 
concerned that mechanisms used to regulate and censor information on the Internet are 
increasingly sophisticated, with multi-layered controls that are often hidden from the 
public”.
32
 He went on to note that state use of filtering is often in violation of Article 19 
where it is not established in law, is carried out without transparency and without “the 
intervention of or possibility for review by a judicial or independent body”. 
Consequently he recommended that, at a minimum, states should: 
 
 Provide lists of blocked websites and full details regarding the necessity for 
blocking each individual site; 
 Provide for stop pages notifying users of each affected site; and 
 Ensure that “[a]ny determination on what content should be blocked must be 
undertaken by a competent judicial authority or a body which is independent of 




La Rue also went on to consider blocking of child pornography specifically, noting that 
it is “one clear exception where blocking measures are justified” subject to the 
requirements that “national law is sufficiently precise and there are sufficient safeguards 
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against abuse or misuse to prevent any ‘mission creep’, including oversight and review 
by an independent and impartial tribunal or regulatory body”.
34
 He also endorsed the 
work of the Global Network Initiative, and similarly stressed that although states are the 
“primary duty-bearers of human rights”, corporations “also have a responsibility to 
respect human rights” which requires that they should “only implement restrictions… 
after judicial intervention; be transparent to the user involved about measures taken… 




(v) Domestic legislation 
 
Other sources of standards which might be applied to the Cleanfeed system are the few 
domestic laws which specifically address prior restraint of speech and filtering of 
internet content. The relevant provisions – section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
section 17 of the Digital Economy Act 2010, and section 97A of the Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 1988 – provide us with comparators and evidence as to the safeguards 




(a) Human Rights Act 1998, section 12 
 
The first comparator is section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This was introduced 
in response to media fears during the passage of the Human Rights Bill that it might 
make the courts too willing to grant injunctions restraining publication of stories alleged 
                                                 
34
 Ibid., para. 71. 
35
 Ibid., para. 76. 
36
 Excluded from this comparison is section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006. This does confer a specific 
legislative authority on police to request removal of online material deemed to contravene that Act. 
However, unlike the other provisions mentioned it applies only to material hosted in the UK, does not 
create a filtering power, does not create a binding obligation on ISPs to remove material, and to date has 
never been used with police policy being to rely on informal requests instead. See Chris Williams, 
‘Terrorism Chiefs Don’t Know What They’ve Censored Online’, The Register, 12 November 2009, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/11/12/west_terror/; Home Office, ‘Response to Freedom of 
Information Act Request Re Implementation of Terrorism Act 2006 to Internet Activity’, 




to infringe the right to privacy and reflects a historic presumption
37
 in English law 
against prior restraints and for subsequent litigation or prosecution as the preferred 




It therefore sets a high threshold which must be met before either interlocutory or final 
relief can be granted and provides: 
 
(1) This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if 
granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression. 
(2) If the person against whom the application for relief is made (“the respondent”) is 
neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is 
satisfied— 
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or 
(b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified. 
(3) No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is 
satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed. 
(4) The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to 
freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the 
respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic 
material (or to conduct connected with such material), to— 
(a) the extent to which— 
(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or 
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be 
published; 
(b) any relevant privacy code. 
(5) In this section— 
“court” includes a tribunal; and 
“relief” includes any remedy or order (other than in criminal proceedings). 
 
Although adopted in response to media concerns, the section is of general application 
and applies to all situations before a court or tribunal where “a relief, if granted, might 
affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression”. It is clear from the 
decision of the ECtHR in Yildirim that a filtering order is to be regarded as affecting the 
exercise of the right to freedom of expression under Article 10, and consequently section 
12 will be implicated in any proceedings which seek filtering as a remedy. In such cases 
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subsection (2) sets out what is in effect a right to be notified, providing that no relief 
shall be granted without all practicable steps being taken to notify the respondent unless 
there are “compelling reasons” why this should not happen. Subsection (3) disapplies the 
ordinary American Cyanamid rules regarding interlocutory relief and provides that no 
such relief shall be granted unless the applicant meets the more stringent test that it is 
likely to succeed at trial.
39
 Subsection (4) then establishes a further protection by 
requiring the court to have regard to the Convention right to freedom of expression and 
(in relation to journalistic, literary or artistic material) also to the extent to which the 
material has been available to the public and whether it would be in the public interest 
for the material to be published. 
 
We see therefore that the IWF can in effect exercise a power of prior restraint in a way 
which would be denied to the courts as a result of section 12. While we argue in chapter 
6 that the IWF should be considered as being subject to the Human Rights Act, even 
treated as a public authority it would nevertheless not fall within the definition of 
“court” or “tribunal” within section 12 and would not be bound by it.
40
 This gives the 
striking result that the IWF in making decisions on filtering will escape the norms – such 
as notification and a presumption against prior restraint – which were considered so 
important by Parliament that they were given special protection as against the courts. 
This highlights an important limitation of section 12, which arguably should apply 
whenever a “public authority” and not merely a “court or tribunal” is empowered to 
grant relief. More generally, however, it also flags a point which recurs throughout this 
thesis – the blocking powers of the IWF have developed in an ad hoc way which does 
not reflect the standards which Parliament has considered appropriate in other contexts. 
 
The Wikipedia block in 2008 illustrates the practical consequences of this exclusion. In 
that case, the album cover which was blocked by the IWF was a type of “artistic 
material”. Consequently, had the blocking of the album cover been before a court then 
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under subsection (4)(a)(i) one of the factors which the court would be required to 
consider would be “the extent to which the material has, or is about to, become available 
to the public”. Given that the album in question had been and continued to be widely 
available, it is difficult to imagine that a court in applying this factor would be inclined 
to make an order blocking distribution of the image. In much the same way, section 12 
prevents restraint of publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant 
is “likely to establish” that publication should not be allowed – a standard which is on 




Section 12 is an important provision which, if followed, would demand changes to the 
practices of the IWF. That said, section 12 was not adopted with filtering in mind and its 
effects should not be overstated. In particular, the only person entitled to notification 
under section 12(2) is “the person against whom the application for relief is made”. In 
the case of filtering, this would be the ISP rather than the domain owners or owner of the 
site to be blocked – leaving them without any notice or opportunity to be heard. 
Consequently, even full compliance with section 12 would not ensure fair procedures for 
those most affected by blocking. 
 
(b) Digital Economy Act 2010, section 17 
 
The only English legislation which specifically addresses the question of internet 
filtering is the Digital Economy Act 2010, making it an especially apt comparator – and 
one which also tends to cast doubt on the operation of the Cleanfeed system. The 2010 
Act owes its genesis to lobbying from the movie and music industries demanding 
measures to tackle filesharing. The Labour government responded by including this 
issue within a review by Lord Stephen Carter of the wider “digital economy”. The 
resulting 2009 Digital Britain Report put forward a number of proposals largely 
reflecting these industry demands.
42
 These formed the nucleus of the Digital Economy 
Bill 2009 which the Labour government then controversially rushed through the wash-
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up procedure in the dying days of its term. The 2010 Act therefore provides for a 
number of measures which may be implemented by the Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport up to and including disconnection of subscribers and blocking of 




Blocking is regulated by section 17 of the Act which allows the Secretary of State to 
make regulations providing for “the granting by a court of a blocking injunction in 
respect of a location on the internet which the court is satisfied has been, is being or is 
likely to be used for or in connection with an activity that infringes copyright”.
44
 A 
blocking injunction is defined to mean “an injunction that requires a service provider to 




Before the Secretary of State can bring this power into effect he or she must first be 
satisfied that (a) online copyright infringement is having a serious adverse effect on 
businesses or consumers, (b) making the regulations is a proportionate way to address 
that effect, and (c) making the regulations would not prejudice national security or the 
prevention or detection of crime. The draft regulations must also be approved by each 
House of Parliament.
46
 In addition, the section is prescriptive about the content of any 
regulations which might be made. Amongst other things, the regulations must: 
 
 Require that notice be given to the operator of the location (the person having 
editorial control over material at the location).
47
 
 Limit blocking injunctions to situations where a “substantial amount of material” 
infringing copyright is involved.
48
. 
 Provide that the court must take account of: 
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o Any steps taken by the service provider or operator to prevent 
infringement; 
o Any steps taken by the copyright owner to facilitate lawful access to the 
material; 
o Any representations made by a Minister; 
o Whether the injunction would be likely to have a disproportionate effect 
on any person's legitimate interests (which would include considerations 
of overblocking and other collateral damage); and 
o The importance of freedom of expression.49 
 
This power to implement site blocking was, along with the rest of the Digital Economy 
Act, the subject of intense criticism when it was adopted. Opposition to the Act brought 
together civil liberties groups, ISPs and consumer rights advocates alike.
50
 While the 
main focus of the opposition was the possibility of “technical measures” being taken 
against subscribers alleged to have infringed copyright, the site blocking provisions were 
also identified as both impractical and a threat to fundamental rights.
51
 This continued 
opposition proved influential with the incoming coalition government and in February 
2011 the new Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt asked Ofcom to assess whether the 
blocking power under section 17 “could work in practice”.
52
 In an important report in 
May 2011, Ofcom concluded that it would not – with a key finding being that “[f]or all 
blocking methods circumvention by site operators and internet users is technically 
possible and would be relatively straightforward by determined users”.
53
 Since that 
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report the coalition has stated that it will not implement section 17 and that it intends to 
repeal the site blocking provisions of the Digital Economy Act – though, as we shall see, 
a separate jurisdiction to block websites on copyright grounds has been developed by the 




While section 17 of the 2010 Act is now a dead letter, the safeguards which it included 
are still important as indicators of legislative intention regarding the control of filtering 
in the only legislation to date to explicitly deal with the issue. It is therefore significant 
that the Cleanfeed system would not meet any of those safeguards. In particular, 
Cleanfeed was adopted following informal pressure from the Home Office without any 
formal Parliamentary input while section 17 requires a prior finding of proportionality 
and Parliamentary approval of the draft regulations. Similarly, the blocking power which 
the 2010 Act would vest in a court is in the case of the IWF vested in a private body. 
The criteria which must be included in any regulations under section 17 are also absent 
in the case of Cleanfeed – notably the requirements that a website owner must be 
notified and that risks of overblocking and other collateral damage must be taken into 
account by the court before a blocking order is made. 
 
(c) Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, section 97A 
 
One of the reasons for the demise of the blocking provisions in the Digital Economy Act 
was that, by the time it had passed, copyright plaintiffs had already found a new vehicle 
for their ambitions in section 97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This 
section (inserted in 2003 to implement the Copyright in the Information Society 
Directive
55
) provides that: 
 
The High Court… shall have power to grant an injunction against a service provider, where that 
service provider has actual knowledge of another person using their service to infringe copyright. 
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Although this section does not explicitly refer to filtering, it has been interpreted in a 
series of cases to apply to internet access providers and to confer on the High Court the 
power to make blocking orders cutting off access to particular websites.
56
 Crucially, it 
contains no safeguards or guidance as to how this power should be exercised so that 
(unlike section 17 of the Digital Economy Act) the development of any controls has 






The first case to apply this jurisdiction was Twentieth Century Fox v. British 
Telecommunications
58
 – better known as Newzbin2. In this case the plaintiffs chose BT 
as a defendant precisely because of its use of the Cleanfeed system, arguing that BT 
could add the Newzbin2 site (previously found to be infringing) to its blocking list 
without any great technical difficulty or cost. Arnold J. accepted their arguments that a 
blocking injunction could be imposed on BT under s.97A, relying in large part on a 
finding that the cost of implementing blocking using the existing system would be 
“modest and proportionate”. The court rejected arguments that a blocking injunction 
would amount to a general monitoring obligation contrary to article 15 of the E-
Commerce Directive and held that it would be “prescribed by law” notwithstanding the 
general terms of section 97A and complete lack of guidance in that section. The court 
also held that an injunction blocking access to the entire site rather than specific URLs 
was appropriate, holding that any non-infringing uses were de minimis and that the 
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burden on the plaintiffs of notifying specific URLs would be excessive.
59
 Finally, the 
court applied a remarkably low standard regarding the effectiveness of the order and 




In a follow on hearing the court considered the precise form of the order to be granted.
61
 
Significantly, it rejected the argument that the plaintiffs should indemnify BT against 
any claims which might arise from third parties who were the victims of overblocking – 
for example, due to the plaintiffs notifying an innocent IP address or URL to BT in the 
future. Instead, the court held compliance with the order would provide a complete 
defence for BT and in any event BT would not incur liability for overblocking: 
 
It appears unlikely that any subscriber would have a claim against BT for breach of contract 
anyway, for two reasons. First, BT's broadband service terms incorporate its Acceptable Use 
Policy. This states that “You must not infringe the rights of others, including… copyright”. Thus 
a subscriber could not claim against BT for being prevented from accessing Newzbin2 for the 
purpose of obtaining infringing content. Secondly, BT's terms contain a series of limitations and 
exclusions: paragraphs 7 and 8 in clause 1.1.1.24 provide that “we do not guarantee either the 
quality of the service or that the service will be available at all times” and “The quality of the… 
service is dependant on… other conditions or circumstances beyond our control”, and paragraph 
21 in clause 1.1.1.27 provides that “Unless we are negligent, our only responsibility is to pay you 
the rental credit as described in paragraph 19”, which appears to apply only where there is a 
continuous total loss of service that persists for more than three days. 
 
As for third parties who are not subscribers, my conclusion is the same. In any event, I find it 
very difficult to see the basis on which such a third party could have a claim in tort against BT. 
Counsel for BT suggested that a third party might have a claim for interference with contractual 
relations, but he did not explain how an order against BT could result in BT interfering with the 




This is a notably weak treatment of possible liability – it does not, for example, address 
the point that a block page might be defamatory – but is nevertheless important in 
illustrating the difficulties which would be faced by any person claiming to have been 
the victim of overblocking. If ISPs can avoid liability for wrongful blocking due to their 
terms of use or the lack of a contractual relationship with a third party then judicial 
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review of the IWF would appear to be the only remedy available – and overblocking 
which is not directly attributable to the IWF would go entirely uncontrolled. 
 
Developing the Newzbin2 jurisdiction 
 
In some ways the Newzbin2 decision was still very narrow – it granted a blocking order 
against a single site, which had previously been determined to be infringing on a 
wholesale basis following inter partes proceedings and where the non-infringing content 
was found to be de minimis. Two later cases have, however, pushed the blocking 
jurisdiction considerably further – aided by the fact that ISPs have chosen not to resist 
these applications. 
 
The first was Dramatico Entertainment v. British Sky Broadcasting.
63
 This saw the 
music industry seek blocking of The Pirate Bay (“TPB”) torrent site. Unlike Newzbin2, 
however, there had been no prior proceedings against TPB, the operators of TPB were 
neither joined nor served in the blocking proceedings, and the ISPs did not appear and 
were not represented at the initial hearing to determine whether TPB should be blocked. 
Consequently it is disappointing but perhaps not surprising that the High Court (Arnold 
J.) entirely failed to consider the possible rights of TPB and its operators under Article 6 
ECHR in holding that there was no obligation to notify TPB of the proceedings.
64
 A 
later judgment in those proceedings did accept that the court was obliged to consider 
whether a blocking order was proportionate as regards parties not before the court: 
 
where (as here) the terms of the orders have been negotiated between the parties, and those 
parties are professionally represented, then it may be assumed that the orders are proportionate as 
between the parties; but it does not necessarily follow that they are proportionate as between the 
Claimants and users of the Defendants’ services. Accordingly, it is the duty of the Court not 
simply to rubber stamp the terms agreed by the parties, but independently to consider the 
proportionality of the proposed orders from the perspective of individuals affected by them who 
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That obligation to consider proportionality, however, illustrates a fundamental 
inconsistency in the court’s reasoning – how can the court assess the impact on those not 
before the court without affording them an opportunity to be heard? If taken seriously 
this would require – contrary to the earlier ruling – that the affected parties should be 




In 2013 the blocking jurisdiction was extended further again in EMI v. British Sky 
Broadcasting.
67
 In this case the music industry sought blocking orders against three 
different torrent sites – KAT (Kickass Torrents), H33T and Fenopy. As in Dramatico 
Entertainment v. British Sky Broadcasting the court (Arnold J.) held that there was no 
obligation to serve the proceedings on the sites to be blocked.
68
 There was, however, a 
significant difference between the cases. In Dramatico the site to be blocked was The 
Pirate Bay which, as the name suggests, was an avowed proponent of filesharing. There 
was, therefore, no real issue as to whether it was infringing. The three sites at issue in 
EMI v. British Sky Broadcasting, however, purported to respect copyright and to comply 
with take down notices. Consequently it is striking that the court in EMI v. British Sky 
Broadcasting was prepared to make adverse findings of fact on what would have been 
contested issues had the sites been joined as parties – and was prepared to make a 
blocking order in what was in effect an ex parte proceeding.
69
 As before, no 
consideration was given to the possible Article 6 ECHR rights of the sites. 
 
Assessing the section 97A case law 
 
It is not surprising that copyright plaintiffs have not felt the need to push for 
implementation of the blocking provisions in the Digital Economy Act when the section 
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97A case law has already given them everything that they could have hoped for by way 
of blocking, minus the safeguards which the Digital Economy Act regulations would 
have imposed. In effect, therefore, a parallel jurisdiction has been developed by the High 
Court which is now the only filtering power exercised by the English courts. 
 
Despite this, however, it is of relatively little value in assessing the Cleanfeed system. It 
does show a judicial willingness to adopt blocking as a remedy, even if it is capable of 
being circumvented by a majority of users. However, it is focused on the rights of ISPs 
and mandatory rather than voluntary blocking. Consequently there is relatively little 
attention given to issues such as overblocking which affect parties who were not 
represented before the court, with no consideration at all of the fundamental issue of fair 
procedures under Article 6 ECHR. In addition, the finding that the section 97A power is 
“prescribed by law” was made prior to the decision of the ECtHR in Yildirim and will 
have to be revisited in light of that decision. 
 
It should also be noted that these blocking orders present fundamental transparency 
issues. While there are public judgments in the initial cases discussed above, subsequent 
cases have seen blocking orders issued without any written judgment being available.
70
 
The process by which plaintiffs have additional sites blocked under existing orders is 
also opaque. Under the order granted in Newzbin2 (and presumably, though we have no 
way of knowing, in later orders also) the ISP is required to block the site itself and also 
“any other IP address or URL whose sole or predominant purpose is to enable or 
facilitate access to the Newzbin2 website”.
71
 The effect of this is to confer a power on 
the plaintiffs to notify additional IP addresses and URLs to the ISPs to be blocked. This 
is intended to deal with mirrors or alternative URLs adopted solely to circumvent the 
blocking order, but creates a substantial risk that innocent sites will be wrongfully 
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blocked in an invisible process without any prior judicial scrutiny. The Article 6 ECHR 
point is all the more acute in this context. 
 
3. Blocking and the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Having identified standards which might be used to assess filtering systems we now turn 
to ask whether in light of those standards the IWF and the Cleanfeed system as a whole 
can be said to comply with fundamental rights guarantees under the ECHR as 
implemented by the Human Rights Act. 
 
(i) Standard of review: margin of appreciation and judicial deference 
 
Before we look to the substance of the system we should first mention the applicable 
standard of review. It is true that the ECtHR will afford a margin of appreciation to 
national laws in general, with a wider margin regarding questions of freedom of 
expression in the area of morals.
72
 However this is rooted in the notion that the 
requirements of morals vary from place to place so that state authorities are “in principle 
in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of 
those requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to 
meet them”.
73
 This principle is therefore one which applies only in Strasbourg – it does 
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A different question would therefore arise if an English judge were faced with a claim 
against the IWF regarding Cleanfeed: to what extent should judicial deference be given 
to its actions? Following the adoption of the Human Rights Act there has been 
considerable discussion of the appropriate judicial deference to be given either directly 
to Parliament or indirectly to public authorities exercising powers conferred by 
Parliament, reflecting the democratic accountability of these bodies.
75
 In relation to the 
IWF, however, no such deference would be appropriate – although a public authority for 
the purposes of the Human Rights Act it is neither created by nor answerable to 
Parliament and lacks any such democratic accountability. At most one might say that a 
court might attach particular evidential weight to the views of the IWF in areas where it 
has special expertise – but this would fall short of any deference as a matter of principle. 
Consequently the courts in reviewing the acts of the IWF will have to make an 
independent and hard-edged judgment as to whether those acts are compliant with the 
ECHR and the Human Rights Act. 
 
(ii) Article 10 
 
The first obligation to be considered is the right to freedom of expression and 
information under Article 10 which provides that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
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the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
(a) Existence of an interference 
 
Child pornography as expression within Article 10 
 
A preliminary question is whether child pornography constitutes a type of expression 
within Article 10 ECHR or whether – as the US Supreme Court held in New York v. 
Ferber
76
 – child pornography involving actual minors should be viewed as unprotected 
speech. In the first case to consider the issue the ECtHR has recently accepted that the 
possession and distribution of child pornography can amount to an exercise of freedom 
of expression, so that the requirements of Article 10(2) must be met in relation to its 
criminalisation. 
 
In Karttunen v. Finland
77
 the applicant was a Finnish artist who exhibited in a gallery a 
work which included hundreds of sexually explicit photographs of children, downloaded 
from the internet. She argued that she included these images to raise awareness of the 
easy accessibility of child pornography. She was convicted of possessing and 
distributing sexually obscene pictures depicting children (although no sanction was 
imposed on her) with the Finnish courts taking the view that her right to freedom of 
expression was outweighed by the need to protect children against sexual abuse and the 
violation of their privacy. When she brought the matter to the Court in Strasbourg the 
Court accepted that her conviction, even where no penalty was imposed, “constituted an 
interference with her right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10(1) of 
the Convention”.
78
 Nevertheless, the Court went on to rule that her application was 
manifestly ill-founded, holding that the national courts had correctly ruled that the 
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offence was justified by “the need to protect children against sexual abuse as well as 




This holding is significant for our evaluation of the Cleanfeed system in that it precludes 
any argument that child pornography is categorically outside the protections of Article 
10 – instead measures attempting to restrict child pornography must still be assessed 
under Article 10 in the ordinary way. 
 
Filtering as a prior restraint 
 
In Yildirim the ECtHR accepted that the blocking orders imposed by the Turkish judicial 
system, insofar as they were given prior to a full ruling on the merits, constituted a prior 
restraint both in relation to the targeted site and also the others affected by the 
overblocking in that case.
80
 While Article 10 does not of itself preclude prior restraints 
the Court has long accepted that “the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that 
they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court” particularly given the 
perishable nature of news stories and other topical material which might be blocked.
81
 
By analogy, the Cleanfeed system would similarly constitute a prior restraint. Indeed 
this reflects the IWF’s own view that they merely decide on potential illegality on the 




Filtering as an artificial border 
 
It should also be noted that any national filtering system calls for special scrutiny as 
being in “direct conflict” with the wording of Article 10, which guarantees the right to 
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freedom of expression “regardless of frontiers”.
83
 As the Court put in Cox v. Turkey, the 
starting point is that: 
 
Article 10 rights are enshrined “regardless of frontiers” and… no distinction can be drawn 
between the protected freedom of expression of nationals and that of foreigners. This principle 
implies that the Contracting States may only restrict information received from abroad within the 




A tripartite right: speaker, intermediary and user 
 
Another important aspect of Article 10 is that it conceptualises freedom of expression as 
a right involving three parties – encompassing the freedom to speak, the freedom to 
receive information and also the freedom of those who facilitate speech. In an internet 
context this means that intermediaries are also protected by the right, as can be seen 
from the recent decision in Neij and Kolmisoppi v. Sweden.
85
 In that case the applicants 
had been involved in the running of The Pirate Bay file sharing site and were convicted 
of complicity to commit crimes in violation of the Copyright Act. They claimed that 
their convictions amounted to an interference with their Article 10 rights. While their 
claim was ultimately declared ill-founded and inadmissible, the Court did accept their 
preliminary point that Article 10 was implicated by legislation which criminalised their 
actions as intermediaries. 
 
The Court noted first the well established rule that “Article 10 applies not only to the 
content of the information but also to the means of transmission or reception since any 
restriction imposed on the means necessarily interferes with the right to receive and 
impart information”. Consequently, the Court held that Article 10 applied to the 
applicants insofar as they “put in place the means for others to impart and receive 
information” so that any interference with the running of the site would breach Article 
10 unless it met the conditions set out in Article 10(2). 
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This finding means, in the context of Cleanfeed, that we must consider the impact of 
filtering on at least three groups: the users who are prevented from viewing a page, those 
with editorial responsibility for a page, and the intermediaries who host or otherwise 
facilitate access to a page. We could also add a fourth group to this list, consisting of 
other content providers who may suffer collateral damage from a blocking system. 
Given the judgments in Karttunen and Yildirim it is clear that the operation of the 
Cleanfeed system will constitute an interference with the rights of members of all these 
groups, which requires that we consider whether that interference can be justified in 
accordance with the requirements of Article 10(2). 
 
(b) Legitimate aim 
 
Having determined that there is an interference, we next ask whether it serves one of the 
purposes identified in Article 10(2). For the most part this is a straightforward question. 
Certainly the Cleanfeed system can be said to aim at “the prevention of disorder or 
crime” by preventing the further creation and possession of illegal images, “the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others” by preventing children from being 
further victimised by the dissemination of their images and also “the protection of 
morals”
86




This is supported by the decision in Karttunen where the Court accepted the 
criminalisation of CAI as unproblematic without any independent analysis, merely 
deferring to the national court’s findings that the law “was intended to protect morals as 
well as the reputation or rights of others” and was therefore “mainly based on the need 
                                                 
86
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Indeed the recent judgment of the Court in KU v. Finland
89
 strongly suggests that 
prevention of the distribution of CAI is not merely a legitimate aim but would itself be a 
positive obligation on the state. In KU the applicant was a 12 year old child whose 
contact details were posted on a dating site along with a statement suggesting that he 
was seeking older men. As a result he received an email soliciting him. A police 
investigation was launched but was hampered by a lack of any legal basis on which to 
compel the internet service provider to disclose information identifying the person who 
placed the advertisement. Consequently no prosecution was brought, prompting the 
applicant to complain that his rights under Article 8 had been infringed. The Court 
accepted this argument, holding that: 
 
States have a positive obligation inherent in Article 8 of the Convention to criminalise offences 
against the person, including attempted offences, and to reinforce the deterrent effect of 
criminalisation by applying criminal-law provisions in practice through effective investigation 
and prosecution. Where the physical and moral welfare of a child is threatened such injunction 
assumes even greater importance… Children and other vulnerable individuals are entitled to State 
protection, in the form of effective deterrence, from such grave types of interference with 









It should be noted, however, that these approaches presuppose that the material in 
question involves images of actual children. If, for example, the Cleanfeed system were 
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to be extended to cover virtual child pornography such as cartoon images then it would 
not necessarily follow that such a restriction would serve a legitimate aim for the 
purposes of Article 10. We may compare the US Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition
92
 which struck down a provision of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996 dealing with “virtual” child pornography on the basis that it 




(c) Prescribed by law 
 
All restrictions on Convention rights have to be justified by reference to some law. They cannot 
be invented out of thin air or imposed by the authority as a matter of brute executive force. 
 




The next and more difficult question is whether the interference created by the 
Cleanfeed system can be said to be “prescribed by law”. The most well known treatment 
of this concept was given in Sunday Times v. United Kingdom
95
 where the Court held 
that in addition to requiring a legal basis it also imposes requirements regarding the 
quality of the law. First, “the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able 
to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to 
a given case”. Secondly, “a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able – 
if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 




This has been supplemented in Ekin Association v. France
97
 which held that in relation 
to prior restraints “a legal framework is required, ensuring both tight control over the 
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scope of bans and effective judicial review to prevent any abuse of power”.
98
 In that case 
a law which gave the Minister of the Interior a wide-ranging power to ban foreign 
publications by administrative action was held to be contrary to Article 10. Central to 
this finding were the facts that bans took place prior to any hearing while the only 
judicial review available was limited in its scope (rather than considering the merits) and 
was not automatic but required the publisher to apply to the courts.
99
 Consequently, the 
Court took the view that the judicial review procedures in place provided “insufficient 
guarantees against abuse”. 
 
The decision in Ekin Association was applied in Yildirim v. Turkey
100
 in which the 
ECtHR considered for the first time the question of internet filtering. Yildirim challenged 
a decision of a Turkish court which issued an order blocking access to the entirety of the 
Google Sites service in an attempt to prevent access to a single site critical of Atatürk. 
The court had initially issued an order which was limited to the offending website. That 
order was sent to the state Telecommunications and Information Technology Directorate 
(the TİB) for execution. The TİB however lacked the technical capability to block this 
particular site and therefore advised the court that it would be necessary to block all 





The blocking order therefore blocked a vast number of entirely unrelated sites, including 
one belonging to a Turkish PhD student who found himself unable to access his own 
site. He claimed that this measure breached his right to freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas under Article 10. The ECtHR found at the 
outset that this overblocking constituted an interference with his rights notwithstanding 
that the order intended to target a third party site and that it was relatively limited in its 
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 Consequently the Court considered whether the measure could be said to be 
“prescribed by law”. 
 
Under Turkish law, statute provided that the court could order the blocking of access to 
“Internet publications where there are sufficient grounds to suspect that their content is 
such as to amount to... offences”.
103
 The law in turn specified the eight class of offences 
for which such orders could be issued.
104
 However, the ECtHR nevertheless found that 
the blocking in this case was not prescribed by law in that neither the applicant’s site nor 
Google Sites per se fell within the scope of this section, while the law had “no provision 
for a wholesale blocking of access such as that ordered in the present case” and did not 
authorise “the blocking of an entire Internet domain like Google Sites which allows the 
exchange of ideas and information”.
105
 The Court was also critical of the role of the TİB 
as an administrative body in widening the blocking order, noting that “the TİB could 
request the extension of the scope of a blocking order even though no proceedings had 
been brought against the website or domain in question and no real need for wholesale 




The ECtHR then referred to Ekin Association in reiterating the need for “tight control” 
and “effective judicial review” in the case of prior restraints, and found that these 
elements were missing. In relation to judicial review of prior restraints the Court held 
that this required “a weighing-up of the competing interests at stake... designed to strike 
a balance between them” and also “a framework establishing precise and specific rules 
regarding the application of preventive restrictions on freedom of expression”. Both 
were absent here, where national law did not provide for any balancing test and where 
the domestic courts had simply acted on the recommendation of the TİB without 
considering the proportionality of the blocking measure and its collateral impact on 
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internet users. Consequently the Court held that the measure “did not satisfy the 
foreseeability requirement under the Convention and did not afford the applicant the 





This is a judgment of fundamental importance for internet blocking laws generally in its 
treatment of overblocking. The approach of the Turkish authorities was, in effect, to 
assume that a degree of overblocking was implicitly permitted to achieve the blocking 
explicitly authorised by statute. The ECtHR has now entirely rejected that approach. 
While the judgment is not a model of clarity, the key holding appears to be that any 
overblocking must itself be explicitly authorised by a law including safeguards to ensure 
that the extent of the overblocking is both necessary and proportionate. Otherwise, the 
collateral damage caused by a blocking order will not be “prescribed by law”.  
 
Self-regulatory systems as “prescribed by law” 
 
Independent courts of law are the guarantors of justice which have a fundamental role to play in a 
state governed by the rule of law. In the absence of a valid legal basis, the issuing of blocking 
orders and decisions by public or private institutions other than independent courts of law is 
therefore inherently problematic from a human rights perspective. 




Can Cleanfeed – as a self-regulatory system with no statutory underpinning – be said to 
be prescribed by “law”? The leading decision on this issue is Barthold v. Germany
109
 in 
which the applicant was a veterinary surgeon who had been disciplined under rules of 
conduct adopted by a non-state professional body. His claim that these rules did not 
constitute “law” was rejected by the ECtHR, which held that it was sufficient that there 
had been a “parliamentary delegation” to the professional body and that the rules needed 
approval by the state before they took effect. This approach will require formal state 
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involvement in the rule making process before a restriction can be said to be prescribed 
by law. In particular, Barthold appears to set a minimum standard of state delegation of 
rulemaking and involvement in the oversight of rules before these can be said to be 
“law” for the purposes of Article 10(2).
110
 The Cleanfeed system clearly could not meet 
this standard and therefore would not be “prescribed by law” in this sense. 
 
There has been one domestic case applying Barthold – R. v. Advertising Standards 
Authority, ex p. Matthias Rath BV
111
 – which gave it a far less demanding interpretation. 
In that case Turner J. held that a ruling under the Advertising Standards Authority 
(ASA) Code of Practice should be regarded as “prescribed by law”, notwithstanding that 
the ASA was a self-regulatory body established by the industry itself and lacking a 
statutory basis. It was held sufficient that there was indirect recognition for the ASA in 
legislation given the “statutory underpinning” provided by the Control of Misleading 
Advertisements Regulations which recognised the desirability of self-regulatory 
controls.
112
 However, the decision in Matthias Rath would still not permit the Cleanfeed 
system to be regarded as “prescribed by law”. The permissive approach in that case – 
even if a correct application of Barthold – would not be appropriate following the 
decision in Yildirim which specifically requires, in the case of blocking, that there must 
be “a legal framework… ensuring both tight control over the scope of bans and effective 
judicial review to prevent any abuse of power”.
113
 The absence of these factors would 
mean that Cleanfeed would still not be prescribed by law even if we could make the case 
that it was somehow indirectly recognised. 
 
                                                 
110
 See e.g. Hans-Bredow-Institut, Study on Co-Regulation Measures in the Media Sector: Final Report 
(Hamburg: University of Hamburg, 2006), 151, 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/library/studies/coregul/final_rep_en.pdf. 
111
 [2000] EWHC Admin 428. 
112
 SI 1988/915. 
113
 Para. 64. 
275 
 
Contractual terms as a legal basis 
 
Callanan et al. have suggested that ISP terms of use might provide a legal basis for 
filtering systems – subject to the requirements that the user would have to “openly 
consent” to such terms, that the user would have the ability to make a free choice 
whether to accept, and that the legality of the terms would remain subject to review 
under e.g. the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.
114
 This in some ways echoes our 
discussion in chapter 5 regarding the ability of user consent to legitimise a self-
regulatory system, but it is problematic when applied to state involvement. There is no 
support in the caselaw for this proposition, which would treat private law as a substitute 
for the public law basis which the ECtHR requires. It is also inapt in the stage at which it 
applies – if a person freely consents to filtering then it would be more logical to say that 
there is no interference with that person’s right than to say that there is an interference 
which is justified as having a legal basis. In any event, however, it is clear that this 
argument could not apply in the Cleanfeed system where the UK government has 
deliberately acted to deny users such a choice. 
 
Accessibility and predictability 
 
Would the Cleanfeed system meet the requirements established in Sunday Times, Ekin 
Association and Yildirim in relation to the accessibility and precision of the norms 
restricting speech? Some elements of the system might. The criteria used by the IWF in 
determining whether URLs should be added to the CAIC list are public and simply 
mirror the underlying law criminalising CAI.
115
 There is, following the Wikipedia 
incident, an element of discretion where blocking images might create specific risks – 
this is, however, significantly circumscribed and much less open-ended than other 
discretions which have been upheld by the ECtHR.
116
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Despite this, however, the Cleanfeed system as a whole would fail when considered 
against the requirements in Ekin Association and Yildirim that prior restraints are 
permissible only if there is “a legal framework… ensuring both tight control over the 
scope of bans and effective judicial review to prevent any abuse of power”. The absence 
of any judicial involvement, in either the decision to block or the assessment of the 
proportionality of a particular type of block, fails to meet the standards set out in those 
cases. In addition, while the IWF does recommend that blocking take place at the full 
URL level, to the extent that ISPs remain free to block at an IP or DNS level then 
arbitrary overblocking is still likely to take place in the precise manner condemned by 
the ECtHR in Yildirim. 
 
(d) Necessary in a democratic society 
 
The final question to be asked of the Cleanfeed system for the purposes of Article 10(2) 
is whether it can be said to be “necessary in a democratic society”. This involves a 
proportionality test which considers whether there is a “pressing social need”
117
 for the 
interference and whether the interference goes further than is “proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued”.
118
 In particular we must ask whether an outcome could be 
achieved by less restrictive means than those actually used.
119
 In the context of filtering 
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Takedown at source 
 
An important element in favour of the proportionality of the Cleanfeed system is that it 
is confined to material hosted outside the United Kingdom.
121
 This reflects the principle 
that filtering should be limited to those cases where the less restrictive means of 
takedown at source is impossible. Where material is hosted within the UK the 
justification for filtering – that a site is beyond the reach of national authorities – does 
not apply and the ordinary criminal process should take its course. Similarly, moves by 
the IWF towards international takedown are to be welcomed for similar reasons – if 
foreign hosting providers are willing to remove material notified to them then blocking 






We have seen that the Cleanfeed system is prone to underblocking in the sense that it 
will prevent only a small subset of attempts to view CAI, is relatively easily evaded and 
leaves untouched other sources such as peer to peer.
123
 How will this affect our 
assessment of its proportionality under Article 10? 
 
A comparable issue arose in Perrin v. United Kingdom
124
 (“Perrin”) where the applicant 
had been convicted of the offence of publishing an obscene article in the form of a web 
page which depicted “people covered in faeces, coprophilia, coprophagia and men 
involved in fellatio”. Before the Strasbourg court he claimed that this was a 
disproportionate interference with his freedom of expression arguing, amongst other 
things, that similar material was readily available elsewhere on the internet. The Court 
did not accept that the sanction was disproportionate even if the law was largely 
                                                 
121
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ineffective to prevent other comparable websites from being accessible. Instead it held 
that “the fact that the [Obscene Publications] Act may provide only limited protection to 
vulnerable people is no reason why a responsible Government should abandon the 
attempt to protect them”. The Court went on to distinguish the decision in Observer and 
Guardian v. United Kingdom.
125
 In that case (part of the notorious Spycatcher litigation) 
the Court had held that it was disproportionate to continue an injunction against 
newspapers restraining publication of “confidential” material which was readily 
available elsewhere. Here, however, the Court took the view that:  
 
there is a clear difference between what is necessary to preserve the confidentiality of secret 
information, which is compromised after the very first publication of the information and what is 
necessary to protect morals, where harm can be caused at any time at which a person is 
confronted with the material. 
 
While Perrin was an admissibility decision rather than a fully argued and reasoned 
judgment, it is likely that the same approach would be taken in the context of CAI where 
the harm lies in continued distribution as well as the initial publication. Consequently 
the limited effectiveness of the Cleanfeed system would not in and of itself mean that the 






There is as yet no judicial consensus on what degree of overblocking will make a 
restriction disproportionate under Article 10(2) though some standards are slowly 
emerging. In an offline context we can look to comparators such as Ürper and others v. 
Turkey
127
 where the ECtHR held that orders banning the future publication of entire 
periodicals went beyond any restraint which might be necessary in a democratic society 
and therefore amounted to impermissible censorship. By analogy it seems unlikely that 
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filtering systems which block at the level of an entire website or domain would be 
acceptable where there is other, legitimate, content on that site or domain.
128
 This is 
supported by the decision in Yildirim where the Court – without explicitly ruling on the 
point – appeared to take the view that the blocking measure was in any event 
disproportionate on the basis that it “produced arbitrary effects and could not be said to 
have been aimed solely at blocking access to the offending website, since it consisted in 




The European Court of Justice in Scarlet Extended v. SABAM
130
 has taken into account 
the potential that a filtering system “might not distinguish adequately between unlawful 
content and lawful content, with the result that its introduction could lead to the blocking 
of lawful communications” as one factor in deciding that an injunction did not strike a 
fair balance between the right to intellectual property, on the one hand, and the freedom 
to conduct business, the right to protection of personal data and the freedom to receive 
or impart information, on the other.
131
 Unhelpfully, however, it did not elaborate on this 
point or consider what degree of overblocking (if any) might be compatible with the fair 
balance it describes. 
 
At a domestic level, the only authority directly on point is the judgment of Arnold J. in 
Newzbin2 which held that an order requiring blocking of an entire site was 
proportionate, notwithstanding that not all of the content on that site would infringe 
copyright. This decision did not, however, discuss the standards which might apply to 
that assessment other than to say that: “the order would potentially prevent BT 
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subscribers from making use of Newzbin2 for non-infringing uses. On the evidence, 




While these decisions do not establish any definitive standards in relation to 
overblocking they do provide us with some guidance under which the IWF will 
generally perform well. The IWF has led the way in its use of full URLs as the basis for 
the CAIC list – unlike, for example, the EU funded CIRCAMP model which deliberately 
overblocks at the domain name level.
133
 Consequently the system can be granular down 
to the level of the individual image, without needing to block entire pages or sites.
134
 
This will not eliminate overblocking – for example, the content of pages might change 





The difficulty lies not with the IWF CAIC list itself but rather with ISPs’ technical 
implementations which may lead to collateral damage. For example, some ISPs have 
chosen to filter by using DNS or even IP based blocking – which has resulted in the type 
of massive overblocking condemned by the ECtHR in Yildirim.
136
 Will this mean that 
the Cleanfeed system should be regarded as disproportionate? Our analysis in this area is 
complicated by the fact that only the IWF itself will be regarded as a public authority so 
that the private choices ISPs make in implementation are most likely beyond the scope 
of Article 10. As a result it is possible that this overblocking cannot be attributed to the 
                                                 
132
 Twentieth Century Fox v. British Telecommunications [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch) para. 186. 
133
 McIntyre, ‘Child Abuse Images and Cleanfeeds’. 
134
 Though technical mistakes on the part of IWF analysts can still lead to overblocking. See Clayton, 
‘Technical Aspects of the Censoring of Wikipedia’. 
135
 There is a trade-off here. Location based filtering necessarily suffers from the fact that what is at a 
particular location can and does change. It is however computationally less demanding and potentially less 
invasive of privacy than hash value based filtering, which would gain precision at the cost of more 
invasive inspection of user traffic. See the discussion in McIntyre, ‘Child Abuse Images and Cleanfeeds’. 
136
 Lahtinen, ‘Be Unlimited Causes Stir in Effort of Blocking Child Abuse Images’; Joe McNamee, 




state, especially as the IWF recommends against these types of systems.
137
 (Though the 
IWF could – and should – make it a contractual condition of taking the CAIC list that 
licensees would block only at the full URL level.) This highlights a point we 
encountered in chapter 6 – while judicial review of the IWF may address some concerns 
it is at best only a partial means of oversight and in particular cannot deal with issues 
which arise at the ISP level. 
 
(iii) Article 6 
 
While the main issues presented by the Cleanfeed system relate to Article 10 ECHR, 
there is also a significant issue regarding the procedural rights guaranteed by Article 6. 
Is the decision to block a particular website a “determination of… civil rights and 
obligations” of the site operator so as to trigger the entitlement to a “fair and public 
hearing” before “an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”? If so, would 




(a) “Civil rights and obligations” 
 
One of the less satisfactory aspects of the Strasbourg case law is the application of 
Article 6 to non-criminal cases.
139
 The concept of “civil rights and obligations” was 
early on given a restrictive interpretation so as to apply to private law obligations only, 
leaving most public law matters outside its scope.
140
 More recently, however, the trend 
in the jurisprudence of the Court has been to widen the scope of the concept to ensure 
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greater protection for individuals.
141
 Consequently, while there is no authority expressly 
on this point, it is most likely that blocking decisions made by national authorities would 
fall within Article 6 – either on the basis that freedom of expression must be regarded as 
a “civil right”
142
 or else on the basis that the result of a blocking decision is decisive for 
private rights and obligations
143




The Council of Europe Recommendation on Internet Filtering supports this view by 
stating that blocking of content should only take place if “the filtering concerns specific 
and clearly identifiable content, a competent national authority has taken a decision on 
its illegality and the decision can be reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal 




(b) Requirements imposed by Article 6 
 
Given that Article 6 applies to decisions to block content, a significant overhaul of the 
structures and practices of the IWF would be necessary to put in place the legal 
framework which Article 6 requires.
146
 As the IWF stands it cannot be described as 
“established by law” for the purposes of blocking decisions insofar as it has no basis in 
legislation.
147
 It therefore would also lack the other requirements of a tribunal identified 
in Belilos v. Switzerland in relation to “determining matters within its competence on the 
basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner” and 
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“independence, in particular of the executive; impartiality; duration of its members’ 




The absence of any notification – either before or after a decision to block is made – 
would also be incompatible with Article 6 which establishes a right to an adversarial 
trial to include “the opportunity for the parties to a civil or criminal trial to have 
knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed with a view to 
influencing the Court’s decision”.
149
 Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain
150
 illustrates this point, 
finding that there was a breach when the applicants were not allowed to reply to written 
submissions made by counsel for an opposing party on the basis that there was a right 
for one party to have knowledge of and to comment on observations or evidence filed by 
the other party. This will apply a fortiori where one party has not been notified and is 
therefore entirely unaware of the existence of proceedings. Indeed, quite apart from 
Article 6 the failure to provide any notice would almost certainly provide the basis for 
judicial review on traditional procedural grounds.
151
 There is a striking parallel with the 
decision in R. v. Norfolk County Council, ex parte M
152
 in which the High Court held 
that a local authority decision to enter a person’s name on a child abuse register as a 
suspected abuser had been made in breach of natural justice where this was done after a 
one sided investigation and without affording him the opportunity to object or make 
representations. 
 
(c) Judicial review as satisfying Article 6 
 
Might these deficiencies be cured by the possibility of judicial review of the IWF before 
the High Court? It is true that Article 6 does not require that all first instance decision 
                                                 
148
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149
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makers must comply with the requirements of that article.
153
 In the interests of 
“flexibility and efficiency”
154
 the Court has narrowed the requirement of an independent 
tribunal and will allow decisions which affect fundamental rights to be made 
administratively at first instance, provided that there is “subsequent control by a judicial 
body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6(1)”.
155
 The 
case law on this point, however, makes it clear that “full jurisdiction” requires the 
existence of an appeal on the merits: a mere review of legality is insufficient.
156
 
Consequently, judicial review in the restrictive sense in which it exists in English law 
would be unlikely to ensure that the IWF decision making process meets the 






This chapter has demonstrated that from an English perspective the application of 
governance standards and fundamental rights to filtering is an area which is nascent at 
best. It is particularly striking to see how little influence Parliament has had on the 
development of the law in this area. While both section 12 of the Human Rights Act and 
section 17 of the Digital Economy Act reflect parliamentary concern about prior 
restraints of speech, these concerns are not addressed in the two nationwide filtering 
systems which have actually developed – blocking under section 97A and Cleanfeed. 
Indeed it is remarkable that the courts in developing the section 97A jurisprudence have 
chosen to reject safeguards (such as notification) which Parliament considered to be of 
fundamental importance when passing the Digital Economy Act. 
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At an international level there is a substantial degree of consensus as to the norms which 
filtering should meet. The most important of these – accepted by both the Council of 
Europe and the UN Human Rights Committee – is a rejection of private censorship so 
that mandatory filtering should take place only with a legislative basis and only where 
decisions on blocking are made by an independent public body or a judicial body. There 
is then near universal consensus regarding the need for procedural safeguards and in 
particular transparency in blocking (such as the use of block pages) and the need for 
blocking to take place at the level of the item to be blocked only. 
 
Applying these standards to the IWF and Cleanfeed we see that the IWF generally does 
well while the Cleanfeed system as a whole does poorly. In overall terms the IWF meets 
the majority of the procedural and structural safeguards identified (though it lacks an 
adequate appeals process) and in relation to the ECHR falls down primarily due to the 
lack of notification for Article 6 and its lack of a legal basis as required by Article 10. 
The system as a whole, however, suffers due to the fact that ISPs remain free to 
disregard the safeguards recommended by the IWF. In particular, so long as ISPs remain 
free to overblock rather than use full URL blocking then the system as a whole is 
compromised. Consequently, while the blocking of CAI is certainly a legitimate aim, the 
manner in which it is implemented would not meet the requirements of the ECHR. 
 
To what extent then might the rights discussed in this chapter be used to enforce these 
standards against the Cleanfeed system? Here we face the problem that in most cases the 
concerns are structural and not easily addressed by the use of individual rights. There are 
several dimensions to this problem. 
 
First, a standard or recommendation for good governance simply might not have an 
equivalent individual right associated with it. For example, it is hard to see how there 
could be an enforceable individual right to the use of a block page. In fact, 
conceptualising the area in rights terms may be counterproductive – we have already 




Second, even if a particular standard does mirror an individual right (the right to be 
notified, for example) then there is no guarantee that litigation will be an appropriate 
vehicle to secure that right. There will be relatively few cases where the facts are 
favourable to challenge blocking practices. Of those, where a site owner discovers that 
they have been wrongfully blocked then their interest is, understandably, in having the 
site unblocked – not establishing a point of principle for the benefit of some unknown 
person in the future. In addition, the nature of blocking is such that the site owner will 
usually be abroad and thus have little interest in domestic law. Finally, the cost of taking 
an action is likely to be prohibitive. The Wikipedia incident illustrates these points – in 
that instance the blocked entity was well resourced, well versed in the law and 
ideologically committed to freedom of expression. Despite this, however, once the block 




Assuming we can jump these first two hurdles we may still face a third one – given the 
diffuse nature of the Cleanfeed system, there may be no remedy available against the 
entity responsible. If, for example, an ISP is overblocking by using DNS blocking based 
on the IWF list then there is no obvious basis for action against either the IWF (which 
recommends against DNS blocking) or the ISP itself. Even treating the IWF as a public 
entity will not assist with downstream interferences which are the result of the manner of 
implementation by private ISPs. While it might be possible to attribute some of these 
interferences to the state – by arguing that there is a positive obligation to promote 
freedom of expression online – the challenges involved in doing so are greater again. 
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Given these points, the rights discussed in this chapter may well be valuable in 
individual cases but are unlikely to act as a vehicle for any systemic change in the 
Cleanfeed system. It is difficult to disagree with Brown and Korff who have argued in a 
similar context that: 
 
the ECHR as currently applied is insufficient to regulate the actions of private entities involved in 
the day-to-day operation of the Internet. It should not be left to the indirect, haphazard 
application of the doctrine of horizontal effect to secure the rights to communication, expression 
and association of everyone, including political activists, on the Internet vis-à-vis ISPs, search 
engines and blog hosts, for example. In our opinion, the emerging Internet governance principles 
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In this thesis we have assessed the Cleanfeed system and developed the argument that it 
sits at the intersection of three distinct regulatory strategies – regulation by code, 
gatekeeper regulation and self-regulation – which individually and all the more so 
collectively present substantial risks for freedom of expression online. We have seen that 
many of these risks have manifested themselves in the Cleanfeed system as a whole – 
notably a lack of transparency, limited feedback, overblocking, function creep and 
reduced accountability – though at the same time the self-regulatory nature of the system 
has helped to promote transparency and accountability and reduce function creep in the 
IWF itself. We have considered the fundamental rights standards which should apply to 
blocking and have concluded that Cleanfeed would not meet the requirements of the 
ECHR. However, we have also seen that the available public law remedies would be 
insufficient to address these issues so that systemic change is necessary if Cleanfeed is 
to be made ECHR compliant. In this chapter we conclude by considering the 
implications of these findings for possible reform of the Cleanfeed system and for 
filtering in the UK more generally. 
 
2. Proposals for reform 
 
(i) Moving towards co-regulation? 
 
The most common response to criticisms of self-regulation is to argue for more state 
involvement in the regulatory mechanism.
1
 Greater involvement, so the argument runs, 
will legitimate and provide greater transparency to self-regulatory systems as well as 
guarding against abuses of power, while still maintaining the flexibility of self-
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regulation. Lievens et al. have argued for this in the area of online child protection 
provided that five standards are met: 
 
1. A more balanced constitution of co-regulatory bodies with the equal participation of different 
partners (government, industry, and users); 
2. Systems that ensure that co-regulatory bodies are accountable to the government if they act 
outside the scope of their competences; 
3. A clear, unambiguous legal basis; 
4. Easily accessible arrangements regarding the operation of the co-regulatory bodies; and 




In identifying these standards they drew on work by Ofcom, which is under a statutory 
obligation to promote the development of effective forms of self- and co-regulation and 
to that end has developed criteria which it will use in determining whether to transfer 
regulatory responsibilities to a co-regulatory body.
3
 For example, in relation to appeals 
Ofcom advise: 
 
[I]t is desirable for there to be a genuinely independent appeals mechanism that complies with the 
Human Rights Act 1998. Examples of the features of an appeal process which promote 
independence include, appeal arbitrators or panel members drawn from outside the industry and 
appointed on fixed, preferably non-renewable terms, and open, even-handed and transparent 




The current IWF “appeals” process, consisting of a simple referral to a police force, does 




A “Digital Rights Commission”? 
 
The possibility of building in safeguards in this way has an obvious appeal and this 
approach has been developed by Laidlaw who argues for the establishment of a statutory 
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body to regulate the IWF and other internet speech gatekeepers such as search engines.
6
 
Under her proposal a UK “Digital Rights Commission” would have three broad sets of 
functions: 
 
 Education, policy and research; 
 Corporate support – assisting internet companies with internal corporate social 
responsibility codes, policy assessment tools and human rights audits; and 
 Remedial and rule making – dealing with complaints from owners of sites who 




The remedial functions would be a last resort once internal appeals had been exhausted 
and would enable the Commission to make binding decisions regarding complaints of 
wrongful blocking, including the power to fine and to award damages.
8
 The point 
regarding damages in addition to a fine is significant – we have already seen that Peck
9
 
requires that damages should be available for breach of a Convention right if national 
remedies are to meet the requirements of Article 13 ECHR and Laidlaw argues that any 
national scheme which fails to specifically provide for damages would not be compliant. 
 
Laidlaw describes this approach as “meta-regulation” or “the legal regulation of self-
regulation” rather than co-regulation.
10
 This reflects the fact that under her proposal the 
IWF itself would continue to be self-regulatory without any statutory basis. In this, she 
appears to assume that oversight by a Digital Rights Commission would remedy the 
Article 10 issues she identifies in the IWF. However, this would leave open the 
objection that its blocking role would still not be “prescribed by law” as defined by cases 
such as Barthold v. Germany.
11
 Given the fundamental nature of the power exercised by 
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the IWF it would be necessary that the power have an express legal basis. The closest 
precedent might be the way in which Ofcom has delegated certain functions to the 
Authority for Video on Demand (ATVOD). ATVOD has evolved from a self-regulatory 
to a statutory co-regulatory structure as a result of the Audio Visual Media Services 
Directive which requires that video on demand services should be regulated on at least a 





This objection aside, there would be merit to Laidlaw’s proposal. In particular, by 
leaving Cleanfeed as a voluntary system for ISPs it would leave open the possibility of 
ISPs reining in any function creep by declining to implement it. 
 
(ii) Establishing the IWF as a public body? 
 
Edwards would go further and has argued that the IWF should be reconstituted as a full 
public body. In her model the IWF would continue its blacklisting function but on a 
statutory basis with a board comprised of a “majority of legal professional members 
alongside industry and charity representatives and chaired by an independent member of 
the judiciary who could resist [government pressure to expand the blocking list]”.
13
 The 
main advantage would be that this approach would clearly satisfy the requirement that 
blocking should be “prescribed by law” as required by Article 10 ECHR. While it is 
unlikely that the IWF itself could be constituted as an “independent and impartial 
tribunal” under Article 6 ECHR, we have seen that it would be sufficient that there is 
“subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the 
guarantees of Article 6(1)”.
14
 Consequently a framework whereby the IWF makes initial 
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decisions which could then be appealed on the merits to the First Tier Tribunal could in 
principle be compatible with the ECHR. 
 
Edwards’ argument is based in large part on the fear that future governments might 
instruct the IWF to begin blocking additional content and she has identified the IWF as 
being ill-placed to resist such pressure, being lacking in independence and prone to 
function creep.
15
 Ironically, however, the current research suggests that putting the IWF 
on a statutory basis might exacerbate rather than mitigate function creep without 
necessarily providing better governance in return. 
 
We have seen that the self-regulatory structure of the IWF – by demanding industry and 
charity support for any extension – has helped to ensure that no expansion of the 
blocking system has taken place despite frequent political suggestions to this effect.
16
 
Consequently where the expansion of blocking has taken place it has done so outside the 
IWF – most significantly in the form of s.97A blocking orders which we have argued are 
themselves not ECHR compliant.
17
 In the same way, the IWF has demonstrated a level 
of transparency in its activities which far outweighs that of (for example) the Home 
Office in its existing scheme for filtering of “terrorist” websites.
18
 There are a number of 
ways in which self-regulation has provided an alternative accountability mechanism and 
acted as a check on the actions of the state, which might be jeopardised if the IWF were 
to be established as a public body with compulsory powers. 
 
Perhaps the closest comparator is Australia where the Australian Communications and 
Media Authority (ACMA), police and certain regulatory agencies have been given 
statutory powers to order ISP level blocking and the removal of links to content, with 
proposals on the table to extend these powers much further.
19
 Despite the statutory basis 
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for that filtering it has been marred by repeated controversies with complaints that it is 
entirely opaque, has resulted in significant collateral damage (wrongfully blocking 
250,000 sites in one particular instance) and has been extended well beyond its original 
justification.
20
 Most famously, in 2009 ACMA threatened fines of up to $11,000 per day 
for an online forum which posted a link to a blocked anti-abortion website – followed up 
by threats of similar fines for sites which linked to a leaked blacklist on Wikipedia.
21
 
This was followed soon after by a leak of ACMA’s own blacklist which revealed that 
the authority had blocked: 
 
a slew of online poker sites, YouTube links, regular gay and straight porn sites, Wikipedia 
entries, euthanasia sites, websites of fringe religions such as satanic sites, fetish sites, Christian 




In short, therefore, it is clear that public bodies are not in any way immune from 
function creep and we must also consider what might be lost by a move away from self-
regulation or co-regulation. 
 
3. Generalising from Cleanfeed to other forms of filtering 
 
The government is to order broadband companies to block extremist websites and empower a 
specialist unit to identify and report content deemed too dangerous for online publication… 
Ministers are understood to want to follow the model used to crack down on online child abuse. 
The Internet Watch Foundation, which is partly industry-funded, investigates reports of illegal 
child abuse images online; it can then ask service providers to block or take down websites. The 
prime minister, David Cameron, is understood to favour a similar model for terrorist content. A 
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government-funded body, possibly within the counter-terrorism referral unit, will order 
companies including BT, TalkTalk, BSkyB and Virgin Media to block websites, according to 
industry sources. 




The perceived success of the IWF and Cleanfeed has reinforced the commitment of the 
UK to self-regulation online and has led to a fascination on the part of successive 
governments with internet blocking as a regulatory tactic. The system has been cited in 
support of the expansion of mandatory blocking to various other contexts ranging from 
filesharing sites
24




 or promote 
anorexia.
27
 Very often this takes the facile form of simply pointing to Cleanfeed as a 
proof of concept
28
 but even more sophisticated observers have uncritically accepted the 
claim that it is a “breakthrough” to be emulated.
29
 At the time of writing, this has again 
manifested itself in proposals from the Prime Minister’s Extremism Task Force to 
develop a parallel system, modelled on Cleanfeed, which would “work with internet 




Against these claims, this thesis has demonstrated that when analysed in detail the 
Cleanfeed system is much more problematic and does not support the further extension 
of blocking. To begin with, we have seen that policy discussions often fail to 
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differentiate between the (very successful) role of the IWF in dealing with illegal 
material hosted in the UK and its role in providing a blacklist of sites hosted abroad. By 
conflating the two, proponents of blocking are (often unwittingly) using the success of 
the notice and takedown remit to justify expansion of the very different filtering remit.
31
 
When we separate the two, it becomes clear that Cleanfeed is a wider system which 
brings together a variety of actors in addition to the IWF itself. The result is that many of 
the desirable features of the IWF are lost in the operation of the system as a whole. For 
example, while the IWF has shown a strong commitment to transparency the 
implementation of Cleanfeed has until recently been marked by precisely the opposite, 




Claims that Cleanfeed represents a gold standard in the technical implementation of 
blocking are also undermined by this research. While the particular URL blocking 
system pioneered by BT is an improvement on prior techniques we have seen that it is 
still prone to causing significant collateral damage and is still not universally used, with 
some ISPs still using much cruder IP and DNS based approaches.
33
 This may have been 
tolerable so far as blocking was limited to a relatively small number of domains hosting 




This has become particularly evident following the decision in Newzbin2 allowing 
copyright plaintiffs to co-opt ISP blocking systems so that many more domains will be 
blocked and for a longer duration in each case. The first examples of overblocking came 
in August 2013 with the blocking of approximately 200 sites (including the Radio Times 
and Blackburn Rovers FC) resulting from a section 97A blocking order granted to the 
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Premier League against sports streaming site FirstRow.
35
 This was matched at the same 
time by the blocking of copyright news site TorrentFreak under an order intended to 
block access to the filesharing site EZTV.
36
 In each case users and site owners were left 
unaware of the reason for the blocking which took several days to identify and 
eventually remedy. While these high profile mistakes may cause ISPs to take more care 
in the way in which they implement blocking, it is likely that similar overblocking will 
continue unless the courts revisit the scope of the orders being granted under section 
97A. In the meantime, however, cases such as these should give pause to those who 
advocate extending blocking further. 
 
Finally, we have also made the case that child abuse images represent the best case 
scenario for blocking and it is impossible to generalise from this into other areas.
37
 This 
reflects both principle and pragmatism. In principle, blocking of CAI is by far the easiest 
to justify as a proportionate protection of individual rights and the Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression has noted 
that in this regard it is an “exception” which cannot be used to justify wider blocking 
measures: 
 
child pornography is one clear exception where blocking measures can be justified, provided that 
the national law is sufficiently precise and there are effective safeguards against abuse or misuse, 




From a practical perspective, there is near universal agreement on the illegality of such 
material and considerable public support for countermeasures. Such images are more 
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straightforward to identify and the comparatively small number of sites involved makes 
it technologically and administratively more convenient to introduce blocking systems. 
These points do not, however, apply to the other types of content which it has been 
proposed to block, making CAI blocking an entirely inappropriate comparator. 
 
4. Further research 
 
While this thesis has focused on the Cleanfeed system as a particularly useful case study, 
the governance and fundamental rights arguments it develops are of wider significance 
for UK internet governance. We have already seen how the IWF typifies long-standing 
government policy favouring self-regulatory controls for online content and as a result 
there are several comparable systems in the UK which merit further research using the 
approach outlined in this work. 
 
Two current examples stand out in particular. The best known is that of Nominet which 
has suspended thousands of .uk domain names based on mere police accusation of 
involvement in crime, without any legislative basis, court order or indeed even an 
internal policy to govern how it does so.
39
 Similar issues also arise with the Home Office 
which has since November 2008 operated a voluntary scheme to block “terrorist” 
websites.
40
 Under this scheme the Home Office provides a secret list of URLs which it 
deems to be “unlawfully terrorism related” to firms which supply filtering software, who 
in turn incorporate these URLs into their blacklists. There is no notification or appeal 
process against this blacklisting, nor is the user notified that the URL has been blocked 
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at the request of the Home Office. While the reach of this blocking is less than that of 
Cleanfeed (it applies only where filtering software is in use at a local level) it is 
nevertheless significant as it operates to prevent users from reading certain material in 
institutions such as libraries and universities where freedom of expression is of 
particular importance. Both cases – Nominet and the Home Office – exemplify the 
concerns identified in this thesis regarding internet governance and require analysis from 








This research set out to investigate the doctrinal and policy issues which might arise 
from the operation of the Cleanfeed system. It began with a review of the academic 
literature in law and other relevant disciplines (in particular computer science, regulation 
and political science) to identify the work which has already been done on fundamental 
rights and governance in relation to filtering of internet content generally and the 
Cleanfeed system in particular. 
 
Following this review it became apparent that there while there is an extensive literature 
on the technical, legal and governance aspects of internet filtering generally
1
 there had 
been relatively little work done on the operation of the Cleanfeed system or its legal 
implications.
2
 The IWF had been the subject of a number of case studies placing it in a 
wider context of self- and co-regulatory systems.
3
 That work had, however, generally 
focused on the IWF itself. It paid less attention to the other actors in the Cleanfeed 
system – the ISPs which implemented filtering and the various state bodies which either 
encouraged or facilitated this. Consequently there was little material which considered 
either the origins or the operation of the Cleanfeed system in sufficient detail to allow it 




                                                 
1
 For summaries see e.g. Deibert et al., Access Denied; Ronald Deibert et al., eds., Access Controlled: The 
Shaping of Power, Rights and Rule in Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). 
2
 Indeed, the main pieces which do address English law specifically all postdate the start of this research: 
Mac Sithigh, ‘Datafin to Virgin Killer’; Marsden, ‘Internet Co-Regulation and Constitutionalism’; 
Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation, chap. 2; Laidlaw, ‘The Responsibilities of Free Speech Regulators’. 
3
 See in particular Marsden, Simmons, and Cave, Options for and Effectiveness of Internet Self- and Co-
Regulation Inception Report; Marsden et al., Options for and Effectiveness of Internet Self- and Co-
Regulation Phase 1 Report; Cave, Marsden, and Simmons, Options for and Effectiveness of Internet Self- 
and Co-Regulation; Tambini, Leonardi, and Marsden, Codifying Cyberspace. 
4




It was therefore necessary to widen the sources used to gain a full picture of the 
Cleanfeed system. The first port of call was the IWF website which made available all 
board minutes and the majority of internal policy documents from 2000 onwards. This 
was followed by a search of publicly indexed freedom of information requests which 
revealed a number of responses from the Home Office and other departments regarding 
the IWF.
5
 The evolution of government policy was also assessed using a search of 
government publications, Hansard and mainstream media for references to the IWF and 
filtering during the relevant period. Given the background provided by these sources, the 
implementation of the Cleanfeed system was then traced using specialist industry 
publications, publicly archived mailing lists and other sources such as the LINX Public 
Affairs bulletin. These proved useful in providing contemporaneous evidence as to how 
the system was perceived by those in industry at the time. They also proved useful in 
providing greater clarity on a number of points which were either glossed over or simply 
misunderstood by the mainstream media. 
 
These records were then supplemented by a series of interviews with individuals who 
were either key participants in the adoption and development of Cleanfeed or were 
otherwise experts in the area of online child protection and internet filtering. These were 
chosen with a view to filling in the information already identified as absent from the 
literature and offering a representative sample of the views of the various stakeholders. 
Interviews were carried out over the period from July 2009 to October 2010 on a semi-
structured basis with the following: 
 
 John Carr, IWF Board Member, 1997-2004, member of the Executive Board of 
the UK Council for Child Internet Safety, 2008 onwards; 
                                                 
5
 E.g. Home Office, ‘Response to Freedom of Information Act Request Re Internet Watch Foundation 
Audits’, 10 March 2009, 
http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/internet_watch_foundation_audits#incoming-20085; Home 
Office, ‘Response to Freedom of Information Request Re the Relationship between the IWF and the Home 




 Cormac Callanan, CEO of INHOPE (International Association of Internet 
Hotlines), 2003-2007; 
 Richard Clayton, Senior Research Assistant in the Computer Laboratory of the 
University of Cambridge, 2006 onwards, Technical Advisor, Demon Internet, 
1995-2000; 
 Don Colcolough, Director, Investigations & Law Enforcement Affairs AOL, 
2002-2006, Director, Cyber Security AOL, 2006-2013; 
 Andrew Cormack, Chief Regulatory Advisor to JANET(UK), 2002 onwards, 
Chair IWF Funding Council 2009 onwards; 
 Roger Darlington, IWF Chairman 2000-2005; 
 Malcolm Hutty, IWF Board Member 2000-2002, LINX Regulation Officer 2003-
2005, LINX Head of Public Affairs 2006 onwards; 
 Stuart Hyde, Deputy Chief Constable of Cumbria Constabulary, 2009-2012, 
Chief Constable of Cumbria Constabulary, 2012 onwards, former ACPO 
spokesman on e-Crime prevention and President of the Society for the Policing 
of Cyberspace; 
 Nicholas Lansman, Secretary General of the Internet Service Providers’ 
Association (ISPA), 1995 onwards; 
 Michael Moran, detective sergeant on secondment to Interpol, specialising in 
online child sexual exploitation, 2006 onwards; 
 Roland Perry, Public Affairs Officer at RIPE NCC, 2005-2010, IWF Board 
Member, 2001-2003 and Director of Public Policy at the London Internet 
Exchange (LINX), 1999-2003; 
 Peter Robbins, Chief Executive IWF, 2002-2011; 
 Peter Sommer, Visiting Fellow/Professor at the London School of Economics 
Information Systems Integrity Group, 1994 onwards; 




In addition, one other individual closely familiar with the development of Cleanfeed was 
interviewed on a confidential basis and declined to be identified given what they 




This research involves the use of views attributed to interviewees by name unless they 
express a preference to speak in confidence, in which case their identities will not be 
revealed and their views will be used for background only. Research ethics approval was 
granted by the School of Law on 3 March 2009 subject to interviewees giving informed 




(i) “Child pornography” or “child abuse images”? 
 
Please note that “child pornography”, “child porn” and “kiddie porn” are not acceptable terms. 
The use of such language acts to legitimise images which are not pornography, rather, they are 
permanent records of children being sexually abused and as such should be referred to as child 
sexual abuse images. 




In recent years children’s groups have sought to eliminate the use of the term “child 
pornography”, arguing that it trivialises the abuse suffered by children and tends to lead 
to confusion with legitimate adult pornography. The law, however, has not kept up and 
references to “child pornography” are still common in legislation, case law and other 
materials – particularly earlier material relevant to this work. This thesis generally uses 
the terms child abuse images (CAI) or child abuse material (CAM) with “child 
pornography” being used mostly for consistency with the older terminology in particular 
contexts. 
 
                                                 
6
 Internet Watch Foundation, ‘About Us’, 2013, http://www.iwf.org.uk/about-iwf. 
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(ii)  “Cleanfeed” as a generic term 
 
When BT implemented server level filtering in 2004 “Cleanfeed” was used as an 
internal project name, not as a public title.
7
 Despite this, the term stuck as a description 
of the BT scheme
8
 and, soon after, as a term for similar filtering by UK ISPs.
9
 It has also 





 In doing so, the term has also widened in meaning – from 
initially describing the filtering technology used by BT to now describing the wider 
system by which blocking takes place – including, for example, the designation of sites 
to be blocked and the possibility of appeal against such blocks.
12
 Consistent with this 
usage, Cleanfeed will be used throughout this work as convenient shorthand for the 




For most consumers the term internet service provider or ISP denotes their broadband 
provider. It would be more accurate to describe these as internet access providers, 
reflecting the fact that the term ISP is wide enough to include a variety of internet 
services such as search engines, DNS provision, hosting, content aggregation, and so on. 
Nevertheless, in the context of filtering the term ISP is most commonly used to denote a 
consumer level connectivity provider and it will be used in that way in this work.
13
 
                                                 
7
 “Cleanfeed” is a registered trade mark of the THUS group of companies and is used by them to describe 
voluntary filtering at an end-user level. 
8
 Hunter, ‘BT’s Bold Pioneering Child Porn Block Wins Plaudits amid Internet Censorship Concerns’. 
9
 Edwards, ‘From Child Porn to China, in One Cleanfeed’. 
10
 Derek Bambauer, ‘Filtering in Oz: Australia’s Foray into Internet Censorship’, December 2008, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319466. 
11
 Jane Bailey, ‘Confronting Collective Harm: Technology’s Transformative Impact on Child 
Pornography’, University of New Brunswick Law Journal 56 (2007): 65. 
12
 See e.g. the usage in Wikipedia: ‘Cleanfeed (content Blocking System)’, Wikipedia, 15 June 2013, 
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13
 See e.g. Eneman, ‘Internet Service Provider (ISP) Filtering of Child-Abusive Material’; Sophie Stalla-
Bourdillon, ‘Chilling ISPs... When Private Regulators Act without Adequate Public Framework’, 
Computer Law & Security Review 26 (2010): 290; Paul Ohm, ‘The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP 
Surveillance’, University of Illinois Law Review, 2009; Kleinschmidt, ‘An International Comparison of 




(iv) “Filtering” or “blocking”? 
 
In some contexts – particularly in the United States – the terms “filtering” and 
“blocking” have been given distinct meanings, with filtering being used to describe 
voluntary end-user systems while blocking describes systems which are imposed – 
usually at network level – without the consent of the user.
14
 This is a useful distinction 
which highlights the fact that there is a crucial difference between technologies which 
help to empower users in exercising bottom-up control and those which enforce 
censorship on a top-down basis at the behest of the state.
15
 The general practice in the 
European literature, however, is to use the terms interchangeably and that is reflected in 




                                                 
14
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Publishing, 2008). 
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16
 See e.g. Internet Watch Foundation, ‘IWF Facilitation of the Blocking Initiative’; Ian Brown, ‘Internet 
Filtering: Be Careful What You Ask for’, in Freedom and Prejudice: Approaches to Media and Culture, 
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